Colombia - Drugs
In Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production have surged to all-time records under President Gustavo Petro, and his failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups only exacerbated the crisis. Under President Petro’s leadership, coca cultivation and cocaine production have reached record highs while Colombia’s government failed to meet even its own vastly reduced coca eradication goals, undermining years of mutually beneficial cooperation between against narco-terrorists. Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, elected in June 2022, has wasted no time outlining the country’s new position on the fight against illegal drugs. Petro has proposed a plan of “total peace,” an ambitious proposal to disarm around two dozen criminal organizations operating in the country. As part of this proposal, Spanish center-left online daily Público reports the Petro administration is willing to suspend the practice of extradition and forgo arrest warrants to encourage criminal groups to participate in a ceasefire. Ryan Berg noted: "Mexican daily El Financiero also reported that the Petro administration has floated a proposal to decriminalize cocaine. For now, Colombia’s new government says it will favor crop substitution policies, paying farmers to grow alternatives to the coca plant. Petro’s plan for “total peace,” combined with a new posture on narcotics policy, if implemented fully, may help to tamp down violence in Colombia at least temporarily. Similar plans have been tried in Central America and have led to short-term reductions in violence. However, the large size and value of many criminal economies easily attract illicit actors, often leading to the splintering of criminal organizations, as happened with the FARC during earlier negotiations; and creates vacuums normally filled by upstart groups." By September 2025 Colombia was designated as having failed demonstrably to meet its drug control obligations. Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to show skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values the service and sacrifice of their dedicated public servants across all levels of government. The failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership. On 24 October 2025 the State Department announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio would not certify Colombia under the criteria of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, as carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2025. President Trump made it clear in his September 15 determination [on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026] that Colombia is “failing demonstrably” to uphold its drug control responsibilities. Petro has since doubled down in defense of his failed policies. Tommy Pigott is the Principal Deputy Spokesperson for the Department of State said "The United States will not turn a blind eye to Petro’s appeasement and emboldening of narco-terrorists. We are committed to bringing terrorists and drug traffickers to justice and preventing deadly illegal drugs from entering our country. There must be no impunity for drug traffickers or acts of terrorism or violence by criminal armed groups. We remain steadfast in our support for Colombian security forces, its justice sector, and departmental and municipal officials, and we will continue to partner with them in our joint efforts to combat drug trafficking. Today’s decision is not a reflection on these institutions but rather the failures and incompetence of Gustavo Petro and his inner circle.
For decades, Colombia has been synonymous with the global cocaine trade, serving as the primary source of the drug that flooded American cities and fueled violence across two continents, while the country itself became a battleground between powerful cartels, government forces, and guerrilla movements.
Origins of the Colombian Drug Trade
Colombia's emergence as the epicenter of the global cocaine trade began in the 1970s, though the country had previously been involved in marijuana trafficking. The transformation came when Colombian traffickers recognized the enormous profit potential in cocaine, a drug derived from coca leaves that had been grown for centuries in the Andean regions of South America, particularly in Peru and Bolivia. Colombian criminal organizations initially served as middlemen, transporting coca paste from Peru and Bolivia to laboratories in Colombia where it was processed into cocaine hydrochloride, the powder form of the drug that could be smuggled efficiently to markets in the United States and Europe.
The cocaine boom coincided with and contributed to massive social and economic changes in Colombia. The country had long struggled with violence, political instability, and economic inequality, conditions that created fertile ground for the growth of criminal enterprises. The drug trade offered unprecedented opportunities for social mobility and wealth accumulation, particularly for individuals from lower and middle-class backgrounds who might otherwise have had limited prospects. The enormous profits generated by cocaine trafficking, with markups of several thousand percent from production to street sale, created a new class of narco-millionaires who wielded tremendous economic and political power.
The Rise of the Medellín Cartel
The Medellín Cartel, based in Colombia's second-largest city, emerged in the late 1970s and dominated the cocaine trade through much of the 1980s. Led by Pablo Escobar, the organization became one of the most powerful and violent criminal enterprises in history. Escobar, who came from modest origins in the town of Envigado near Medellín, built his empire through a combination of ruthless violence, strategic corruption, and business acumen. By the mid-1980s, he was one of the wealthiest individuals in the world, with his cartel controlling an estimated eighty percent of the cocaine shipped to the United States.
The Medellín Cartel's operations were remarkably sophisticated, involving everything from coca cultivation and processing to transportation networks that moved tons of cocaine into the United States through various routes. They used planes, boats, submarines, and elaborate tunnels to smuggle their product past law enforcement. The organization employed thousands of people directly and indirectly, from chemists and pilots to enforcers and money launderers. The cartel pioneered many of the techniques that would become standard in international drug trafficking, including the use of front companies, offshore banking, and corruption of officials at all levels of government.
Violence became the cartel's trademark. Escobar embraced a strategy he called plata o plomo, silver or lead, meaning officials could accept bribes or face assassination. The cartel murdered judges, journalists, police officers, politicians, and countless others who opposed them or got in their way. They conducted terrorist bombings targeting government buildings, aircraft, and civilian areas to intimidate authorities and the public. The violence peaked in the late 1980s when the cartel waged open war against the Colombian state in response to government efforts to extradite traffickers to the United States, where they would face certain prosecution and lengthy prison sentences.
The Cali Cartel
While the Medellín Cartel grabbed headlines with its spectacular violence, the Cali Cartel operated with a more sophisticated and less overtly violent approach. Based in the southwestern city of Cali, this organization was led by the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, Gilberto and Miguel, along with José Santacruz Londoño and Hélmer Herrera. The Cali Cartel came to prominence in the 1980s and became the dominant force in Colombian cocaine trafficking after the Medellín Cartel's decline in the early 1990s. At its height, the Cali Cartel controlled approximately eighty percent of the world's cocaine market and generated billions of dollars in annual revenue.
The Cali leadership styled themselves as gentlemen criminals who preferred bribery and infiltration over bloodshed. They invested heavily in corrupting Colombian institutions, reportedly spending millions of dollars to influence elections, bribe officials, and penetrate law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Their intelligence gathering capabilities were so extensive that they often knew about government operations against them before they happened. The cartel operated more like a modern corporation than a traditional criminal gang, with sophisticated business structures, professional management, and global distribution networks. They invested their profits in legitimate businesses, real estate, and other assets, creating a veneer of respectability.
Despite their more subtle approach, the Cali Cartel was still responsible for significant violence. They engaged in brutal warfare with the Medellín Cartel throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, with each organization attempting to eliminate the other. They also ruthlessly dealt with rivals, informants, and anyone who threatened their operations. The difference was that their violence tended to be more targeted and less spectacular than Medellín's terrorism, making them appear less threatening to the public and government even as they grew more powerful economically and politically.
U.S. Involvement and the War on Drugs
The United States became deeply involved in combating Colombian drug trafficking as cocaine use exploded in American cities during the 1980s. The Reagan administration made drug interdiction a priority, viewing cocaine as both a public health crisis and a national security threat. The drug war became increasingly militarized, with U.S. military and intelligence assets deployed to support Colombian efforts against the cartels. American aid included training for Colombian security forces, intelligence sharing, equipment and weapons, and direct involvement by Drug Enforcement Administration agents operating in Colombia.
The strategy of extraditing Colombian traffickers to the United States became a central element of American policy. Colombian criminals feared U.S. prisons and courts far more than their own country's justice system, which they could often corrupt or intimidate. The Medellín Cartel's violent campaign against extradition demonstrated how seriously traffickers took this threat. The Colombian government wavered on the issue, at times allowing extradition and at other times banning it under pressure from the cartels. This back and forth reflected the difficult position Colombian authorities found themselves in, caught between American pressure to get tough and cartel violence that threatened the state's very existence.
American drug policy toward Colombia evolved over the decades but consistently focused on supply-side strategies aimed at reducing the amount of cocaine reaching U.S. streets. This included crop eradication programs that used aerial spraying of herbicides to destroy coca plants, interdiction efforts to seize drugs in transit, and support for Colombian military and police operations against trafficking organizations. Critics argued that these supply-side approaches were ineffective because they failed to address demand in the United States, displaced cultivation to other areas, and caused environmental damage and harm to legitimate farmers. Supporters countered that aggressive action against supply was necessary to disrupt trafficking organizations and prevent even greater quantities of cocaine from reaching American communities.
The Fall of Pablo Escobar
Pablo Escobar's downfall came gradually through the early 1990s as Colombian and American forces closed in on him and his organization. The Colombian government, with strong U.S. support, launched an intensive campaign to capture or kill the drug lord. This effort was aided by Los Pepes, a vigilante group whose name stood for People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar, which was widely believed to be supported by the Cali Cartel and elements within Colombian security forces. Los Pepes systematically targeted Escobar's family, associates, and assets, putting unprecedented pressure on the trafficker.
Escobar surrendered to authorities in 1991 under an agreement that he would serve time in a luxurious self-designed prison called La Catedral and would not be extradited to the United States. The arrangement was criticized as a sweetheart deal that allowed Escobar to continue running his criminal empire from prison. When the government attempted to move him to a more secure facility in 1992, he escaped and went on the run. The final manhunt lasted sixteen months and involved thousands of Colombian police and military personnel supported by American intelligence and special operations forces.
Escobar was finally located and killed in a rooftop shootout in Medellín on December 2, 1993. His death was celebrated in Colombia and the United States as a major victory in the war on drugs. However, the demise of the Medellín Cartel did not end Colombian cocaine trafficking. Instead, it created a power vacuum that the Cali Cartel quickly filled, and when that organization was dismantled in the mid-1990s, numerous smaller groups emerged to take its place. The pattern would repeat itself over and over, with the elimination of one major trafficking organization leading not to the end of the trade but to its fragmentation and evolution.
The Dismantling of the Cali Cartel
Following Escobar's death, the Colombian government and the United States turned their attention to the Cali Cartel. Operation Cornerstone and other law enforcement efforts aimed at dismantling the organization through arrests, asset seizures, and international cooperation. The Cali leadership, believing they had reached an understanding with the government, were shocked when the crackdown came. Between 1995 and 1996, the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers and other top leaders were arrested, and the organization was systematically taken apart.
The Cali Cartel's collapse revealed the extent of its infiltration into Colombian society. Investigations uncovered that the organization had corrupted officials at the highest levels of government, including allegedly making substantial contributions to President Ernesto Samper's 1994 election campaign. The narco-cassette scandal, as it became known, nearly brought down Samper's government and severely damaged Colombia's international reputation. The crisis demonstrated how deeply drug money had penetrated Colombian politics and institutions, raising questions about whether the country could ever fully free itself from cartel influence.
The dismantling of the Cali Cartel, like the fall of the Medellín Cartel before it, did not reduce cocaine production or trafficking. Instead, the cocaine trade fragmented among numerous smaller organizations often called boutique cartels or baby cartels. These groups were more difficult for law enforcement to target because they lacked the high-profile leadership and centralized structure of their predecessors. They also tended to be more flexible and adaptive, quickly adjusting their operations to evade law enforcement pressure. The atomization of the trade made it more resilient and arguably more difficult to combat than when a few large cartels dominated the business.
Guerrilla Involvement and the FARC
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by its Spanish acronym FARC, began as a Marxist guerrilla movement in the 1960s but became increasingly involved in the drug trade starting in the 1980s. Initially, the FARC imposed taxes on coca cultivation and cocaine production in areas under its control, justifying this involvement as a way to fund its revolutionary struggle. Over time, however, the organization became more directly engaged in the drug business, protecting cultivation areas, running labs, and even trafficking cocaine itself. This transformation blurred the line between political insurgency and criminal enterprise.
The FARC's involvement in drugs created a complex three-way conflict in Colombia among the guerrillas, the cartels, and the government. At times, the FARC cooperated with drug traffickers, providing security and territory for cocaine production. At other times, they fought with cartels over control of coca-growing regions and trafficking routes. The organization's deep involvement in the drug trade provided it with hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue, making it one of the world's wealthiest guerrilla movements and allowing it to sustain a decades-long insurgency.
The connection between drugs and the guerrilla conflict fundamentally shaped Colombia's drug problem. Cocaine production became concentrated in remote rural areas controlled by the FARC, making eradication and interdiction efforts dangerous and often impossible. The drug trade helped perpetuate the armed conflict by providing the guerrillas with funding, while the instability caused by the conflict created conditions favorable for drug trafficking. This symbiotic relationship between drugs and political violence became one of the defining features of Colombia's crisis and one of the most challenging aspects for both the Colombian government and the United States to address.
Paramilitary Forces and the AUC
Right-wing paramilitary groups emerged in Colombia partly as a response to guerrilla violence and partly to protect drug trafficking interests. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, known as the AUC, was formed in 1997 as an umbrella organization uniting various regional paramilitary groups. These forces claimed to be defending rural landowners, business interests, and local communities from guerrilla extortion and violence, but they themselves became heavily involved in drug trafficking, particularly after the dismantling of the major cartels created opportunities for new players in the cocaine business.
The paramilitaries were responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in Colombia's conflict. They carried out massacres, forced displacements, and assassinations targeting suspected guerrilla sympathizers, union leaders, human rights activists, and civilians. Their strategy of terrorism aimed to drive the FARC out of strategic areas by making the civilian population too afraid to support the guerrillas. Many paramilitary commanders were themselves drug traffickers who used the anti-guerrilla rhetoric as cover for criminal enterprises. The AUC's involvement in cocaine trafficking made them as much a part of Colombia's drug problem as the criminal organizations they claimed to be fighting.
The Colombian government's relationship with the paramilitaries was deeply controversial. Some military and police units were accused of collaborating with paramilitary forces or at least tolerating their activities. This was seen as part of a dirty war strategy where the government used illegal armed groups to do the brutal work of combating guerrillas that official forces could not or would not do. The United States put pressure on Colombia to crack down on the paramilitaries, particularly after their drug trafficking activities became undeniable, but the effort was complicated by the murky relationships between these groups, drug traffickers, Colombian security forces, and local political and economic elites.
Plan Colombia
In 2000, the United States and Colombia launched Plan Colombia, an ambitious multibillion-dollar initiative aimed at combating drug trafficking, strengthening the Colombian state, and ending the armed conflict. The plan represented the largest U.S. foreign aid package to any country outside of the Middle East and marked a significant escalation of American involvement in Colombia. The initial funding of $1.3 billion was followed by billions more over subsequent years, with money going toward military equipment, training, intelligence support, alternative development programs, and institution building.
The military component of Plan Colombia focused on strengthening Colombian security forces to combat both drug traffickers and guerrilla groups, which were increasingly seen as intertwined threats. The United States provided helicopters, training for special units, intelligence support, and other assistance that significantly enhanced Colombian military capabilities. Aerial fumigation programs were expanded dramatically, with thousands of acres of coca crops sprayed with herbicides in an effort to reduce cocaine production. The Colombian military launched aggressive operations against FARC strongholds in the south of the country where coca cultivation was concentrated.
Plan Colombia was controversial from the start. Human rights organizations criticized the militarization of drug policy and the support for Colombian security forces that had poor human rights records and alleged ties to paramilitary groups. Environmental groups opposed the aerial fumigation program, arguing that it damaged ecosystems, harmed legitimate crops, and posed health risks to rural communities. Alternative development programs designed to help coca farmers switch to legal crops were seen as underfunded compared to the military components of the plan. Critics in Latin America viewed Plan Colombia as U.S. imperialism and questioned whether the real goal was fighting drugs or expanding American military influence in the region.
Despite the controversies, Plan Colombia did achieve some of its objectives. Colombian security forces became more professional and effective, regaining control over territory that had been dominated by guerrillas and paramilitaries. The FARC was pushed back from many areas, and its military capabilities were degraded through successful operations that killed or captured key leaders. The Colombian state became stronger and more capable of asserting authority throughout its territory. However, coca cultivation proved resilient, with production declining in some areas only to increase in others as growers adapted to enforcement pressure. The balloon effect, where squeezing drug production in one location simply moved it to another, demonstrated the difficulty of supply-side approaches to the drug problem.
The Peace Process and FARC Demobilization
After decades of conflict, the Colombian government and the FARC entered into peace negotiations that eventually resulted in a historic accord in 2016. The agreement provided for the demobilization of the guerrilla group, its transformation into a political party, and various measures to address the root causes of the conflict including land reform and rural development. The peace process was controversial in Colombia, with opponents arguing that it was too lenient on the FARC and failed to adequately punish those responsible for atrocities committed during the conflict. A referendum on the peace accord narrowly failed in October 2016, shocking the government and international observers, though a revised agreement was subsequently approved by Congress.
The peace process had significant implications for Colombia's drug problem. The FARC's demobilization removed a major actor from the cocaine trade, but it also created a power vacuum in areas the group had controlled. Dissident FARC factions refused to accept the peace accord and continued involvement in drug trafficking. Other criminal organizations, including remnants of paramilitary groups and Mexican cartels, moved to take over former FARC territories and trafficking routes. The National Liberation Army, another guerrilla group known by its Spanish acronym ELN, expanded its presence in some areas. These dynamics demonstrated that ending the armed conflict, while important, did not automatically solve the drug trafficking problem.
The peace accord included provisions for voluntary coca crop substitution programs designed to help farmers transition from coca to legal crops. These programs offered financial support and technical assistance to coca-growing communities that agreed to abandon drug cultivation. The approach represented a shift from the forced eradication that had characterized earlier policies toward more development-oriented strategies. However, the programs faced challenges including insufficient funding, slow implementation, violence against participating communities, and the continued economic incentive to grow coca given the lack of viable alternatives in many remote rural areas. The difficulty of implementing crop substitution illustrated the complexity of addressing coca cultivation, which was as much a development and poverty issue as a law enforcement problem.
Mexican Cartels and Changing Dynamics
As Colombian cartels declined or fragmented, Mexican criminal organizations became increasingly important in the cocaine trade. Mexican traffickers had long served as transporters moving Colombian cocaine into the United States, but they gradually gained more control over the business. The Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and other Mexican groups became major players in the international drug trade, often working directly with Colombian suppliers or even controlling production operations in Colombia. This shift reflected the evolution of the drug trade and the effectiveness of law enforcement pressure that had dismantled the large Colombian cartels.
The rise of Mexican cartels changed the dynamics of the cocaine business in important ways. Mexican organizations tended to be extremely violent, importing the brutal tactics of Mexico's drug wars to areas where they operated. Their presence in Colombia created new security challenges as they fought with each other and with Colombian groups for control of production and trafficking routes. The Mexican cartels' dominance of drug transportation into the United States also meant that Colombian traffickers became more dependent on these organizations, shifting some of the profit and power northward. This transformation demonstrated how the drug trade continually adapted and reorganized itself in response to law enforcement pressure and market conditions.
Cocaine Production and Cultivation Trends
Despite decades of aggressive eradication efforts, coca cultivation in Colombia has proven remarkably resilient and has even expanded in recent years. After declining in the mid-2000s during the height of Plan Colombia's fumigation programs, cultivation increased dramatically starting around 2013. By 2017, Colombia's coca cultivation had reached record levels, surpassing even the peaks of the 1990s. This resurgence reflected multiple factors including the peace process with the FARC, which led to a temporary suspension of aerial fumigation in former conflict zones, the displacement of coca cultivation to more remote areas, and the continued profitability of cocaine production for farmers with few economic alternatives.
The geography of coca cultivation shifted over time as growers adapted to eradication pressure. Initially concentrated in the south of the country in departments like Putumayo and Caquetá, coca production spread to other regions including the Pacific coast and the areas near the Venezuelan border. Growers developed smaller, more dispersed plots that were harder to detect and eradicate. They also improved cultivation techniques, developing varieties of coca that produced more cocaine per hectare and could thrive in different climates and altitudes. These adaptations made the coca economy more resilient and more difficult for authorities to suppress.
The persistence of coca cultivation highlighted fundamental challenges in the war on drugs. For poor rural farmers in areas with little infrastructure, few government services, and minimal economic opportunities, coca offered a far more profitable livelihood than legal crops. Coca could be grown on marginal land, did not require refrigerated transport, and had guaranteed buyers who came to the farm to purchase the crop. Alternative crops like coffee, cacao, or legal palm oil required substantial investment, technical knowledge, functioning supply chains, and access to markets that often did not exist in remote areas. Without addressing these underlying economic realities and development deficits, eradication programs alone could not eliminate coca cultivation no matter how aggressive they became.
Impact on Colombian Society
The drug trade profoundly shaped Colombian society in ways both obvious and subtle. The violence associated with drug trafficking and the armed conflict it helped fuel claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions of people from their homes. Entire generations grew up amid violence and instability. The corruption fueled by drug money penetrated every level of government and society, undermining institutions and rule of law. The narco-culture that emerged glorified traffickers and their lifestyle, influencing music, fashion, and popular culture. Drug money distorted the economy, creating artificial booms in certain sectors while corrupting markets and creating unfair competition for legitimate businesses.
Yet the drug trade's impact was not uniformly negative. In some regions, particularly during the height of the Medellín and Cali cartels, drug money provided employment, stimulated construction and investment, and funded social programs that the government had failed to provide. Pablo Escobar, for instance, built housing projects, soccer fields, and schools in poor neighborhoods of Medellín, creating a Robin Hood image that some residents embraced even as they condemned his violence. This complexity made the drug trade difficult to address because it was not simply an external threat but had become woven into the fabric of Colombian society and economy in ways that could not easily be undone.
The social costs of the drug war itself were also substantial. Aerial fumigation programs damaged legitimate crops and raised health concerns among rural populations. Heavy-handed security operations against drug trafficking sometimes victimized innocent civilians. The focus on the drug problem diverted attention and resources from other pressing needs like education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Young men from poor communities faced limited options beyond choosing between joining armed groups, whether guerrillas, paramilitaries, or criminal gangs, or trying to survive in an economy shaped by violence and illegality. Breaking this cycle required not just law enforcement but comprehensive social and economic development that addressed the root causes that made the drug trade attractive and allowed it to thrive.
Current Challenges and Future Prospects
Colombia continues to grapple with drug trafficking and its consequences, though the nature of the challenge has evolved. The fragmentation of the cocaine trade among numerous smaller organizations, the involvement of Mexican cartels, the persistence of coca cultivation, and the emergence of new drugs like synthetic opioids have created a complex security environment. The Colombian government faces the difficult task of implementing the peace accord with the FARC while combating remaining armed groups, all while trying to address the social and economic problems that fuel drug trafficking.
Recent policy debates have focused on whether supply-side approaches have failed and whether alternative strategies should be considered. Some advocates call for decriminalization of drug use, focusing resources on treatment rather than punishment. Others suggest that cocaine production should be legalized and regulated, removing the profit motive that drives trafficking organizations. These ideas remain controversial in both Colombia and the United States, but the decades-long failure to significantly reduce cocaine production despite enormous investments has made previously unthinkable policy options part of the discussion.
The fundamental challenge remains that as long as there is strong demand for cocaine in the United States, Europe, and increasingly in other markets, there will be incentives for production in Colombia. The country's geography, with its remote areas suitable for coca cultivation and long coastlines facilitating smuggling, makes it inherently attractive for drug production. The continued poverty and lack of opportunity in rural areas ensures a steady supply of farmers willing to grow coca. Corruption, while reduced from the worst days of the cartels, remains a problem that limits the effectiveness of law enforcement. These structural factors suggest that Colombia's drug problem, while it may continue to evolve, is unlikely to disappear entirely without changes that address both supply and demand sides of the equation and invest in genuine development alternatives for vulnerable communities.
Despite these challenges, Colombia has made remarkable progress in recent decades. The country that once seemed on the verge of becoming a narco-state has strengthened its institutions, reduced violence, improved security, and demonstrated resilience in the face of extraordinary challenges. The peace process with the FARC, despite its imperfections, represents a historic achievement. Economic growth has been strong in recent years, though inequality remains high. Colombian society has shown tremendous courage and determination in confronting the drug trade and its associated violence. While the drug problem persists, Colombia is no longer defined solely by cocaine and cartels but is recognized as a vibrant democracy with a rich culture and a determined people working to build a better future. The story of Colombia and drugs is not just one of tragedy and violence but also of resilience, adaptation, and the ongoing struggle to overcome a destructive legacy.
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