DR Congo - December 2023 Elections
The situation in the DRC is not conducive to a free, fair and credible election in Deember 2023. Under the Tshisekedi regime, political rights and civil liberties in our country have sharply declined as its collapsing ratings on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report and Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrate.
Since taking power after an election that was widely seen as fraudulent by both domestic and international observers, President Felix Tshisekedi has brazenly violated our constitution in a selfish pursuit to once again wrest power away from the Congolese people. He has appointed judges unconstitutionally; handpicked partisan members of the supposedly independent electoral commission (CENI); imposed or otherwise failed to reform unfair electoral laws that are favourable only to him; and declared a “state of siege” – which amounts to martial law – in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, areas known to be opposition strongholds. Meanwhile, CENI has been failing to meet its voter registration responsibilities. In January, the commission said it had managed to enrol only 7 million Congolese voters, from 10 provinces. Then for several months, CENI officials refused to release new figures upon repeated requests made by our coalition. In the past few weeks, CENI has declared that it has enrolled nearly 47 million Congolese out of an estimated 49 million eligible voters. There aren’t many people in the DRC who believe these figures to be credible, not least because of the fact that they were not broken down by electoral district.
The legal system continues to be used to quash dissent. Opposition leaders, as well as critical journalists, artists, and human rights activists, have been slapped with criminal charges or other trumped-up and arbitrary legal actions. This is creating a climate of fear, as documented by numerous international human rights groups – including the Committee to Protect Journalists and Human Rights Watch – and is meant to discourage opposition activity and participation as well as citizens’ access to information in the lead-up to the election.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a centralized constitutional republic. Voters popularly elect the president and the lower house of parliament (National Assembly). Following a two-year delay, presidential, legislative, and provincial elections were held in December 2018. In January 2019, the National Independent Electoral Commission declared Felix Tshisekedi the winner of the 2018 presidential election. The 2018 election was marred by irregularities and criticized by some observers, including the Council of Bishops, a local Roman Catholic church group also referred to as the Episcopal Conference of the Congo that participated in elections observation and conducted a parallel vote tabulation. The Council stated the results did not match those of their observation mission. Nevertheless, the 2019 inauguration of President Tshisekedi was the first peaceful transfer of power in the country’s history.
Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress political party won 32 seats in the National Assembly, whereas the Common Front for Congo coalition, aligned with former President Kabila, won 335 seats of 500 seats total.
Conflict between government military forces and the more than 15 significant and cohesive armed groups continued in the eastern provinces of the country. In response the president announced a state of siege akin to martial law in Ituri and North Kivu Provinces in May 2021, which parliament repeatedly extended and remained in effect as of November. The state of siege transfers powers from civilian to military authorities, provides for increased police powers, extends the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilian criminal offenses, restricts certain rights and fundamental freedoms, and suspends immunity from prosecution for certain elected officials (including national and provincial deputies and senators). Separately, beginning in April the armed rebel group March 23 Movement significantly increased attacks against the country’s forces and in June took over the border town of Bunagana. In December, the UN Group of Experts reported it had evidence the Rwandan Defense Forces supported the March 23 Movement and were conducting operations on Congolese territory.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses or punishment, and unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers by armed groups and the armed forces; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence, including but not limited to domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child, early, and forced marriage, and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic groups or Indigenous peoples; trafficking in persons; and crimes involving violence or threat of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons.
Armed groups continued to commit abuses in the eastern provinces. Additionally, large-scale abuses by the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo, ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo, also known as Allied Democratic Forces, and other groups persisted in parts of North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Abuses included unlawful killings, disappearances, physical abuse and other mistreatment, destruction of government and private property, and gender-based violence, widespread even in areas with no armed conflict, by both government and armed groups. Armed groups also reportedly unlawfully recruited, abducted, and retained child soldiers and subjected children and adults to forced labor. The government took military action against armed groups and investigated and prosecuted some armed group members and the state security forces for human rights abuses. The Burundi Human Rights Initiative and local media reported that members of the Imbonerakure, the Burundian government ruling party youth wing, the Burundian National Defense Force and their local allied Congolese armed groups committed abuses against Congolese civilians between December 2021 and July including unlawful or arbitrary killings, looting, extortion, and forced labor.
There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Military courts had primary responsibility for investigating whether security force killings were justified and for pursuing prosecutions. Although the military justice system convicted some members of state security forces (SSF) responsible for human rights abuses, impunity remained a serious problem. The government maintained joint human rights committees with the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and used available international resources, such as the UN-implemented technical and logistical support program for military prosecutors as well as mobile hearings supported by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) reported that from January to June 2022, 1,156 men, 268 women, and 129 children were victims of extrajudicial executions, the majority occurring in conflict-affected provinces and perpetrated by armed groups.
Marginalized racial and ethnic communities were both perpetrators and victims of arbitrary and unlawful killings. Ongoing conflict with armed groups, tensions concerning land rights, and migration exacerbated long-standing divisions regarding ethnicity . There were reports that the SSF perpetrated, threatened, and condoned violence against marginalized ethnic communities.
There were reports of disappearances attributable to the SSF during the year. Authorities often refused to acknowledge the detention of suspects and sometimes detained suspects in unofficial facilities, including on military bases and in detention facilities operated by the National Intelligence Agency (ANR). The whereabouts of some civil society activists and civilians arrested by the SSF remained unknown for long periods. Despite the president’s promise to grant the United Nations access to all detention facilities, some ANR prisons remained hidden and impossible for independent observers to access. Armed groups abducted numerous persons, generally for forced labor, military service, or sexual slavery. Many of these victims disappeared.
The law criminalizes torture, but there were credible reports the SSF continued to abuse civilians, particularly detainees and prisoners. There were also credible reports that SSF subjected individuals, including minority groups and journalists, to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and rape and sexual violence.
Conditions in most prisons throughout the country were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care. Harsher conditions prevailed in small detention centers run by the ANR, Republican Guard, or other security forces, which often detained prisoners for lengthy pretrial periods without providing them access to family or legal counsel. Central prison facilities were severely overcrowded, with an estimated occupancy rate of 200 percent of capacity; some prisons operated with an estimated occupancy rate more than 500 percent. Ministry of Justice, which oversees prisons, often had insufficient funds to pay for food or medical care for inmates, who instead relied on relatives, NGOs, and church groups to provide them sustenance. Guards, psychologists, and cooks generally did not receive salaries, which led to a variety of buying and selling arrangements. Directors and staff generally operated prisons for profit, selling sleeping arrangements to the highest bidders and requiring payment for family visits. Rape of new male prisoners was considered initiation in one prison.
Security forces regularly held protesters and civil society activists incommunicado and without charge for extended periods. Police sometimes arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without filing charges to extort money from family members or because administrative systems were not well established. A shortage of prosecutors and judges hindered the government’s ability to provide expeditious trials, and judges occasionally refused transfers to remote areas where shortages were most acute because the government could not sufficiently support judges in these areas. The Ministry of Human Rights reported in 2021 that 90 percent of cases lacked magistrates.
There were reports of political prisoners or detainees during the year, consisting primarily of individuals arrested under defamation laws for criticizing the actions of government officials. In late July and early August, several opposition party members and supporters were arrested in Kinshasa on separate charges of defamation, public insult, and spreading false rumors. Officials, particularly in the provinces under the state of siege, commonly used the charges of contempt, defamation, spreading false rumors, and public insult against persons critical of the government.
The press frequently and openly criticized public officials and public policy decisions. Individuals generally could criticize the government, its officials, and other citizens in private without being subject to official reprisals. Public criticism, however, of government officials and corruption sometimes resulted in intimidation, threats, or arrest. Provincial governments also prevented journalists from filming or covering certain protests. Journalists and human rights defenders were regularly targeted by arbitrary arrests. Government officials, particularly in the state of siege provinces North Kivu and Ituri, used charges of contempt, defamation, spreading false rumors and public insult to silence persons critical of the administration, including journalists and human rights defenders.
UNHCR estimated that there were 5.6 million IDPs in the country, more than half of whom were children who had been displaced for longer than 12 months. The government was unable to consistently protect or assist IDPs adequately but generally allowed domestic and international humanitarian organizations to assist. The government was unable to consistently promote IDPs’ safe, voluntary, and dignified return, resettlement, or local integration. The government sometimes closed IDP camps without coordinating with the international humanitarian community. Humanitarian access was difficult in some locations, due to weak civilian authority, insecurity, and poor infrastructure. In many locations IDPs lived in poor conditions without adequate shelter or protection. Intercommunal violence and fighting among armed groups in the east resulted in continued population displacement and increased humanitarian needs for IDPs and host communities. Armed groups also attacked individuals and organizations providing humanitarian assistance.
On 06 May 2022, after nearly two years of interim governors and vice governors ruling in more than half of the country’s provinces, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) held gubernatorial elections in 14 of 26 provinces for governors or vice governors who had been previously dismissed by provincial deputies. Gubernatorial elections are indirect, with only provincial deputies casting votes. The elections were largely peaceful, and the CENI accredited national and international observers, including representatives from various diplomatic missions. Unsuccessful candidates and some journalists alleged vote buying by President Tshisekedi’s coalition, the Sacred Union, which swept the elections and holds 20 gubernatorial seats.
State-run media, including television and radio stations, remained the largest sources of information for the public and government. There were reports of government intimidation of political opponents, such as exercising political influence in the distribution of media content. The national electoral law prohibits certain groups of citizens from voting in elections, including members of the armed forces and the national police.
In several districts, known as chefferies, traditional chiefs perform the role of a local government administrator. They are unelected and instead are selected based on local tribal customs (generally based on family inheritance) and if approved, are paid by the government.
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