Close Combat Vehicle (CCV)
The Family of Land Combat Vehicles (FLCV) program covered a suite of new combat capabilities. By 2013 the program to date had included upgraded Light Armoured Vehicles, the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle, Armoured Engineering Vehicles, and the Close Combat Vehicle known as the CCV. The Family of Land Vehicles program was a complex undertaking and had taken time. Throughout that time, Defence continuously assessed and validated the program’s success in matching new equipments capabilities with the identified requirements of each project. It was this ongoing assessment that led to consider a change in course.
Unlike the other vehicles in the Family of Land Combat Vehicles, the CCV is not replacing a vehicle in the current Canadian Forces fleet. The CCV’s fundamental purpose is to bridge the gap between the current light (5-25 tonnes) and heavy armoured (45 tonnes +) vehicle fleets by providing the [army] with an operational capability that can predominantly operate with the main battle tanks and the other Canadian Forces armoured vehicles within a high-threat environment,
The Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) would provide the Canadian Forces with a medium-weight infantry fighting vehicle that is both highly protected and tactically mobile. Unlike the other vehicles in the Family of Land Combat Vehicles, the CCV is not replacing a vehicle in the current Canadian Forces fleet. Instead, the CCV would bridge the gap between light armoured vehicles (five to 20 tonnes) and heavy armoured vehicles (more than 45 tonnes), coming in between 25 and 45 tonnes. The CCV would allow infantry to operate in intimate support of the Leopard 2 tanks, providing the Army with a more balanced and integrated fleet. This vehicle’s reliable protection and enhanced mobility and firepower would improve our troops’ combat effectiveness on the battlefield of today and tomorrow.
The CCV project would involve the procurement and fielding of the armoured vehicles as well as the development and implementation of a through-life in-service support contract. The Canadian Forces would acquire 108 vehicles with an option for up to 30 more. The contract is scheduled to be awarded by summer 2011 with initial operational capability (IOC) declared one year later in July 2012. The CCV is expected to reach full operational capability by July 2015. The procurement process would be a competitive military off-the-shelf approach. A letter of interest and price and availability (LOI/P&A) would be issued shortly. The project’s definition phase would include a solicitation of interest and qualifications (SOIQ) and a request for proposals (RFP).
In today’s networked-based CNN-covered international conflicts, where violence and loss are commercially valuable marketing and sales tools, the difference between mission success and failure not only comes down to issues of defeating enemy forces and limiting collateral damage. Mission failure can also result from the potential loss of small numbers of friendly forces and resources due to enemy fire. Western populations are, at present, not willing to indulge in the large losses of friendly troops which were representative of the Second World War. Even the loss of a single platoon can have dramatic political ramifications which could ultimately result in the withdrawal from coalition operations, due to political pressure at home. This departure could result in a continued ripple effect to include the likely loss of credibility in the face of our partners and allies, which could potentially have additional political and economic consequences. While nothing can guarantee that such losses would never occur, outstanding leadership, training, and the application of pivotal equipment can have a very significant influence upon mission success.
The first request for proposal saw no winner. “Following the conclusion of a Solicitation of Interest and Qualification (SOIQ), a Request for Proposals (RFP) was released to the pre-qualified bidders. There were no technically compliant bids received in response to the original RFP,” a spokesperson for the CF said. The second RFP, issued to five pre-qualified bidders in April 2012, closed on 04 September 2012. They were Germany’s Artec GmbH and Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH, Sweden’s BAE Systems Hägglunds, Canada’s General Dynamics Land Systems and France’s Nexter. Of the five, the latter three submitted bids before the September 4 deadline and would enter this next, and hopefully last, round of competition: BAE’s CV90, General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada’s Piranha V and Nexter’s VBCI 25.
The CCV platform was envisioned to bridge the protection, mobility, and firepower gap between a Light Armoured Vehicle and a Main Battle Tank. However, since the beginning of the Land Combat Vehicles program in 2009, significant new capabilities addressed the protection concerns. The capabilities of the Upgraded Light Armoured Vehicle III were far superior to what was originally envisioned. Additionally, considerable investment in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities; significant advances in Counter-IED; and the Canadian Army’s improvements in its tactics, techniques and procedures have all resulted in significant mitigation of tactical risk to our soldiers in deployed combat operations.
Based on this assessment, and the fundamental principle that the Canadian Armed Forces do not procure capabilities unless they are absolutely essential to the attainment of our mandate – the mandate outlined in the Canada First Defence Strategy – the Department of Defence recommended that the Government of Canada not proceed with the procurement process for the Close Combat Vehicle.
