DPRK-ROK Relations - 1994-2011 - KIM Jong Il
As the 1990s progressed, concern over the North's attempts to develop a nuclear program became a major issue in North-South relations and between North Korea and the United States. The lack of progress on implementation of the Joint Declaration's provision for an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime led to reinstatement of the U.S.-R.O.K. Team Spirit military exercises for 1993. The situation worsened rapidly when North Korea, in January 1993, refused IAEA access to two suspected nuclear waste sites and then announced in March 1993 its intent to withdraw from the NPT. During the next 2 years, the United States held direct talks with the D.P.R.K. that resulted in a series of agreements on nuclear matters, including the 1994 Agreed Framework (which broke down in 2002 when North Korea was discovered to be pursuing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons--see below, Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula).
At his inauguration in February 1998, R.O.K. President Kim Dae-jung enunciated a new policy of engagement with the D.P.R.K., named "the Sunshine Policy." The policy had three fundamental principles: no tolerance for provocations from the North, no intention to absorb the North, and the separation of political cooperation from economic cooperation. Private sector overtures would be based on commercial and humanitarian considerations. The use of government resources would entail reciprocity.
Various events led to the formation of this policy. Kim Dae Jung entered office in 1998 at the height of South Korea’s financial crisis, and after a period of time in which the lessons of German unification had seeped into all of South Korean society. The focus of national attention on extricating South Korea from its economic crisis, in combination with the liberal ideologies long held by the new president, allowed Kim to put forward a new view of inter-Korean relations with relatively little opposition. Kim called for an open-ended engagement of North Korea in which unreciprocated cooperation was acceptable, and indeed expected.
The Sunshine Policy encouraged all countries to engage with the North, in a departure from the position of his predecessor, South Korean president Kim Young-sam, who desired all engagement with the North to be routed through Seoul. This new approach facilitated the North’s normalization of diplomatic relations with a number of European countries, including the United Kingdom and other European Union nations. By seeking to create a modicum of trust and transparency through Seoul’s one-sided generosity, the Sunshine Policy constituted an entirely different stance from the decades of zero-sum diplomatic contention between North and South. The policy also resulted in the establishment of a joint-venture scenic sport and tourism project, at Mount Kumgang, in the North near the DMZ, as well as the reconnection of railroad lines between the two Koreas.
The Sunshine Policy’s culmination was the historic June 2000 summit in which Kim Dae Jung went to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong Il. The joint communiqué from the meeting reaffirmed the principles of peaceful unification and proposed more family reunions. But the most long-lasting impact of the summit was the image of the two leaders embracing, broadcast throughout South Korea. A cathartic moment for many Koreans, this event had the effect of changing South Korean popular views of the North, virtually overnight. Images of a demonized North Korean leader were replaced by an infatuation with him. Views of a North Korean “threat” were lost on much of the younger generation of South Koreans, despite the absence of any amelioration of the military situation on the ground.
In spite of later revelations that the South Korean government made unofficial cash payments to facilitate the June 2000 summit, the Sunshine Policy continued to gain popularity among the younger generation in the South.
Following his inauguration in February 2003, R.O.K. President Roh Moo-hyun (president of South Korea, 2003–8), continued his predecessor's policy of engagement with the North, although he abandoned the name "Sunshine Policy." A wave of demonstrations, which accompanied the electoral victory of Roh in 2002 led some to believe that the younger generation (that is, under age 50) in South Korea has aligned itself more with the fate of North Korea than with the country’s traditional ally, the United States.
In terms of inter-Korean relations, considerable accomplishments were made in the first half of 2004: inter-Korean cooperative projects were smoothly carried out; military cooperation was realized; and an atmosphere conducive to resolving the nuclear issue was created, etc. Up until late July 2004, nine occasions of political/military talks, 13 occasions of economic talks, and three occasions of Red Cross/sports-related talks were held (total of 25 meetings).
After July 2004, however, when members of an organization failed to visit Pyongyang to observe the 10th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's death, and when hundreds of North Korean defectors arrived en masse in South Korea, government-level inter-Korean dialogue governments came to a halt, with North Korea pointing to the abovementioned issues as obstacles to improving inter-Korean relations. Meanwhile, consultations have continued for humanitarian aid for North Korea and the three major economic cooperation projects, including construction of the Gaesong Industrial Complex. Private-level contacts were held intermittently.
Taking advantage of major political events such as the 10th anniversary of the inauguration of the military-first policy, the fifth anniversary of the June 15 Joint Declaration, and the 60th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), during 2005 North Korea was expected to focus on reinforcing the direct rule regime of Kim Jong-il and intensifying internal solidarity.
The R.O.K. and D.P.R.K. held a second inter-Korean summit October 2-4, 2007 in Pyongyang. Following the inauguration of R.O.K. President Lee Myung-bak in February 2008, inter-Korean relations have declined as the D.P.R.K. criticized Lee's policy of seeking greater reciprocity in inter-Korean relations. In the fall of 2009, inter-Korean relations showed some signs of potential improvement following a reunion of separated families and several meetings to discuss joint economic projects and other issues. However, no enduring progress was made.
Inter-Korean relations further deteriorated following the D.P.R.K.’s sinking of the R.O.K. warship Cheonan on March 26, 2010, which killed 46 R.O.K. sailors. Although the D.P.R.K. has continued to deny responsibility for the attack, an objective and scientific investigation found overwhelming evidence that the warship was sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine. On July 9, 2010, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential Statement that condemned the attack on the Cheonan. On November 23, 2010, the D.P.R.K. launched an unprovoked attack against Yeonpyong Island, killing two R.O.K. soldiers and two civilians. The D.P.R.K.’s attack on Yeonpyong Island was a clear violation of the armistice agreement.
The United States supported engagement and North-South dialogue and cooperation. Major joint economic projects have included a tourism development in Mt. Kumgang, the re-establishment of road and rail links across the DMZ, and a joint North-South industrial park near the North Korean city of Kaesong (see further information below in the section on the Economy). Following the sinking of the Cheonan, the R.O.K. severed nearly all economic links with the D.P.R.K., with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC).
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