Panama - Noriega Takes Control
In August 1982, President de la Espriella formed a new cabinet that included independents and members of the Liberal Party and the PRD; Jorge Illueca Sibauste, Royo's foreign minister, became the new vice president. Meanwhile, Colonel Armando Contreras became chief of staff of the National Guard. Colonel Noriega continued to hold the powerful position of assistant chief of staff for intelligence — the Panamanian government's only intelligence arm.
In December 1982, Noriega became chief of staff of the National Guard.
In November 1982, a commission was established to draft a series of proposed amendments to the 1972 Constitution. The PRD supported the amendments and claimed that they would limit the power of the National Guard and help the country return to a fully democratic system of government. These amendments reduced the term of the president from six to five years, created a second vice presidency, banned participation in elections by active members of the National Guard, and provided for the direct election of all members of the legislature (renamed the Legislative Assembly) after nomination by legitimate political parties. These amendments were approved in a national referendum held on April 24, 1983, when they were considered to be a positive step toward lessening the power of the National Guard. In reality, however, the National Guard leadership would surrender only the power it was willing to surrender.
General Paredes, in keeping with the new constitutional provision that no active National Guard member could participate in an election, reluctantly retired in August 1983. He was succeeded immediately by Noriega, who was promoted to brigadier general. During the same month, Paredes was nominated as the PRD candidate for president. National elections were only five months away, and Paredes appeared to be the leading presidential contender.
Nevertheless, in early September, President de la Espriella purged his cabinet of Paredes loyalists, and Noriega declared that he would not publicly support any candidate for president. These events convinced Paredes that he had no official government or military backing for his candidacy. He withdrew from the presidential race on September 6, 1983, less than a month after retiring from the National Guard. Although Paredes subsequently gained the support of the Popular Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Popular — PNP) and was able to appear on the 1984 ballot, he was no longer a major presidential contender. Constitutional reforms notwithstanding, the reality of Panamanian politics dictated that no candidate could become president without the backing of the National Guard and, especially, its commander.
With Paredes out of the way, Noriega was free to consolidate power. One of his first acts was to have the Legislative Assembly approve a bill to restructure the National Guard, which thereafter would operate under the name of Panama Defense Forces (Fuerzas de Defensa de Panama—FDP). Nominally, the president of the republic would head the FDP, but real power would be in the hands of Noriega, who assumed the new title of commander in chief of the FDP.
Meanwhile, the PRD — the military-supported party — was left without a candidate. To strengthen its base for the upcoming election, the PRD created a coalition of six political parties called the National Democratic Union (Union Nacional Democratica — UNADE), which included the PALA, PLN, and PR, as well as the smaller PP and the left-of-center Broad Popular Front (Frente Amplio Popular — FRAMPO). With the approval of the military, UNADE selected Nicolas Ardito Barletta Vallarino to be its presidential candidate. Ardito Barletta, a University of Chicago-trained economist and former minister of planning, had been a vice president of the World Bank for six years before his nomination in February 1984. Ardito Barletta was considered well qualified for the presidency, but he lacked his own power base.
Opposing Ardito Barletta and the UNADE coalition was the Democratic Opposition Alliance (Alianza Democratica de Oposicion — ADO) and its candidate, the veteran politician, Arnulfo Arias. ADO, formed by the PPA, the PDC, the center-right National Liberal Republican Movement (Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacional — MOLIRENA), and an assortment of leftist parties, was a diverse coalition made up of rural peasants (especially from Arias' s home province of Chiriquf) and lower- and middle-class elements that opposed military rule and government corruption. During the campaign, Arias emphasized the need to reduce military influence in Panamanian politics. He called for the removal of the defense bill passed in September 1983, which had given the FDP control over all security forces and services.
The campaign proved to be bitterly contested, with both sides predicting victory by a large margin. Arias and his backers claimed that Ardito Barletta was conducting the campaign unfairly. Indeed, UNADE took advantage of being the pro-government coalition and used government vehicles and funds to help conduct its campaign. In addition, most of the media—television, radio stations, and newspapers—favored the government coalition. For example, only one of the country's five daily newspapers supported the ADO.
Voting day, May 6, 1984, was peaceful. Violence broke out the next day between supporters of the two main candidates in front of the Legislative Palace, where votes were being counted. One person was killed, and forty others were injured. Irregularities and errors in the voter registration and in the vote count led to credible charges of electoral misconduct and fraud. Thousands of people, who believed that they had registered properly, showed up at the polling places only to discover that their names had been inexplicably left off the voting list. Large-scale vote-buying, especially in rural areas, was reported.
More serious problems developed during the next several days. Very few official vote tallies were being delivered from the precinct and district levels to the National Board of Vote Examiners, with no apparent reason for the delay. The vote count proceeded slowly amid a climate of suspicion and rumor. On May 9, the vote tabulation was suspended. On May 1 1 , the members of the National Board of Vote Examiners declared that they could not fulfill their function because of 2,124 allegations of fraud, and they turned the process over to the Electoral Tribunal.
The opposition coalition publicized evidence showing that many votes had been destroyed before they had been counted. These charges and all subsequent challenges by the opposition were rejected by the tribunal, even though the head of the three-member tribunal demanded a further investigation into the allegations. The election results were made public on May 16. Ardito Barletta won the election with 300,748 votes; Arias came in second with 299,035; retired General Paredes received 15,976. The military-supported candidate had won the election, and the threat to the political power of the FDP had been circumvented.
The United States government acknowledged that the election results were questionable but declared that Ardito Barletta' s victory must be seen as an important forward step in Panama's transition to democracy. Relations between the United States and Panama worsened later in the year because of Panama's displeasure at the alleged slowness with which the United States-controlled Panama Canal Commission was replacing American workers with Panamanians. The resignation of President Ricardo de la Espriella and his cabinet on February 13, 1984, was barely noticed during the intense election campaign. De la Espriella was forced out by Noriega.
De la Espriella had opposed the military's manipulation of the election and strongly advocated free elections for 1984. During his brief tenure, de la Espriella had failed to institute any significant policy changes, and his presidency was lackluster. De la Espriella was succeeded immediately by Vice President Jorge Illueca, who formed a new cabinet.
Ardito Barletta, a straitlaced and soft-spoken technocrat, took office on October 11, 1984. He quickly launched an attack on the country's economic problems and sought help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) to refinance part of the country's US$3.7-billion debt—the world's highest on a per-capita basis. He promised to modernize the government's bureaucracy and implement an economic program that would create a 5-percent annual growth rate. On November 13—to meet IMF requirements for a US$603-million loan renegotiation—he announced economic austerity measures, including a 7-percent tax on all services and reduced budgets for cabinet ministries and autonomous government agencies. He revoked some of the measures ten days later in response to massive protests and strikes by labor, student, and professional organizations.
Negative popular reaction to Ardito Barletta's efforts to revive the country's stagnant economy troubled opposition politicians, the military, and many of his own UNADE supporters. Ardito Barletta's headstrong administrative style also offended Panamanian politicians who had a customary backslapping and back-room style of politicking. Moreover, Arditto Barletta's economic program conflicted with the military's traditional use of high government spending to keep the poor and the political left placated.
On August 12, 1985, Noriega stated that the situation in the country was "totally anarchic and out of control"; he also criticized Ardito Barletta for running an incompetent government. Observers speculated that another reason — and probably the real one — for the ouster of Ardito Barletta was FDP opposition to the president's plan to investigate the murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a prominent critic of the Panamanian military. Shortly before his death, Spadafora had announced that he had evidence linking Noriega to drug trafficking and illegal arms dealing. Relatives of Spadafora claimed that witnesses had seen him in the custody of Panamanian security forces in the Costa Rican border area immediately before his decapitated body was found on September 14, just a few miles north of the Panamanian border.
Because of uneasiness within the FDP over the Spadafora affair, Noriega, using Ardito Barletta's ineffectiveness as an excuse, pressured Ardito Barletta to resign, which he did on September 27, 1985, after only eleven months in office. Ardito Barletta was succeeded the next day by his first vice president, Eric Arturo Delvalle Hennquez, who announced a new cabinet on October 3. 1985.
Conditions continued to deteriorate in 1985. Elements of the government coalition joined in protests against Ardito Barletta's economic policies, and pressures from the National Guard and the PRD forced the president to agree to changes in several key cabinet posts. Both business and labor confederations withdrew from government- sponsored meetings to discuss the situation, and labor disturbances increased. In August Noriega publicly criticized the government.
Rumors of a coup were spreading when, on September 14, 1985, the headless body of a prominent critic of Noriega, Dr. Hugo Spadafora, was found in Costa Rica. This discovery unleashed another round of protest demonstrations. Noriega and the National Guard denied any involvement in the murder, but they refused to allow an independent investigation. When Ardito Barletta seemed to indicate some willingness to do so, he was hurriedly recalled from a visit to the United Nations (UN) and, on September 28, forced to resign. Vice President Delvalle became the fifth president in less than four years.
The ousting of Ardito Barletta failed to calm the situation. Protests over Spadafora' s murder and over the economic situation continued. In October the government was forced to close all schools for several days. Rising tensions also began to affect relations with the United States, which had opposed the ousting of Ardito Barletta, and even created problems within the major pro-government party, the PRD, which underwent a shake-up in its leadership.
The new administration initially attempted to reverse the rising tide of discontent by returning to the populist policies of the Torrijos era. Prices of milk, rice, and petroleum were lowered, and President Delvalle announced that any agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would be based on negotiations with labor and with the private sector. Economic realities, however, soon forced the government to impose an austerity program remarkably similar to that advocated by Ardito Barletta and to introduce, over strong objections from the unions, sweeping reforms in the labor code, designed to make Panama more attractive for foreign and domestic investment. A national strike protesting the new policies failed when Noriega and the FDP supported Delvalle. The new policies produced some economic improvement but did nothing to resolve mounting political problems.
Panama's domestic problems were paralleled by growing criticism abroad, notably in the United States. In March 1986, the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began holding hearings on the situation in Panama, and the following month hearings also began in the House of Representatives. In June a series of articles by Seymour Hersh alleging involvement by Panamanian officials in narcotics trafficking, the murder of Spadafora, and the passing of sensitive intelligence to Cuba were published in the New York Times.
Both within and outside Panama, the increased criticism focused attention on the military and on General Noriega. Delvalle 's civilian government found it increasingly difficult to contend with the perception that it was little more than a pliant tool of the military. These perceptions were further strengthened in October 1986, when the president, despite open protests, was forced to dismiss four cabinet ministers and appoint their replacements from a list prepared by the PRD.
Tensions also increased between the government and opposition media within Panama in 1986. Roberto Eisenman, Jr., editor of La Prensa, took refuge in the United States, alleging that there was a government plot to kill him. Radio Mundial, owned by opposition political leader Carlos Ivan Zufiiga, was ordered closed. But despite increased protests and international pressures, the government's hold on power seemed unshaken.
The situation changed abruptly in June 1987. A long-time power struggle within the FDP between Noriega and his chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, led to the forced retirement of Diaz Herrera on June 1 . Six days later, the colonel responded by a series of public denunciations, accusing Noriega of involvement in the deaths of Torrijos and Spadafora and of using massive fraud to ensure the victory of Ardito Barletta in the 1984 elections. The result was widespread rioting. The opposition demanded that both Noriega and Delvalle resign, and numerous civic and business groups formed the National Civic Crusade (Cruzada Civilista Nacional—CCN) to press for changes in the government.
As demonstrations spread, the government declared a state of emergency, suspending constitutional rights and instituting censorship. The CCN responded by calling a national strike that paralyzed the economy for several days. Violent actions by government forces and antigovernment demonstrators further polarized public opinion. The leadership of Panama's Roman Catholic Church joined in criticism of the government but urged a peaceful solution to the national crisis. Such calls were ignored by the government, which, instead, threatened to arrest those involved in the protests and seize the property of businesses that joined in the strike, closed the schools, and unleashed a virulent propaganda campaign accusing its opponents of being linked with United States interests that wanted to abort the Panama Canal treaties.
The general strike collapsed after a few days, but protests did not end. Periodic protests, strikes, and demonstrations continued throughout the summer and fall of 1987. Relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the government charged the United States embassy with supporting the opposition and bitterly protested a United States Senate resolution calling for an investigation of the charges made by Diaz Herrera. An attack on the embassy by a mob and the arrest of United States diplomatic and military personnel by the FDP led to a suspension of military assistance by the United States. At the end of 1987, relations were more strained than at any time since the 1964 riots.
The continued civil strife also badly damaged Panama's economy. The future of the banking sector seemed especially imperiled if the deadlock between the government and its opponents should be prolonged.
In late 1987, it seemed clear that the CCN and the opposition political parties could not, by themselves, force a change in either the military or civilian leadership. Indeed, their efforts may have solidified military support behind Noriega and Delvalle. But it was equally clear that the incumbent leadership could neither restore business confidence nor stop the steady flight of capital from the country. Efforts to portray the conflict as a class struggle or as part of a United States plot to retain control of the canal only exacerbated the situation. Restoring order, rebuilding the economy, and creating faith in the political system were formidable tasks that became more difficult with each passing month. Panama, in late 1987, was a society in crisis, with a political system that could not function effectively, but the government appeared determined to resist any effort to produce fundamental changes.
The 07 May 1989 elections removed any remaining pretense of quasi-legal civilian government. In early 1989, faced with approaching elections, the Noriega regime launched a wave of repression, closed most opposition media, limited the opposition's access to the media, and attempted to keep the foreign press out of Panama. Although some opposition rallies were permitted, free campaigning was clearly restricted.The continuing political crisis throughout 1989 had a deep impact on Panama's service-oriented economy, which is sensitive to public and international confidence. Panama's gross domestic product dropped by 20 percent in 1988 and an additional drop was projected for 1989. Despite massive regime fraud, the Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC) won the May 1989 election by a three-to-one margin, according to independent observers, including the Catholic Church. The Catholic hierarchy, an international observer delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter, and the official U.S. delegation headed by Congressman John Murtha (D-PA) denounced the electoral fraud. After the elections, in which vote counters were attacked and four people were murdered, many opposition candidates and participants were forced into hiding and exile or were arrested and tortured. On 10 May 1999, the winning opposition slate leaders were publicly beaten, and one was hospitalized. One of their bodyguards was killed and another wounded. The CPDH reported that by June 1 over 140 persons had been detained in postelection roundups of political opponents.
Human rights under the military dictatorship steadily deteriorated throughout 1989. Elections were annulled, protest brutally repressed, and an unconstitutional regime that ruled by decree was installed. A rebellion led by PDF officers failed and many participants were tortured, killed, or imprisoned. The Noriega dictatorship closed all the country's opposition media, took over two television stations, and intimidated a third. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concluded in its 1989 report that Noriega's de facto regime violated the rights to humane treatment, personal liberty, movement and residence, and thought and expression. On the most basic level, the report stated that the Noriega provisional government was "devoid of constitutional legitimacy." Upon taking office. President Endara made the observance of human rights, the correction of prior human rights abuses, and the prosecution of human rights violators matters of the highest priority for his administration.
People in Panama seldom disappeared permanently under the Noriega regime, although there were a few cases in past years. CPDH listed only two persons who are believed to have disappeared, of whom only one was thought to have political implications. By the end of 1989, a University of Panama student rights group began circulating names and pictures of several persons thought to have disappeared. Throughout 1989, the Noriega regime arrested and held incommunicado a number of political opponents. Information on the whereabouts of many of these detainees was kept from family members and lawyers, and habeas corpus applications and appeals for the protection of constitutional rights were ignored.
Less commonly, victims charged that they were forced to listen to or witness the torture of others, including relatives, to be tortured in front of relatives, to sit naked on blocks of ice, to have fingernails or toenails extracted, and to suffer male and female rape, victims also had fingers or other appendages amputated, or were cut with razor blades (in one case the word "yanqui" was carved on a victim). Frequently, prisoners were moved from one place of detention to another while authorities were denying to attorneys and family members that the detainees were in custody. A favorite tactic was to have night courts impose lengthy, "noncommutable" sentences (criminal sentences are otherwise routinely commuted for good behavior). For example, in several cases a year-long, noncommutable sentence was imposed for the distribution of opposition newsletters.
The Noriega regime responded to the ongoing political crisis by subjugating the media, both electronic and print, either to complete regime control or severe self-censorship. All opposition media were closed in February 1988. At that time, the regime also eliminated local distribution of foreign news publications. In 1989 the Noriega regime further tightened control of the media by prohibiting opposition newsletters, closing a semi-independent radio network, and attempting to curb the international press. By 19 December 1989, there remained only one nonregime radio program of news commentary, and it stayed on the air by never criticizing the military.
During 1989 the PDF was involved in hundreds of incidents of harassment of U.S. military personnel and dependents in Panama, often culminating in illegal detentions and denial of due process under the Panamanian Constitution and the Panama Canal Treaty. On 19 December 1989, Guillermo Endara, who was widely credited with having won elections in May 1989 that were subsequently annulled at Noriega's behest, was sworn in as President. The Noriega regime was ousted by U.S. forces that entered Panama on December 20 to protect U.S. lives, ensure U.S. ability to meet its obligations under the Panama Canal Treaties, help restore democracy to Panama, and bring Noriega to justice on narcotics-related charges in the United States.
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