• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Foreign Relations

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro said, in a television interview 01 January 2019, remarked that Russia's support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has significantly increased regional tensions, and is a worrying development. "Russia has made a maneuver in Venezuela. We know the intention of Maduro's Government... and Brazil has to worry about it. Over the last 25 years, our Armed Forces have been abandoned because of a political issue, because we, the Armed Forces, are the last obstacle to socialism," Bolsonaro said.

A cornerstone of Bolsonaro's government will be the fight against the progressive National Popular governments of Latin America that ruled the region during the last decade and are still in some countries. Bolsonaro has already said that he will oppose the governments of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, but his main objective is to continue the work of delegitimizing the Workers Party's (PT) governments of Lula and Dilma Rousseff.

Vice-president Hamilton Murao, a retired military general, has praised Brazil's intelligence and repression division during the military dictatorship, as has Bolsonaro, and referred to Carlos Brilhante Ustra as a "hero." Murao has spoken against relationships between countries of the Global South, the "diplomacy called South-South. From that point on we were involved with all that 'dirt-bag scum'."

The new Brazilian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araujo has said that he believes that climate change is a ploy by “cultural Marxists” to asphyxiate Western economies and protome China’s growth, and characterized climates science as “dogma." As Reginaldo Lopes noted, the ministry of "Foreign Affairs is against diplomacy," Araujo will follow the prerogatives of Murao and Bolsonaro and will focus the Brazilian relationships towards the North-South relationships, instead of strengthening the relationships among the Global South countries. One of the countries that Brazil will prioritize will be Israel, as Bolsonaro stated, the relationships between both countries "are on the right track," when Bolsonaro spoke about the recent visit of Benjamin Netanyahu to the South American Country.

As part of his plan for international relationships, Bolsonaro vowed to unite the anti-communism in the Americas, as he said in early December 2018 when hosting the Conservative Summit of the Americas. For Eduardo Bolsonaro, Senator and son of Jair, "Latin America gets together to say no to socialism, no to the Sao Paulo Forum, we will not be the next Venezuela." The Bolsonaro government will target the Venezuelan, the Nicaraguan and the Cuban governments, but will probably also try to undermine and target other progressive governments in the region such as the Salvadorean of Sanchez Ceren, the Mexican led by Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and the Bolivian led by Indigenous President Evo Morales.

With Brazil emerging rapidly from the global economic downturn, President Lula's high popularity ratings, the country's new stature in the G20, international trade and financial architecture discussions, a tenth term on the UN Security Council set to begin in January, and Rio de Janeiro's successful bid to host the 2016 Olympics on the heels of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, Brazil was rapidly gaining international confidence and clout. The attainment of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) was a central goal of Brazil's foreign policy under President Lula's government, and Brazil was elected to a tenth UNSC term, a record matched only by Japan. Brazil has also taken a more visible role on major international negotiations, including the Doha trade round, G20 discussions on the global economic crisis, and post-Kyoto climate change talks, taken the lead on peacekeeping in Haiti, and is seeking a role in the Middle East peace process.

Brazil has traditionally been a leader in the inter-American community and played an important role in collective security efforts, as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil supported the Allies in both World Wars. During World War II, its expeditionary force in Italy played a key role in the Allied victory at Monte Castello. It is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a party to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Recently, Brazil has given high priority to expanding relations with its South American neighbors and is a founding member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) created in June 2004, and Mercosul, a customs union between Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil, with Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador as associate members; Venezuela's full membership is pending.

The general policy approach of Lula and his foreign policy team in seeking to maintain stability in the region did not differ enormously from that of his predecessors; historically, Brazilian governments have avoided taking sides in Latin America and followed a policy of trying to maintain good relations with all of their neighbors. Uncertainty about Venezuela added a new element, however, leading to a more concerted effort to contain Chavez. Brazil was the leading advocate of Venezuelan admission to Mercosul, a move that, if approved by the Brazilian and Paraguayan congresses, would further complicate both the stated economic integration and political objectives of the organization. From Lula's point of view, bringing Chavez into a political organization in which Brazil has strong influence makes sense.

Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations and participates in its specialized agencies. It has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor, and most recently Haiti. Brazil is currently leading the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti. In 2010-2011, Brazil is serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Prior to this, it had been a member of the UN Security Council nine times. Brazil is seeking a permanent position on the Council.

As Brazil's domestic economy has grown and diversified, the country has become increasingly involved in international economic and trade policy discussions. For example, Brazil was a leader of the G-20 group of nations and in 2009 became a creditor country to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The U.S., Western Europe, and Japan are primary markets for Brazilian exports and sources of foreign lending and investment. China is a growing market for Brazilian exports. Brazil also bolstered its commitment to nonproliferation through ratification of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signing a full-scale nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), acceding to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

If Brazil's rapid emergence on the global stage is unquestionable, it is also true that it is very much still emerging. Brazil's clear sense of purpose in South America, where the overriding importance of maintaining stability on its poorly protected borders has led to an emphasis on dialogue and integration with its ten neighbors, is not in evidence on most extra-regional issues. Brazil's objective in achieving a seat at the table on many global issues seems to stop at the seat itself. In part, this stems from a general Brazilian disposition to prefer dialogue with other countries to confrontation or isolation. It was also driven by Lula's determination to develop and maintain friendly relations with all global players as Brazil seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The end result is that Brazil often remains reticent to take firm positions on key global issues and generally seeks ways to avoid them. More often than not, the GOB eschews positions of leadership that might require overtly choosing sides.

Under Lula, Brazil was increasingly insistent that international efforts to promote security must go hand in hand with commitments to economic and social development. Brazil maintains a double-standard on democracy and human rights. Although a founding member of the Community of Democracies and Partnership for Democratic Governance, Brazil rarely stands firm on these issues. In the wake of what it considered a near-disastrous brush with election observation in Zimbabwe in 2008, the GOB opted to focus on technical cooperation related to running elections, in lieu of observing them. In the UN, Brazil generally chooses to abstain even on resolutions regarding the most egregious human rights abuses-such as those in Iran, North Korea, and Sudan - unless it considers evidence of non-cooperation with international human rights bodies to be clear-cut (as in Burma, for example).

Where Brazil's policy was not hesitant, it was often ill-informed or straight-jacketed by the policies of the past. As it stepped out on Middle East issues, the GOB did so with a lack of expertise on the region. Inclined to take assertions from the Syrians, Iranians, and Hizbullah at face value, it insisted that peace can be achieved only if all players are at the table, and seeks to position itself as a neutral party, "the country who can talk to everyone," over against what it perceives as the biased U.S. and European efforts. This penchant for dialogue stood together with respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs as the hallmarks of Brazilian foreign policy. But as Brazil played in a growing number of international arenas, it found it more difficult to remain true to these principles, and more difficult to hide its inconsistencies.

Brazil was careful to avoid any suggestion that it is toeing a U.S. line, was intent on avoiding situations in which it might be perceived as a junior partner, and tended to see an "independent" position-i.e., independent of the United States in the first instance, and wealthy countries more generally-as the preferred default. Nor did Brazil want to be lumped in with the mass of developing countries. In multilateral settings, Brazil prefered to position itself as a "bridge" between the wealthy and developing nations.

On 29 March 2021, the Brazilian minister Foreign Affairs gave his resignation to the far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, thus accentuating the institutional crisis in the South American country. Brazilian Foreign Minister, Ernesto Araújo, resigned from his responsibilities due to pressure exerted by parliamentarians, business people, and politicians, who have vehemently criticized his management in the Ministry. Pressures against Araújo had grown in recent weeks, even from the Government's official base, given the Foreign Minister's criticism of key partners for Brazil, such as China and the United States. The president of the Senate, Rodrigo Pacheco, called for his resignation, considering that Brazil's foreign policy was defective, while Arthur Lira, president of the lower house, also asked for his resignation. For their part, around 300 Brazilian diplomats also published a letter in which they claimed that he had caused "serious damage in international relations" and demanded that he leave office. Likewise, Araújo had been seriously questioned for his management purchasing vaccines against Covid-19, which has left 313,866 dead and more than 12 million 573,615 cases in the country.