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J-8II (Jian-8 Fighter aircraft 8) / F-8

The previous models of the J-8 were handicapped in that the design of nose inlet impaired the performance of the aircraft's airborne fire control radar. In 1979, the Chinese made a proposal to redesign it so that the inlet of the engine was in located in the sides of the fore fuselage. The re-designed aircraft became a new variant of the J-8 in 1980, designated the J8-II. Institute 601 and the Shenyang Aircraft Company once again were placed in charge of the development of the new J-8II.

The design principles of the J-8II stressed that not only is the aircraft capable of high speed and high service ceilings, but also that the aircraft be maneuverable at both transonic speeds and in medium-low altitudes. It was also guided by the idea that a fighter should be able to perform beyond visual range capabilities with the assistance of improved avionics, armaments, and fire control systems.

The J-8II was refitted with two WP13AII engines for increased performance. Additionally, a new radar for the fire control system was added in order to increase the operational range of the J-8II, as well as an interception fire control system. As for armaments, radar guided medium range missiles and air-to-ground rockets became new weapon options. Lastly, an autopilot system was also added, thus giving the J-8II all-weather interception and ground attack abilities.

The moving of the inlets to the sides of the fore fuselage from the nose of the aircraft was a sharp departure from the usual design of Chinese fighters, in which the nose had always had the air intake. Because of this, Institute 601 conducted a large number of tests to ensure the function of the design.

As for the performance of the aircraft, the J-8II’s intake efficiency was the same as the J-8 at high speeds and 6% higher at lower speeds. The intake efficiency maintained the level of the J‑8 at high speed and was 6% higher at low speed. A electrically controlled differential horizontal tailplane also contributed to the enhanced performance of the J-8II. As a result, the J-8II was 45% more efficient in roll control compared to the J-8 in sub-sonic speeds.

Guizhou Engine Design Institute and the Guizhou Engine Company were responsible for the development of the WP13AII engine. Compared to the previous engine, a high temperature turbine was put in place, which increased the turbine’s entrance temperature. As a result, the thrust of the engine was improved.

The design plans for the J-8II were released to the Shenyang Aircraft Company in April 1983, which commenced trial production. In March 1984, the first J-8II was produced and was successfully flown in June 1984 and certified in October 1988 after completing its test flights.

After the 1970s there was a noticeable change in the world fighters. Very high flying speed and flying altitude were no longer pursued but good maneuverability at low and medium altitude and improved avionics, armament and fire control system came into vogue. This was because the practice in the past ten years and many local wars had showed that most air battles between the supersonic fighters were conducted at low and medium altitude and at a speed near the sonic speed and that the dog fight in the air required the fighter to have good maneuverability, i.e. good performance in turn rate, acceleration, deceleration and rate of climb. The gun(s) and missiles mounted or carried on a fighter were of equal importance.

Since the early 1980's Chinese aviation industry had closely followed the trend of world fighters, marched to a higher level and began to develop a contemporary fighter J-8 II to meet the Air Force's needs in updating and improving its combat capability.

The J-8 II was developed on the basis of J-8 aircraft but significant improvements were incorporated. The improvements were emphasized on the armament, fire control system, avionics and power plant. The intakes were moved to two sides of the fuselage, therefore the space in the nose could be saved for a big antenna of the radar. Two engines were changed to the uprated WP13As for improvement of the maneuverability at low and medium altitude. The hard points were increased for carrying several different weapons so that the J-8 II could have the all-weather interception capability as well as the ground attack capability. The J-8 II had more than 70 per cent modifications over the J-8 and one third of its total vendor-furnished-equipment were replaced.

The operational requirement of the J-8 II was approved by authorities in September 1980. The conceptual definition study was started in April 1981 and then the general configuration was determined. The development tasks were taken by the Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute and the Shenyang Aircraft Company.

The development of the J-8 II was managed with the principles of the system engineering. Under the leadership of the J-8 II chief director He Wenzhi, vice minister of the MAI, the feasibility study of the J-8 II had taken 3 factors into consideration: technology, cost and schedule. Various systems of job responsibility were established: chief designer's responsibility for design art, administration responsibility, cost contractual responsibility, and quality control responsibility. And the management was carried out in four areas: technology, cost, schedule and quality. The chief designer Gu Songfen had an important position in this system engineering management. In the area of technology there were four responsibility levels, i.e. the program chief designer, system chief designer, director designer and project designer. In this system the divisions of work and responsibility were clearly defined.

In the area of administration Tang Qiansan, general manager of the Shenyang Aircraft Company, Guan De, vice general manager and on-site chief director, and Gu Yuanjie, chief engineer, carried out their work effectively. The chief accountant used fixed-price-contract to stimulate the development of the program. Quality control was carried on throughout the development process. The designs were carefully reviewed for the second time before their drawings were released. With all these efforts, the smooth progress of the aircraft development was ensured and all the sub-systems, work items and even every work procedure in manufacturing were completed as scheduled.

The Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute began its technical and structure designs in 1982, all the drawings were released for production by May 1983. By the end of May 1984, 11,000 wind tunnel tests for 39 test items, 58 structure and system test items and 25 dynamic and static test items were completed.

The Shenyang Aircraft Company began its manufacture of production tooling and aircraft parts in 1983. It only took the company 17 months to send the prototype aircraft into the air. It was only 3 years from the beginning of the development of the WP13A engine by Guizhou Engine Design Institute, Guizhou Engine Company and Chengdu Engine Company to the delivery of the first engine for the prototype aircraft.The vendor-furnished-equipment and components for the aircraft basically satisfied the aircraft requirements.

On June 12, 1984 the graceful-looking and novelly configured J-8 II was flown for the first time by test pilot Qu Xueren.

By the mid-1980s China's military leaders had recognized for some time that their lack of a modern all-weather, day/night fighter-interceptor has left China without an effective deterrent to the increasingly sophisticated Soviet air forces in the Far East. In an attempt to meet this Soviet air challenge?or at least not fall too much further behind over the next decade?Beijing has decided me F-8 Finback fighter, The Chinese plan to convert this 1960s- vintage daytime fighter into a modern, long-range, high- and low-altitude interceptor, designated the F-8-2. Two versions of the F-8-2 are under development, one with advanced Western technology and the other with domestically built radars, missiles, and engines: ? For the Western version, China on 30 October 1986 signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchase agreement for a US-integrated avionics system and has signed a tentative contract?pending COCOM approv- al?for an Italian radar-guided, air-to-air missile, the Aspide. The Chinese have also expressed interest in US- or Israeli-produced engines. ? The domestic F-8-2 may eventually carry a new Chinese radar 25X1 25X1 25)0 25X1 25X1 By the mid-1990s, Beijing should have at least 50 F-8-2 long-range interceptors far superior to anything in its present inventory. The all- weather "Westernized F-8-2," for example, will be able to distinguish low- flying bombers from ground clutter and destroy these targets, and should be able to destroy aircraft coming head-on up to 46 kilometers away. Current Chinese aircraft, by contrast, have a maximum missile-firing range of only 15 kilometers, can engage targets only from behind, and are limited to clear weather. 25X1 The F-8-2 also will have the potential to operate as a multimission fighter with credible ground attack/strike capability. By relatively simple modifi- cations to the US fire-control system and the fitting of a laser designator, the F-8-2 could be armed with antiradiation missiles to destroy defending ground radars, incapacitating surface-to-air missile batteries. iii Secret EA 86-10046X SW 86-10059X December 1986 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret We judge that the F-8-2 is more likely to affect the air balance between China and Vietnam than that between China and the Soviet Union or Taiwan: ? US avionics and Aspide missiles would make the fighter superior to the Soviet MIG-23 Flogger. But the F-8-2 will be no match for the advanced MIG-29s and SU-27s that will become the mainstays of Soviet airpower in the Far East by the time F-8-2s are deployed in numbers in the 1990s. ? We believe Beijing already has the ability to gain command of the air over Taiwan because its Air Force greatly outnumbers Taiwan's. The F-8-2s would erode the qualitative advantage of Taiwan's F-5E fighters, but Taipei's planned Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) would offset many of these gains. ? Vietnam in the mid-1990s might face a force of Chinese F-8-2s that are more advanced than its own fighters and a Chinese Air Force more prepared than today's for deep strikes into Vietnam. The shape of the Sino-Vietnamese air balance, therefore, is likely to depend heavily on the Soviet Union's willingness to provide Hanoi with a more modern fighter than its current MIG-21s and with more sophisticated ground-based air defense systems. Although the Chinese have signed a letter of agreement for the US avionics package, we believe tough negotiations lie ahead. The Chinese, in our judgment, will again press for the transfer of technology in addition to the purchase of 55 radar packages. They also will seek the production technology for the avionics and missiles necessary for an air-to-ground- attack capability. The technology transfer issue notwithstanding, Beijing is pleased with the avionics program, but is concerned that Washington might use the F-8 program to justify new arms sales to Taiwan. Taipei, for its part, will almost certainly push more vigorously for the Patriot air defense system, advanced air-to-air missiles, and F-16 or F-20 fighters. Secret iv Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25.X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Reverse Blank .a We believe the sale of the avionics packages to Beijing will serve as a model for future FMS sales, such as a Mark 46 torpedo coproduction agreement, and will increase US influence with the Chinese military. Indeed, Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping has already signaled Beijing's interest in an even wider arms technology relationship by asking about the possibility of US military credits or commercial assistance for weapon purchases during Secretary Weinberger's visit to Beijing in October 1986. Moreover, the United States will gain its first real access to China's defense plants and operational air units through the Defense Department officials and contractors on hand to install the avionics packages and provide maintenance training. V Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Contents Secret Page Key Judgments 111 F-8-1: A Problem Aircraft 1 Revamping the F-8 3 Seeking Foreign Assistance 4 The Domestic Upgrades 6 Why Modernize the F-8? 6 The F-8 and Regional Air Balance 9 The Sino-Soviet Border 9 The Taiwan Strait Balance 11 Implications for Vietnam 13 A New Entry in China's Arms Export Catalogue 13 Implications for the United States 13 vii Secret - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret China's New Westernized F-8 Fighter: US Role and Implications for Regional Air Balance F-8-1: A Problem Aircraft Beijing's attempts over the past three decades to build a twin-engined, high-altitude, high-speed intercep- tor?without foreign assistance?have largely failed. The Chinese began work on the F-8 Finback, which is similar to the 1961 Flipper?a Mikoyan design that Moscow never put into production?in the mid-1960s soon after the Sino-Soviet split. The first F-8 in the early 1970s, but even at that time- China's senior leaders were skeptical that the aircraft industry was capable of building a modern fighter. In fact, unsatisfactory performance prevented even the prototype of this aircraft from entering service with the Chinese Air Force until 1982, almost two decades after the project began. The Chinese have produced only 73 of the F-8-1 aircraft at the Shen- yang aircraft plant We believe these were only intended to familiarize the Air Force and Naval Air Force with the aircraft 1 Figure 2 China's Fighter Interceptors, 1986 Number of aircraft 25X1 25X1 3,500 3,000 25X1 25X1:1 2,500 25X1 25X1 2,000 25X1 1,500 1,000 500 F-5/MIG-17 F-6/MIG-19 F-7/MIG-21 Fresco Farmer Fishbed 1 F-8-1 Finback 25)(1 25X1 25X1 311067 12-86 25X1 25)(1 25X1 Problems cited by the Chinese with the F-8- is include faulty avionics, poor radars, underpowered and short- lived engines, and outdated weapon systems: ? The aircraft has no inertial navigation system, no head-up display, and range-only radar based on a Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 3 F-8-1 Fighter With WP-7 Engines and Nose Air Intake Soviet system of the late 1950s that searches only to approximately 10 kilometers. ? The F-8-1's engine?the Wopen-7A (WP-7A), which is based on the Soviet-designed R11F engine of the early 1960s?must be overhauled after the first 300 hours of operation and discarded after another 300 hours, ? The F-8-1, with the low thrust-to-weight WP-7A, is markedly underpowered compared with the latest US and Soviet fighters and, therefore, is significant- ly less maneuverable. Secret 311086 12-86 ? The F-8-1 is armed with the unsophisticated and short-range PL-2 infrared-guided air-to-air missile, which can only be fired from behind the enemy aircraft at ranges less than 7 kilometers in clear weather. If the Chinese are to develop a credible air defense against the Soviet bomber force, Beijing needs all- weather, day/night fighter-interceptors with look- down/shootdown capability. But China's air defense inventory is largely composed of F-5 (MIG-17) Fres- co, F-6 (MIG-19) Farmer, and F-7 (MIG-21) Fishbed daylight, clear-weather fighters incapable of meeting 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 4 The F-8-2 With Type 204 Radar, WP-13 Engines, and Side Air Intakes the modern bomber threat.' With its flaws, the F-8-1 is simply another clear-weather fighter in which the pilot must acquire targets visually. The deployment of radars with terrain-clearance features 2 gives today's Soviet bombers the ability to penetrate at low alti- tudes and high speeds, allowing them to avoid detec- tion and interception by high-flying F-8-1 s with ra- dars unable to distinguish low-flying targets from ground clutter. A terrain-clearance radar mode provides information to the pilot enabling him to maneuver around topographical obstructions in his flight path 3 311088 12-86 Revamping the F-8 The Chinese, recognizing that the utility of the F-8 in its present configuration is low, are on a two-tracked course of domestic and foreign upgrades to make the F-8 an all-weather, day/night interceptor. To allow the fitting of the larger, more sophisticated air- intercept radars?crucial to lookdown/shootdown ca- pability?and all-weather electronics systems, Chi- nese engineers have enclosed the aircraft's nose and added side air intakes. five proto- types of the new F-8, designated the F-8-2 by the Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 _ 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Chinese, have been built for flight-testing while Beij- ing negotiates for Western add-ons and designs new indigenous components. Seeking Foreign Assistance Cognizant that its defense industries were sorely deficient, the Chinese Air Force in early 1984 sought US assistance, primarily to improve the avionics on the F-8. After extended negotiations, the Chinese on 30 October 1986 signed a contract for 55 US integrat- ed avionics system kits-50 for installation in the F-8-2s and five for spare parts?for approximately $500 million under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement. Under the proposed terms, the US avion- ics package will provide the Chinese markedly en- hanced capabilities: ? The US pulsed Doppler radar will enable the F-8-2 to detect a target up to 65 kilometers away and track it up to 46 kilometers away?doubling the capabilities of China's best current radar, the Type 204. ? The radar also will give the Chinese their first all- aspect attack capability against low-flying targets. The radar in its lookdown mode can differentiate targets from ground clutter 37 kilometers away. ? And the head-up display, fire-control computer, and inertial navigation system are all new capabilities not found on the F-8-1. If installation of the avionics packages goes as sched- uled, the first F-8-2s with the US upgrade should be ready to fly in the early 1990s. The other critical improvement Beijing is seeking from the West is a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. in three stages: initial purchase of seven missiles for compatibility testing, outright pur- chase of 1,500 more missiles, and eventual acquisition of production technology. China, however, is still Secret awaiting approval of the purchase by the Coordinat- ing Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Japan has not cast its vote on the pur- chase, citing fears that China could gain a power projection capability with the acquisition of beyond- visual-range missiles. The Aspide is a potent all-aspect, all-weather missile capable of destroying aircraft flying at high altitude or at very low altitude. Essentially an Italian version of the US-built AIM-7M Sparrow, Aspide provides a maximum head-on range of 57 kilometers and if mated to the US radar would be able to hit targets up to 46 kilometers away. China's infrared- and radar- guided missiles are estimated to have ranges up to 15 kilometers. They are, therefore, limited to close-in combat engagements, where the F-8's lack of maneu- verability?compared with current state-of-the-art fighters?makes it extremely vulnerable to the most modern Soviet fighters.' To power the F-8-2, China has expressed interest in the GE-404 engine. An F-8 using the GE-404 would have a significantly higher thrust-to-weight (T/W) ratio than an F-8 with WP-7A engines-1.2 for the GE-404 versus 1.0 for the WP-7A. The increased T/W would give the aircraft greater sustained turn performance, an improved rate of climb, and better acceleration?all valuable in air combat maneuver- ing. China initiated discussions two years ago with General Electric officials, but may try to acquire the US engine through the Pakistani back door. and refit them with GE-404 engines. Beijing may hope that US-sanc- tioned Chinese involvement?by the building of the The Chinese will probably arm the F-8-2 with short-range Israeli Python 3 IR-guided missiles, in addition to Aspide missiles, because fighters in a squadron often carry a mix of weapons. The all-aspect Python 3?desig- nated the PL-8 in China?has a 15-kilometer range and has performance characteristics similar to those of the US AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. 4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 _ :OgY1 25X1 ')c)(1 25X1 ,25X1 L.azx 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret F-7M airframes with GE-404 engine mounts?will lead to a relaxation of US control on the technology. Alternately, Beijing may believe, on the basis of its close military ties, that Islamabad will illicitly pass the GE-404 to China as it has done with French antiship and air-to-air missiles. China has also looked at the Pratt & Whitney 1117, a lower thrust derivative of the F-100, and the Israeli- produced J79-GE-17 to power the F-8-2. For reasons of power and compatibility, however, we believe the GE-404 is Beijing's first choice. The GE-404 is lighter and, although its smaller size would necessitate some modifications to the inlet and nozzle ducts on the aircraft, it would fit better in the F-8-2 airframe than either the PW-1117 or J79-GE-17 engine. Moreover, the fuel consumption of the GE-404 is significantly lower than that of the older J79. Although the J79 engine has performed well on the Kfir fighter and Israel has become an important source of military equipment for China in recent years, Beijing would probably prefer the newer GE-404 engine. The Domestic Upgrades Although Beijing appears committed to US and Ital- ian upgrades to the F-8 aircraft, the Chinese have by no means given up on indigenous programs to improve the fighter. The proposed US sale of avionics pack- ages contains no provision for China's acquisition of the production technology. Thus, Beijing is faced with the prospect of continuing to buy the expensive radars outright or develop a pulsed Doppler radar of its own. According to a brochure acquired at the Farnborough Air Show in early September and published by China's aircraft industry, China has developed a new radar, designated the JL-7, which is fairly sophisti- cated. Although probably lacking a lookdown/shoot- down capability, the radar reportedly can detect a target 29 kilometers away and track it up to 16 kilometers away. The Chinese could use this radar with the Aspide missile, giving them a beyond-visual-range capability on the "non-Americanized" F-8-2s, but only if the missile was modified to operate on the radar's fre- quency. Secret China may also choose to power at least some of its F-8-2s with WP-13 engines, The WP-13, however, is essential- ly Soviet technology of the 1960s. Why Modernize the F-8? Despite its flaws, the F-8 fighter interceptor is Bei- jing's only option if it wishes to deploy an indigenous fighter with an all-weather capability, beyond-visual- range missiles, and a lookdown/shootdown capability 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 - 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ? 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 5 F-8 Finback and F-7 Fishbed Size Comparison Operational Maximum Guns Radius a Speed Missiles Radar F-8-2 Finback B 800-900 km Mach 2.2 2 23-mm cannons 4 infrared guided Search and or semiactive track radar guided F-8-1 Finback A 850 km Mach 2.3 2 30-mm cannons 4 infrared guided Range only F-7 Fishbed C 690 km Mach 2.0 2 30-mm cannons 2 infrared guided Range only The radius given is for a mission flown mostly at high altitudes at subsonic speeds. before the mid-1990s. China's F-7 fighter?although a good clear-weather, short-range fighter?in its pre- sent configuration cannot carry the large nose radar needed to guide medium-range radar-guided missiles to target. 7 0-24-3 311089 12-86 Thus, Beijing views the F-8-2 as China's primary long-range, high- and low-altitude fighter interceptor for the next decade. Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Why Is China Not Buying a Foreign Fighter? Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang publicly stated in August 1982 that China was ready to buy and coproduce French Mirage fighters, but no contract was signed. We believe that, because an imminent threat is not perceived, and because of national pride and cost, Chinese purchase of a foreign fighter such as the Mirage 2000 is unlikely. A widely publicized Mili- tary Commission meeting in May 1985 codified the strategic judgment that China has a "window of security" until the end of this century to revamp its military forces before a major Soviet invasion is even a possibility. Moreover, Beijing's stated goal is self- sufficiency in weapons development and production, and the Chinese are wary, once again, of depending on a foreign country?as they did with the Soviets in the 1950s?for defense modernization. In addition, Bei- jing holds insufficient foreign exchange to finance the bulk purchase of aircraft and prefers either limited imports or technological cooperation to enhance its indigenous systems. Moreover, the F-8-2 has the potential to operate not only as a fighter-interceptor, but also as a multimis- sion fighter with significant ground attack/strike capability. The proposed US radar has a ground- mapping mode, allowing for imprecise navigation and target recognition?with a third of the resolution available with state-of-the-art US radars?and an air- to-ground ranging mode that will provide range infor- mation for weapon launches. With relatively simple modifications to the US fire-control system and the addition of a laser designator for target illumination, the Chinese F-8-2 could, for example, be armed with Secret Table 3 The Soviet Air Threat Along China's Border a 25X1 25X1 25X1 1986 1995 Projections Fighters and interceptors Fiddler (TU-28P) 50 0 Fishbed (MIG-21) 90 0 Flagon (SU-15) 140 0 Flanker (SU-27) 20 260 Flogger (MIG-23) 390 240 Foxbat (MIG-25) 30 0 Foxhound (MIG-31) 40 150 Fulcrum (MIG-29) 0 240 Bombers and fighter-bombers Backfire (TU-22M) 40 60 Badger (TU-16) 50 0 Bear (TU-95) 50 10 Blackjack (TU-160) 0 30 Fencer (SU-24) 240 260 Fishbed (MIG-21) 50 0 Fitter (SU-17) 230 50 Flogger (MIG-23/27) 170 230 Forger 0 20 Frogfoot (SU-25) 10 160 Fulcrum (MIG-29) 0 160 New light bomber 10 Attack helicopters Havoc (MI-28) 0 60 Hind (MI-24) 350 500 Hokum 0 40 a These figures include Soviet Air Force and Air Defense aircraft deployed along China's border, but not Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft for which 1995 projections are not available. In the Pacific Fleet Air Force there are currently 50 fighters, 50 heavy bombers, 190 medium bombers, and 40 fighter-bombers. The projections are based on anticipated production and previous deployment patterns of new systems. All figures are rounded to the nearest 10. the French AS.30 TASM missile and ARMAT anti- radiation missile: ? The laser designated AS.30 TASM is a relatively short-range missile?approximately 15 kilome- ters?used to attack point surface targets, such as bunkers, bridges, and ships. 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 - 25X1 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 6 The F-8-2 Will Give the Chinese Air Force Its First Credible Capability To Interdict the TU-22M Backfire Bomber TU-22M Backfire bomber. ? The ARMAT is a medium-range missile?approxi- mately 30 to 50 kilometers?used to destroy defend- ing ground radars to incapacitate surface-to-air missile batteries. Both systems are exported by France, but we have no evidence of any serious attempt by Beijing to acquire them. Nonetheless, according to US military officers involved in negotiations with the Chinese, Beijing is expressing a strong interest in turning the F-8-2 into a multimission fighter with this kind of sophisticated ground attack capability. 9 311090 12-86- The F-8 and Regional Air Balance The Sino-Soviet Border When Beijing begins fielding F-8-2s in the early 1990s, the Chinese Air Force will have its first credible capability to interdict Soviet medium and light bombers attacking China. Soviet TU-16 Badger and TU-22M Backfire medium bombers, as well as SU-24 Fencer light bombers, already are deployed in East Asia. We expect that by the early 1990s the Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 7 Soviet SU-27 Flankers, Armed With AA-10 Missiles, Initially Deployed in 1985 Soviets will also deploy in East Asia TU-160 Black- jack bombers, capable of carrying nuclear-armed long-range cruise missiles. The F-8-2s, however, will not substantially alter the overall air balance because the Soviet Union will maintain its marked qualitative edge in fighter air- craft by deploying more of its new fourth-generation fighters?MIG-31 Foxhound, SU-27 Flanker, and MIG-29 Fulcrum?in East Asia. An F-8-2 equipped with US avionics and a beyond-visual-range missile like the Aspide surpasses the performance capabilities of the Soviet second-generation MIG-21 Fishbed and approaches those of the third-generation MIG-23 Secret 311091 12-86 Flogger. However, the new F-8-2 will not be a match for the Foxhound?in East Asia since 1983?and the Flanker?initially deployed to East Asia in 1985?or the Fulcrum?expected in East Asia in the 1990s. The Chinese fighter's avionics will not give it the multiple-target or track-while-scan capabilities that the Soviets are developing for their advanced aircraft. With a multiple-target capability, the Soviets would be able to track more than one enemy aircraft at a time. The Flanker and Fulcrum fighters will also be far more maneuverable than the F-8-2. We believe, 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Figure 8 The Soviet MIG-29 Fulcrum Is Expected in Far East in the 1990s therefore, that Beijing must field large numbers of F- 8-2s?as well as modern ground-based air defenses? just to keep pace with the Soviet threat of the 1990s.4 The Taiwan Strait Balance We believe Beijing already can gain command of the air over Taiwan because its Air Force greatly out- numbers Taiwan's. But China would take heavy, probably exorbitant, losses primarily from Taiwan's ground-based air defenses. China has about 5,100 11 311092 12-86 fighter aircraft compared with only some 320 fighter aircraft for Taiwan. F-8-2s will still be highly vulner- able to surface-to-air missiles. But, if equipped with effective antiradiation missiles and TASMs as well as air-to-air missiles, they could greatly reduce the num- ber of Chinese aircraft lost to Taiwan's ground-based air defense systems.' 'Another option for reducing Chinese losses over Taiwan would be to equip A-5 ground-attack aircraft with ARMATs and TASMs to erode Taiwan's surface-to-air missile-firing capability. Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret In aerial combat, today's F-8-1 is not a match for Taiwan's F-5E Tiger II fighter, but the proposed improvements to the F-8-2 would erode the F-5E's qualitative edge. The F-5E's air-to-air combat capa- bility exceeds that of the F-8-1 because Taiwan's fighter has a search-and-track radar and a better air- to-air missile. The F-8-2, however, is likely to be more maneuverable and have beyond-visual-range missiles that allow the F-8-2 to fire before the F-5E acquires the F-8 on its radar. Even if only armed with PL-8 (Israeli Python 3) missiles, the F-8-2 would have an all-aspect attack capability not found on today's F-5E fighter. Better engines?such as the GE-404 ?on the F-8-2 would also improve Secret China's capabilities in air operations against Taiwan, giving the aircraft a combination of greater payload and longer range. In addition, the longer engine life for the F-8-2 engines will greatly reduce the aircraft maintenance problems China experienced during its 1979 war with Vietnam. Taiwan's planned development and deployment of its Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) will offset many of the advantages Beijing could gain from the F-8-2. Taipei plans to equip the IDF with AIM-7F Sparrow beyond-visual-range missiles and AIM-9L Sidewinder all-aspect infrared-guided missiles, although Wash- ington has not yet approved the plan. This equipment 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 would make the IDF more than a match for the F-8-2, with its shorter, radar-limited missile range. Powered by two engines based on the Garrett TFE731-2L, the IDF will be similar in capability to a US F-20 Tigershark. The fighter's proposed APG-67 radar will give the IDF lookup/lookdown capability, air-to-ground ranging, distinction of targets in ground clutter, and the option to add track-while-scan and surface moving-target track capabilities. Implications for Vietnam Fielding of F-8-2s may have its greatest impact along the China-Vietnam border, although airpower has not been a factor in Sino-Vietnamese hostilities. The Soviet Union has not provided Vietnam with any fighters more advanced than the MIG-21 Fishbed, but China's deployment of F-8-2s will substantially strengthen Vietnam's hand in requesting MIG-23 Floggers. the Soviets have denied Hanoi's requests on the grounds that the MIG-21 is at least as capable as any Chinese fighter in service. Vietnam in the mid-1990s might face a force of Chinese F-8-2s that are more advanced than its own fighters and, if these fighters are equipped for strike missions, a Chinese Air Force far more prepared than today's for deep strikes into Vietnam. The shape of the Sino-Vietnamese air bal- ance, therefore, is likely to be determined by the Soviet Union's willingness to provide Hanoi with more modern fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense systems. A New Entry in China's Arms Export Catalogue China is aggressively exporting arms to the Third World?with sales of over $9 billion since 1980?and has added the F-8-2 to its list of aircraft for export. At the Farnborough Air Show, China's aircraft industry displayed a model of the F-8-2 and distributed bro- chures extolling the performance capabilities of the fighter in air combat, battlefield interdiction, and close air support missions. China hopes to find a market for its indigenous F-8-2?not the aircraft with US upgrades?which we estimate may be ready for export as early as late 1987. 13 Secret Beijing is likely to initially sell the F-8-2 to customers who have previously purchased Chinese aircraft, such as Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Sudan. rklthough the F-8-2 may not be a modern fighter, its estimated price of less than $10 million will make it attractive to Third World coun- tries that have come to view China as a reliable and discreet supplier of inexpensive and easily operated arms. Implications for the United States Beijing has high expectations for the F-8 moderniza- tion program and the role the United States will play. Because this is the first major FMS case, the Chinese are bound to push the limits of the Foreign Military Sales agreement to set precedents for future arms sales. According to a US Defense Department offi- cial, the Chinese have tried?in violation of the FMS accord?to persuade the US negotiators to let them select the contractor who will provide the F-8-2 avionics packages. The Chinese are unlikely to be satisfied with the purchase of 55 radar packages and will want Washington to eventually provide produc- tion technology. In addition, we expect Beijing to seek the avionics and missiles necessary for an air-to- ground attack capability and active electronic coun- termeasure equipment to better defend the aircraft. If the Chinese cannot acquire this technology from the United States, they will certainly turn to other West- ern countries, such as France, Italy, or Israel. Beijing appears pleased with US efforts to supply the F-8 improvements and probably views them as a signal that the United States is willing?at least to a limited extent?to upgrade China's military capabili- ty despite its possible detrimental impact on Taiwan's defenses. In our judgment, though, Beijing is con- cerned that the anticipated F-8 program will be used in Washington to justify new arms programs for Taiwan. Successful modernization of the F-8 with US assistance probably will lead Taiwan to pressure the Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret United States to at least match the technology provid- ed to China. We believe that if Washington decides to further aid F-8-2 development by providing engines or upgrading the avionics packages, improving its air-to- ground capability, Taipei probably will press more vigorously for: ? Better ground-based air defense systems, such as the Patriot. ? The AIM-7F Sparrow beyond-visual-range radar- guided missile for the IDF. ? The AIM-9L Sidewinder all-aspect infrared-guided missile for the IDF and F-5E. ? F-16 or F-20 fighters. We believe the successful conclusion of the F-8 avionics sale signals the beginning of long-term ties to Chinese defense industries that are likely to increase Washington's influence with the Chinese military. Today, US-Chinese military ties are limited to occa- sional senior- and training-level exchanges, but instal- lation of the avionics packages and maintenance training will necessitate the presence of US Defense Department officials and contractors at Chinese de- fense plants for at least the next 10 years. If the Chinese are pleased with the results of the F-8-2 avionics upgrade, we expect future FMS sales of items such as the Mark 46 torpedo, currently under negotiation with a contract expected next spring. Deng Xiaoping, moreover, signaled Beijing's interest in a wider arms technology relationship when he raised the possibility of US military credits or com- mercial assistance for weapon purchases with Secre- tary of Defense Weinberger during his October 1986 trip to China. Secret 14 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/13: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200940001-4 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release