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Chinese Submarines - Introduction

At present, China has the largest submarine force in Asia, and the growth rate of the submarine force is second to none in the world. According to a report released by the US Naval Intelligence Office in July 2009, China ’s nuclear submarines are easier to detect because of the greater noise. The conventional diesel-electric submarine has a good mute effect and is difficult to detect.

China ordered five submarines from Germany before the War of Resistance, but failed to deliver the ships due to the outbreak of the war. After the war, the United Kingdom originally agreed to donate two submarines, which were canceled for various reasons. As a weak navy country, China was particularly eager for submarines, hoping to use this asymmetrical force to subvert the naval superiority of big powers. This wish was achieved in 1953 with the assistance of the Soviet eldest brother, and later developed into a large number of troops. On June 24, 1954, the Soviet submarines "C-52" and "C-53" came to Lushun and became "New China 11" and "New China 12".

Including the late 2006 surfacing of SONG-class SS near USS KITTY HAWK, Chinese submarines seem to be operating beyond their familiar operating areas. China claims that its submarines have conducted long-range patrols almost since the inception of the Chinese submarine force. According to Chinese press reports, PLAN submarines have occasionally ventured into the Pacific Ocean and, with some degree of regularity, continue to conduct these "cruises of long duration." Although China has apparently been satisfied with only a handful of these deployments every year, the growing technological capabilities of the PLAN submarine force and China's evolving maritime strategy, which calls for an operational capability beyond the littoral in support of an anti-access mission, create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence in the Western Pacific Ocean east of the Ryukyu Island chain.

The August 2009 US Office of Naval Intelligence report "The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy With Chinese Characteristics" stated "The PLA(N) is currently transitioning from older, less reliable attack submarines like the Romeo SS, Ming SS and Han SSN to the more modern Kilo SS, Yuan SS, Shang SSN and the Type 095 SSN. These more advanced platforms include larger weapons loadouts, better weaponry, improved quieting, and more advanced computer processing. The Song SS, Yuan SS, and Shang SSN are the PLA(N)'s newest indigenous submarines, and the first to be designed to employ the YJ-82 ASCM in addition to the traditional weapons loadout of torpedoes and mines. ... China is further expanding its current force of nuclear attack submarines by adding five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the current inventory of SSNs in the coming years."

PLAN submarines are assessed to incorporate a wide range of quieting technologies, most of which are imported. China nonetheless desires to develop the capability to produce indigenously quiet submarines. The main submarine quieting technologies are machinery mounts, hull coatings, and propellers. Future PLA Navy submarine designs are expected to incorporate lower propeller rotational rates and more advanced propeller designs, machinery mounts, and hull coatings. China's apparent goal is to design and construct quiet submarines independently of other countries. This effort is evident in China's large investment in research, development and manufacturing.

During the 1990s most PLAN submarines were believed to have obsolete sonar systems based on older analog designs. A limited number of Chinese submarines have more modern digital sonar systems based probably on 1980s Western technology. The Chinese have an extensive research and development infrastructure in shallow-water acoustics and have experience using modern commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computer processing technology. It is likely that current Chinese sonar designs are similar to commercially available Western submarine sonar systems and feature modern COTS processors and displays.

China's maritime strategy is evolving along two paths. First, China is focused on a regional anti-access capability, which is principally applicable in preventing third-party intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Second, China is simultaneously expanding its maritime strategy to include a mission to protect China's growing dependence on maritime commerce for economic development. From China's perspective, the lessons of warfare from the mid to late 1990s -namely, that modem navies such as the USN can conduct warfare at long ranges - expanded the geographic scope of the maritime battlefield. In order to counter long-range cruise missile strikes or carrier-based aviation strikes, the Chinese Navy sought ways to extend its reach beyond the littoral regions in a manner that offered the potential to counter a modem navy's advanced assets. Limitations in air defense capabilities for surface combatants as well as the inherent challenges of anti-submarine warfare compelled the Chinese leadership to focus much of its military modernization effort on the submarine force.

By 2023, according to The Wall Street Journal, the era of US nuclear submarine dominance over China is about to end. The Chinese navy's military and technological capabilities in submarine construction and anti-submarine warfare have now reached new heights. This change has even raised concerns that America's powerful fleets could be sunk in a military confrontation with China. The Wall Street Journal quotes from reports on China's scientific and industrial progress in naval warfare. The November 2023 article points out that China is gradually "narrowing" the gap between it and the US in very complex fields such as anti-submarine warfare submarine technology.

These developments not only threaten the Pentagon's regional strategy to contain the Chinese navy in coastal areas but could also challenge the US naval dominance globally in the long term. The China Maritime Research Institute of the US Naval War College pointed out China's progress in manufacturing nuclear reactors for use on its nuclear submarine classes, along with a propulsion system for submarines. Thus, Chinese nuclear submarines now run quieter and have a low altitude comparable to Russian nuclear submarines. This change makes Chinese submarines more difficult to detect than before.

In addition, analysis of satellite images of the Huludao shipyard in Liaoning, northeastern China taken last year shows that Beijing is building new nuclear submarines with much larger sizes than previous existing ship. Wall Street Journal Citing leaked intelligence information from the US Navy, China's impressive shipbuilding capacity by 2023 has exceeded 23,2 million tons per year. Meanwhile, this figure for the US is only about 100,000 tons per year.

China's current shipbuilding speed allows the country to produce many warships at the same time and is about 200 times more capable than the US. Above all, the Chinese navy's construction of a vast network of underwater sensors in China's coastal waters, known as the "Underwater Great Wall", is giving Beijing an immense advantage. big. The US Navy will certainly have difficulty deploying warships close to China if it enters waters equipped with sensors. Currently, the above sensor network has not yet been completed but it will soon be operational. This system includes many passive and active sonar sensors, combined with unmanned vehicles above and below the water surface, allowing detection and monitoring of all activities of vessels in controlled areas.China is also said to have "become better" at detecting US attack and cruise missile submarines that secretly operate near its coast through other weapons systems.

In addition, the number of naval exercises between China and Russia is increasing. This not only enhances the Chinese navy's ability to coordinate with its northern neighbor in an emergency, but also allows it to learn from the Russian navy about operating as a naval power. globally comparable to America. According to former US naval officer Christopher Carlson said: “The implications of China's naval development for the United States and its Pacific allies will be profound.” He also said that the US will have a headache in allocating resources to deal with new challenges from China.

Strategically, activities that the US once took for granted, such as the ability to access China's near coasts, will no longer be possible with China's nuclear-powered attack submarines. can attack American warships by surprise. Above all is the threat of China's submarine-launched ballistic missiles to the US mainland - a threat that Washington has long been accustomed to dealing with but has not yet experienced, in its relationship with the European military superpower. Mr. Carlson added: "Finding a submarine that operates quietly on the seabed is extremely difficult and China's new nuclear submarines may be equivalent to the improved Akula class currently in service with the Russian navy."

China's fleet of 79 submarines currently had at least 16 attack submarines powered by nuclear power and carrying ballistic missiles, including 6 Type 093 attack submarines (NATO code name Shang class) and 6 Type 094 ballistic missile (NATO code name Jin) operates "almost continuously" on patrol between Hainan Island and the East Sea. But Carlson warned that the Asian country could triple its current submarine construction rate to 1-2 per year.

The power of Chinese submarines may have been exaggerated by the US as a way to increase funding for the construction of new nuclear submarines. “Building nuclear submarines can be considered the pinnacle of technology in economics and industry, with only a few countries mastering the technologies to do this. China now possesses submarine manufacturing technology that is not inferior to the US, Russia, UK and France.", Russian military expert Vasily Dandykin analyzed.

According to Dandykin, there are a number of factors slowing down the pace of new US submarine construction, starting with Washington's decision to reduce the size of naval shipyards after the end of the Cold War. In another direction, the Pentagon also reduced the number of new nuclear submarines. According to Dandykin, programs related to US nuclear submarines gradually did not receive due attention after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Not only the US but also Europe were in a similar situation.

“America has the largest military budget in the world, far surpassing all other countries in the world. That means somewhere along the line they got into huge, expensive projects that didn't fit their budget.", Dandykin said. This expert also used the example of the Zumwalt destroyer building program worth $8 billion each that the US is implementing. “There are many projects like Zumwalt that cost the US a lot of money. As a result, the US is now inferior to Russia in developing 4th generation nuclear submarines, even though those designs date back to the Soviet era." Mr. Dandykin emphasized.

Regarding Chinese submarines, Dandykin pointed out that currently, the majority of China's fleet still consists of diesel-electric submarines and for them to reach the same technological level as the US will take a lot of time. time and money. According to the estimates of a retired Chinese naval officer, China's nuclear ballistic missile submarines are mainly focused on second-generation ships, and the future goal is to develop more third generation. Dandykin believes that US efforts to exaggerate the “China threat” are “a bit disingenuous” and are designed primarily to lobby for more resources to be allocated to shipbuilding efforts US submarines because building a nuclear submarine fleet is much more expensive than building an aircraft carrier in terms of both technology and budget.