Cuba - Leadership Dynamics
Cuba is a totalitarian communist state headed by General Raul Castro and a cadre of party loyalists. In 2006 Fidel Castro suffered a health crisis, and temporarily handed over the reigns of power to his younger brother Raul. At that time, it was widely expected that Fidel's death was eminent, that Raul's tenure would be brief, and that revolutionary Cuba would soon disintegrate. By 2013 Fidel remained in the land of the living, Raul's announced intention to remain President through 2018 raised no eyebrows, and there was every indication of a smooth handover of power from the "historical generation" to a much younger successor generation - baby dinosaurs - their thinking is hard line old guard, but they just happen to be younger. The party has continually worked to rejuvenate itself in various ways since its inception.
In 1989, the government instituted a purge of the armed forces and the Ministry of Interior, convicting Army Major General Arnaldo Ochoa, hitherto a national hero, Ministry of Interior Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, and Ministry of Interior Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia on charges of corruption and drug trafficking. The summary executions ofOchoa and three other pro-reform officers inJuly 1989 shocked democratic leaders in Latin America, Spain, and elsewhere. This was one of the most traumatic episodes in the history of the regime, involving the demise of a soldiers' soldier, one of only five heroes of the Republic of Cuba. The trial and execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa was a very serious instance of elite conflict.
The high-profile action against these popular officers inspired rumors that the three had been moved aside because Cuban leader Castro feared their popularity. Ochoa and Antonio de la Guardia were executed. Following the executions, the Army was hugely downsized and the Ministry of Interior was moved under the informal control of Revolutionary Armed Forces chief General Raul Castro, and large numbers of army officers were moved into the Ministry of Interior.
Cuba's political institutions from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s had been marked by very slow rotation of personnel. The circulation of elites accelerated dramatically in the early 1990s and then stabilized somewhat later in the decade. Most members of the party's Political Bureau in place in 2000 had joined the bureau after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In effect, a much younger, more dynamic set of leaders was in place, ready for the regime's future battles for political survival. The armed forces had also changed. In particular, the forces were downsized, a move that reduced the political burden on future governments to do more downsizing.
Fidel officially named Raul as his eventual successor at the fifth party congress in October 1997; a fact not to be understated as it had taken nearly 40 years for Fidel to actually do this. Further, Raul since took on a more prominent role in running the Communist Party. He visited China in November 1997 to acquaint himself with economic changes there and stopped in Rome to organize the Papal visit to Cuba, which occurred in January 1998.
In the late 1990s some Western analysts claimed to have detected three primary political camps in Cuba: Hard liners (Duros) led by Fidel Castro; Centrists (Centristas) headed by Raul Castro, and backed by the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR); and Reformers (Reformistas) who were guided by Vice President of the Council of State and economic czar Carlos Lage (though by 1998 there was some evidence that Lage had moved to the Centrist camp), Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina, and Minister of the Economy Jose Luis Rodriguez. Within a few years the figures identified as Reformers had all been dropped from positions of power.
Roberto Robaina González (born March 18, 1956 in Pinar del Río, Cuba) was the Foreign Minister of Cuba from 1993 until 1999. He was previously the head of the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists). At the end of May 1999, President Fidel Castro replaced Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina with Felipe Perez Roque a close personal aide. Before the appointment, Perez, 34, was a member of the Council of State and the Central Committee of the Communist Party and a deputy in the National Assembly elected at the age of 21. He is regarded as Castro's personal protege, who for several years had been given numerous assignments in domestic and international affairs. Speculation about the motives behind the shift centered on Castro's wish to return to more hard-line or orthodox policy positions. Roberto Robaina was thrown out of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2002.
Minister of the Economy and Planning José Luis Rodríguez was dropped from the Council of State in March 2003 [though he remained Minister for a few years thereafter], and replaced in this key policy-making body by Francisco Soberón, President of the Cuban Central Bank. Earlier in the year, 4 of the 6 vice ministers responding directly to Minister Rodríguez were dismissed. Although the new appointees are younger than their predecessors, there is no reason to expect that their appointment signaled new policy directions. In fact, the new appointees were viewed as being loyal to President Fidel Castro and perhaps less open to reform than their predecessors.
The Cuban government announced 12 major leadership changes 02 March 2009 including the dismissal of Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque and the removal of Vice President Carlos Lage as head of the Cabinet. The sweeping changes followed close on the heels of the naming of three new Vice Presidents (Ramiro Valdes Menendez, Ulises Rosales del Toro, and Jorge Luis Serra), and would seem to give Raul Castro a considerably stronger hand. Vice President Carlos Lage Davila was removed from his position as the Secretary of the Council of Ministers (Chef de Cabinet) and replaced by Brigadier General Jose Amado Ricardo Guerra, the current chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defense.
In virtually identical letters published in the official media on 05 March 2009, former Vice President Carlos Lage and former Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque admitted that they had committed unspecified "errors" for which they assumed full responsibility, and then resigned from their remaining positions. In Lage's case this included his position as Vice President of the Council of State, Deputy in the National Assembly, Member of the Council of State, and member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Political Bureau. Perez Roque resigned from all of the same positions, except for that of Vice President. At the same time, Fernando Remirez de Estenoz, the Communist Party chief of Foreign Relations, was replaced by the deputy chief Jorge Marti Martinez.
The changes may have been part of the process of preparing for the Communist Party congress, announced for later in 2009 but for which no date had been set [in fact, it did not take place until 2011]. As Raul continued to consolidate his power, there was growing evidence that the inner circle of Castro regime was turning further inward. The firing of Foreign Minister Perez Roque removed the most high profile Fidelista from the government. Carlos Lage had gone from being mentioned as a possible successor to Fidel before the February 2008 National Assembly vote to seeing his star flicker out almost completely.
While the changes were extensive in a way that is almost revolutionary in Cuba, they were essentially a conservative move on Raul's part. His focus had always been on trying to boost the economy, and these changes created an economic team that was absolutely loyal and responsive to him. There was no indication that they will be innovative thinkers, but Raul was not looking for innovation. Rather, he wanted obedience and energy of execution in carrying out his orders. The addition of several current and former generals to the most senior levels made the cupola of the Government seem almost like a military junta.
On July 31, 2006, Cuban news media reported an official “proclamation” that Fidel Castro, the long-time chief of state and head of government as president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers, first secretary of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCC, and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR), had undergone emergency intestinal surgery and consequently had transferred power and all of his principal government and party positions provisionally — for the first time in his 47-year rule — to his brother and long-time designated successor, Raúl Castro. Raúl Castro already had been serving equally as long as minister of the FAR, first vice president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers, and second secretary of the PCC’s Political Bureau.
In addition, Fidel Castro transferred his functions as principal coordinator of the National and International Program of Public Health to José Ramón Balaguer Cabrera, a member of the Political Bureau and minister of public health; his functions as principal coordinator of the National and International Education Program to two Political Bureau members, José Ramón Machado Ventura and Esteban Lazo Hernández; and his functions as principal coordinator of the National Program of the Energy Revolution in Cuba to Carlos Lage Dávila, a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Fidel Castro also transferred his personal control of funding for these health, education, and energy programs to a funding committee consisting of Lage Dávila; Francisco Soberón Valdés, minister-president of the Central Bank of Cuba; and Felipe Pérez Roque, minister of foreign relations.
Castro replaced his brother Fidel Castro as chief of state, president of Cuba, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces on February 24, 2008. Fidel CASTRO Ruz was previously President of the Council of State and President of the Council of Ministers, and prime minister from February 1959 until 24 February 1976 when the office was abolished. He had been president since 2 December 1976. The First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministers had been Gen. Raul CASTRO Ruz since 2 December 1976.
The first Communist Party Congress (CPC) since 1997 was held in April 2011, where Raul Castro was officially named first secretary of the Communist Party. He announced that 80-year-old Jose Ramon Machado Ventura would remain second-in-charge and Vice President Ramiro Valdes would remain as number three. The CPC also marked Fidel Castro’s formal resignation from official responsibilities within the party, although he remained an important symbolic figure. The Cuban Government seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.
On 24 February 2013, the so-called "historical generation" began the transition of leadership to a new generation. Jose Ramon Machado Ventura made available to his post as first Vice President, and he himself proposed Miguel Díaz-Canel to occupy it. Raul Castro said this was a step in "defining in shaping the future direction of the country through the gradual and orderly transfer to the new generation..."
With years of practice at secrecy and deception, the regime and its internal workings remains an enigma. But just as many ordinary Cubans have begun to move beyond Fidel in spite of his continued manipulation of events, it appears that many in more privileged positions near the center of power also are beginning to look beyond mere dependence on the benefits that accrue to occupants of those positions.
Cleavages exist along ideological lines and generational lines - specifically the older leaders that fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra in the 1950s versus younger leaders who came of age after the revolution - although these difference were kept in check by Fidel's overpowering presence. The military, the government bureaucracy, and the Party are all led by those with a vested interest in preserving the system and their privileged positions in it. Although deep divisions might exist, there is no evidence that there is a faction oriented toward democracy and free market economics lying below the surface waiting for an opportunity to bring a political opening and capitalism to Cuba.
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