Xi Jinping - A Rising Star
Xi could never be a "true member" of President Hu Jintao's camp, even if Xi did not give any indication of opposition to Hu Jintao. Xi and other first-generation princelings derisively refer to people with non-Party, non-elite, commercial backgrounds like Hu Jintao as "shopkeepers' sons," whose parents did not fight and die for the revolution and therefore do not deserve positions of power. Hu Jintao did not consider him his successor. Hu's favorite for the post was Li Keqiang. While Xi's popularity and broad support certainly played a role in his elevation, these factors came into play only after intense jockeying over the Party's most senior posts, with Xi in the end becoming the "compromise candidate" acceptable to all, even to Hu Jintao.
Party elders were primarily concerned with having someone "conservative" like Xi in place who would not threaten their "vested interests." The Party elder families and their "princeling" offspring, ever since the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, had been pushing for placing their progeny atop the Party, believing that only their own offspring can be trusted to run the country. Xi Jinping is proof of the elders' and princelings' influence, with Xi's elevation the beginning of the "return of the Princelings."
Xi Zhongxun was an early revolutionary later became Party Secretary of Guangdong and both Politburo member and Vice Premier under Deng Xiaoping. Xi's father's status "virtually ensured" Xi broad support within the Party, given the elder Xi's credentials as both a revolutionary and a Deng Xiaoping ally in promoting reform. Moreover, Xi Zhongxun's role as a military leader in the revolution has helped Xi Jinping garner support from the PLA.
For 7 months in 2007 Xi was Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee, first secretary of the Party committee of Shanghai Garrison. After Shanghai Xi became a Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee. In 2008 Xi became a Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of the People's Republic of China and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee. as of 2003 Xi served as an alternate member of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee, and member of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. Member of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee. Xi was elected vice president of the People's Republic of China at the First Session of the 11th National People's Congress.
Xi Jinping's promotion to Shanghai Party Secretary in March 2007 "previewed" his later promotion to the PBSC. In 2007 the leadership made him the Party leader in Shanghai. At the time, the Communist Party was embroiled in a corruption scandal and desperately needed a clean pair of hands that could polish up its reputation. The so-called "Shanghai Clique" under the then still influential former Party Chairman Jiang Zemin wanted to bring Xi in. He was seen as incorruptible and as having sufficient authority to clean up the Party's ranks. Although not necessarily Hu's man now, Hu had supported Xi's selection in part because he hoped to use the promotion to buy Xi's allegiance. Xi was moderate to conservative in his political views, making him appear as a stable, calm, and assuring figure well-matched for the current political and economic chaos clouding Shanghai following the arrest of former Party Secretary Chen Liangyu.
The elevation of "fifth generation" leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at the October 2007 17th Communist Party Congress (Ref A) may be the Congress's most significant outcome. The selection of the "princeling" Xi Jinping balanced by Hu protege and former CYL head Li Keqiang, provided "something for everyone," thereby guaranteeing relative harmony among competing Party factions for at least the next five years. Some emphasized the desire to check the influence of Hu Jintao and the CYL and the perceived need to protect "princeling" interests as being behind Xi's rise.
Anointing Xi and Li as China's next leaders largely determined the outlines of Chinese elite politics for the next fifteen years. In the end, Xi Jinping was reportedly ranked ahead of Hu Jintao protege Li Keqiang because of Xi's broad acceptability within the Party. The support Xi garnered from Party elders and "princelings" as the son of well-respected early revolutionary Xi Zhongxun and a desire to check the influence of Hu Jintao and the Communist Youth League (CYL) were also important factors in his rise. Hu Jintao himself put forward Xi Jinping's name as the leading fifth generation PBSC member after his first choice Li Keqiang ran into opposition from Party elders. Hu "simply could not ignore" the "obvious support" for Xi within the Party, particularly since Hu had stressed that the opinions of other Party members and even the public should be taken into account in selecting the Party's new leaders.
Almost everyone "likes" Xi Jinping because, unlike many other princelings, he is "not arrogant" and instead is low-key, humble and self-effacing. Xi was well liked by "nearly everyone" and had a great network of contacts across China, which in the PRC is still more important than one's talent.
Some contrasted Xi's low-key manner with that of other princelings such as former PBSC Member Chen Yun's son, Chen Yuan, who apparently greatly angered Deng Xiaoping many years ago by issuing a "declaration" calling for the princelings to "rule" China. There was a general perception within the Party that Xi had a great deal of experience in governing at a variety of levels, having served in Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai, in positions ranging from a county-level official to Provincial Party Secretary. A collection of "Party elders," including but not limited to Jiang Zemin, challenged Hu's initial proposal to elevate Li Keqiang as his successor by arguing Li "lacked sufficient experience." Initially, these "elders" offered no alternative but made clear they would not accept Li Keqiang in the "heir apparent" slot. Hu Jintao allegedly then came back with two choices of "fifth generation" leaders as candidates to be placed ahead of Li Keqiang on the PBSC: Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping. The choice, Gu said, was "obvious," given the younger Bo's unpopularity in many quarters within the Party.
Xi was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of the People's Republic of China, vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee. Xi has served as the party leader in China's more prosperous provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang, completed 7 months as the party leader in Shanghai, and presided over the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.
Some thought Xi was a silent liberal and suspect Xi supports private enterprise, having been influenced by his father's reformist credentials. While in Zhejiang province, Xi supported a team of senior researchers to compose a six-volume work called "The Zhejiang Experience and its Implication for the Development of China". "The Zhejiang Experience" states the importance of setting up party cells within private enterprises and even suggests experiments with grassroots democracy within the party and local governments.
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