History
The history of Colombia is characterized by the interaction of rival civilian elites. The political elite, which overlaps with social and economic elites, has shown a marked ability to retain the reins of power, effectively excluding other groups and social institutions, such as the masses and the military, from significant participation in or control over the political process. Members of the lower classes have found it difficult, although not impossible, to challenge or join the established elite in the political and economic spheres. Their subordination dates to the rigid colonial social hierarchy that placed the Spanish-born above the nativeborn . Elite control of the military is the result of the "civilian mystique" that developed along with Colombian independence. That mystique has successfully restricted the military to nonpolitical functions, with three exceptions--1830, 1854, and 1953. Thus Colombia has a history rare for Latin America in that the country has been dominated more by civilian than by military rule. Because military forces have been denied political power, the civilian elites have had only themselves, divided into rival groups, to contend with in the political arena.
Some analysts have divided the political elite along economic lines between the landed and the nonlanded. The agricultural export sector, the backbone of the Colombian economy, has supplied the two main economic groups that also have been the most powerful in the political sphere: the landed aristocracy, who are devoted to the large-scale production of agricultural crops, and the merchants, who are engaged in the trade of these export goods and imported consumer goods. Lesser economic groups, such as the emerging manufacturing sector, have allied themselves with one of the two dominant groups, most often the merchants. Differences within the allied groups on issues such as trade created factions within the alliances even before they officially became established political parties. In addition, the nation's economic development opened up new economic opportunities, and new forces increasingly expressed their views through the political factions.
Two distinct and hostile tendencies were manifest and at war not only since the early days of national independence, but even before the final triumph over the Spanish metropolis. The two parties styled themselves Liberal and Conservative respectively. It would be a great error to suppose that they are identical in tendency or spirit with their English namesakes; names are apt to be misguiding, as the effigies stamped upon coins which may be of gold, silver or copper. The same word may signify — especially in the case ot parties in different countries — not only varying but even antagonistic tendencies.
One thing however can be asserted — the misnamed Conservative party in Colombia is reactionary. The observer of Colombian political history soon acquires the conviction that the two hostile factions which incarnated the opposite tendencies had not been able to establish a modus vivendi, a basis of action common to both of them, by which they might exercise their endeavors peacefully. The differences separating Colombian parties were so great, the abyss that yawned between them is so deep, that the transition of power from one to the other — such was the tale of history — necessitated resort to violence. Both parties governed the country at various times since its emancipation. After a revolution, which lasted over three years, the Liberals came into power in 1863, being in their turn replaced in 1885 by the Conservatives.
The Colombian so-called Conservatives turned their back to the future and seemed each day to grow more enamored of the ideals of the past. The Constitution which they proclaimed in 1886 abolished the federal form and centralised all functions and powers of government in the person of the President of the Republic, who was the pivot of the whole machinery of the State; he was irresponsible and may at will suspend the constitution; the property and the liberty of the citizens are at his mercy, and his powers may be as despotic as those of the Sultan or the Tsar.
It was true that personal property and liberty are only endangered as a rule by hostile political action; but the potentiality of unlimited despotic power existed. Under the Liberal regime the Roman Church enjoyed no special privileges; it was considered on a par with any other religious institution which might exist in the country. The religious orders were abolished by the Liberals. Under the Conservative regime the Roman is recognised as the official religion of the land, against which nothing should be tolerated. The religious orders were reinstated and fostered by the Government. Their numbers, in a great measure from the accession of foreigners, increased in a prodigious degree. The protection of the Government to these religious orders frequently took the form of gifts of lands or buildings, exemptions from taxes and contributions of various kinds and employment in schools and colleges.
Elite members of the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party alternately competed and cooperated with each other throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Often the nature of relations between the two parties depended on whether moderates or extremists dominated the ruling party. During the periods when moderate factions of both parties were in power, the parties were able to work together in coalitions; when extremist factions prevailed, however, conflict often resulted.
Up to 1880 gold and silver were plentiful as currency in the land; exchange on Europe was practically at par; the public debt of the nation had a high quotation. The Conservative regime was responsible for the creation of inconvertible paper currency which was not only of forced circulation but which is declared by law to be the sole legal tender of the land to the ex elusion of any other coin or specie. Contracts made in sterling, dollars or francs, were null. Thus commerce and industry were chained to a national paper currency which very soon began to depreciate. A limit for the authorised issue was originally-fixed, but the temptation to create financial resources in such an easy manner proved too great. Here indeed the true philosopher's stone had at last been discovered!
During the competitive periods, one party usually sought to limit or eliminate the rival party's participation in the political process, attempts that often resulted in political violence. The most notorious of these periods were the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) and la violencia (1948-66). At the end of these civil wars, the elite inaugurated the cooperative governments of the Period of Reconciliation (1903- 30) and the National Front (1958-74), respectively, the former catalyzed by the Rafael Reyes presidency (1904-09) and the latter by the Gustavo Rojas Pinilla dictatorship (1953-57).
The replacement of the discredited extremist factions by the more conciliatory moderate factions in each case made it possible for the two parties to share power and to achieve a consensus on what policies were appropriate for Colombian society at the time.
Although the elite dominated the masses, the different classes were bound to each other through personalistic patron-client relationships, especially in rural areas where peasants relied on the propertied upper class for access to the land they farmed. These patron-client relationships also tied the masses into the political system as the numerical votes or bodies mobilized and controlled by local political bosses. The affiliation adopted by the members of the lower classes was determined largely by the affiliation of their patrons and their families; these affiliations, as much for a party as against the opposing party, became what Robert H. Dix termed "inherited hatreds," elements of one's identity handed down from generation to generation. The emotional bond to the party carried individual members not only to the polls but also into violent conflict with adherents of the opposing party during those times when political conflict could not be controlled. In this way, the peasants and urban masses were recruited by the party elite to participate in the civil wars that riddled the nation's history.
Colombia's economic life has been based consistently on exports of primary goods, especially coffee. In the sixteenth century, the conquistadors and early colonialists, who often exploited Indian and slave labor, mined precious metals and gems for export to Spain under a mercantile system that inhibited the development of domestic industries. Throughout the preindependence and postindependence periods, agriculture on large landholdings, known as latifundios, became the predominant mode of production for export crops such as sugar and tobacco. By the 1860s, coffee had emerged as the key export crop. At the turn of the century, tariffs on coffee exports were the main source of government revenues, and profits from the coffee trade were the major source of investment in the newly emerging industrial sector that was beginning to produce basic consumer goods. Although the industrial sector grew sufficiently to induce urbanization and economic modernization in the first half of the twentieth century, industrial exports remained relatively minor compared with coffee, which in the late 1980s still accounted for almost 60 percent of all export earnings.
Economic modernization, supported by the coffee industry, became significant at the turn of the century. Modernization brought social changes and growing demands that produced various challenges to the dominant position of the traditional elite: the populist movements of the 1940s and 1970s, the military dictatorship of the 1950s, the rise of guerrilla activity in the 1960s through the 1980s, and the emergence of drug traffickers as a major economic and social element in the 1970s and 1980s. The increase in industrialization and the migration of peasants to the cities accelerated the rate of urbanization and the formation of urban working and lower classes. The heightened need for infrastructure, both within a given city and among urban areas, spurred the growing involvement of the state in the economy, especially during the reformist period in the 1930s and 1940s. By the 1980s, the state had become an important investor in and manager of strategic sectors of the economy, such as energy resources, transportation, and communications.
The emergence of the National Front marked a significant break in the traditional political and economic patterns in Colombian society. Interparty conflict receded and was replaced in the 1960s by leftist subversion, which continued through the 1980s. The illicit narcotics industry emerged in the 1970s as a dominant economic force, altering the structure of the national economy and disrupting existing social and political relations. The leadership in both parties proved unable to address inflation, unemployment, and a skewed distribution of income. The post-National Front Liberal tenure bequeathed a triple legacy to the incoming Conservative government in 1982: guerrilla activity, the corruptive drug trade, and an inequitable economy.
In recent years, a multiparty system has developed, and in 2002 Álvaro Uribe became the first independent president in Colombian history. In the March 2006 congressional elections, winners were parties associated with President Uribe, including the Conservative Party in alliance with two main Uribista groupings. The center-left Liberal Party was still the largest party in Congress but was relatively powerless, as is the leftist Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), but the Liberals have been moving to the center, while the PDA has been consolidating its ranks and expanding grassroots support.
As if confirming the demise of the two-party system, Uribe easily won reelection on May 28, 2006, becoming the first Colombian president in 100 years to be reelected, thanks to a constitutional amendment authorizing reelection for a second consecutive term. Moreover, he won by a record majority (62 percent of the ballots) in the first round. With this strong electoral mandate and a working majority in Congress, Uribe began his second four-year term that August. His congressional alliance included independents, some former Liberal Party members, and the Conservative Party.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Colombia exhibited social and economic indicators that, with few exceptions, were close to the Latin American norm. Yet forms of political and criminal violence plagued the country, with an intensity and duration that had few parallels in the region. Neither could many countries in Latin America or elsewhere in the developing world match Colombia’s record of persistent, albeit imperfect, adherence to democratic forms and procedures.
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