Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
An anti-tank guided missile is a small weapon that is designed for destroying tanks and other armored vehicles that are used mostly in close combat warfare. Such missiles are conceptually and design-wise different than conventional rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) as the ATG missiles are required to be steered or guided toward their targets after the launch. Ground-launched anti-tank weapons are of comparatively short range and are among the less complex guided weapons, for example Swingfire, Milan and TOW. Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons (ASGW) are launched from aircraft, including helicopters, against targets on the ground or on the surface of the sea.
The ATGM is not a new concept on the modern battlefield. Following the moderate success of unguided rockets against armored targets in World War II, the Germans developed the X-7, or Rotkappchen, specifically designed for the anti-armor role. The concept of the X-7 was simple: deliver a formidable warhead, capable of penetrating armor, with increased range, accuracy and lethality. The X-7 has inspired decades of guided-missile innovation to date, leading to development and proliferation of ATGMs in an estimated 130 countries and various non-state groups.
One of the basic assets contributing to success of both offensive and defensive operations has been and remains antitank missile (ATGM) systems which can be portable and transportable/portable or carried by vehicles such as wheeled trucks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), armored personnel carriers (APC), tanks, helicopters and aircrafts. Initially designed to counter armored targets, ATGM systems have subsequently become an effective means available to an operational commander due to their high precision of fire and warhead power. The ATGM systems in service with modern armies are the most produced and most widely employed type of high precision weapon.
The warhead is the reason for the existence of a guided weapon, the purpose of which is to deliver the warhead to a particular point in space. Sometimes the warhead has to be oriented in a particular manner at impact or at detonation. For example, the "shaped charge" warhead has brought about a substantial improvement in the armour-piercing capability of anti-tank weapons. Warheads may be described as armor-piercing or semiarmor-piercing which implies that a direct hit on the target is necessary.
Common Anti-Tank Guided Missiles features include a boost motor exhausting through two nozzles on either side of the missile. This configuration avoids interference with the SACLOS guidance. A clean-burning propellant is also essential in maintaining control of the missile. Detection of these missiles depends primarily on detection of the exhaust plumes at ranges up to 5500 m. Detection at closer ranges, and the boost motor is spent, is possible by infrared sensors and radar.
The U.S. Army expected the Dart anti-tank missile to replace the Bazooka-type of anti-tank missile developed during World War II and also to be effective against heavier, post-war tanks. The Dart had a greater range and was far more accurate than its predecessor. This was due to the weapon's command guidance system and moveable aileron forward fins. The Army, however, canceled the Dart in 1958 in favor of the French SS-10 anti-tank missile that also found limited use on helicopter gunships before the introduction of the TOW (Tube launched, Optically trackd, Wire guided) missile.
Predicting the demise of the tank as a principal weapon of land warfare is one of the longest-running pastimes in the study of military history and defense affairs. Before the guns had gone silent on the fields of Cambria, the site of history’s first major tank offensive, the German army had taken its successful blunting of the British attack to mean that the tank was a battlefield novelty of little importance. The combination of high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warheads and the compact guidance systems in the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), first deployed in numbers during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, was also supposed to have spelled the end of the tank.
During the Cold War, American forces in Europe considered the anti-tank defense the backbone of all defenses. NATO considered combat with tanks the most important task in a combined arms battle. The most powerful and reliable means of victory was considered to be nuclear weapons. However, these types of weapons may not always be used. Therefore, other means of defeating the tank will take on an important significance.
The US, therefore, first organized its anti-tank defense by concentrating on emplacing its AT weapons in depth covering the most important tank approaches. The NATO anti-tank defense was based on creating a system of echeloned and maneuverable anti-tank fire. It was characterized by continuous zones of tank-defeating weapons not only along or in front of the forward edge of the defensive area, but also in depth with the highest possible complement of antitank weapons.
Following the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, a number of defense specialists concluded that advances in precision-guidance technologies had marked the birth of a new revolution in modern warfare. Ian Smart, then Deputy Director of Britain’s Royal Institute for International Affairs, was reported to have remarked that modern technology has “consigned to history” an era in which the “tank and aircraft ruled the battlefield ,” that the introduction of new, highly mobile and simply operated antitank and antiaircraft missiles “marks a transformation that recalls the way in which the longbow enabled the English footsoldier of the 14th century to overcome the mounted knight.”
First, the ATGM possessed great range, with the next generation promising even better ranges. Secondly, they are highly mobile whether mounted on an armored personnel carrier (APC), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), a jeep, or in a man-packed configuration. Thirdly, their accuracy is excellent and their ability to penetrate the heaviest armor presently found on the battlefield is excellent. Additionally, employment on advantageous terrain permits the ATGM to be utilized at its maximum range.
Malcolm Currie, testifying before the US Congress as Director of Defense Research and Engineering In the spring following the 1973 Middle East conflict , reinforced such conclusions when he stated that: "A remarkable series of new technological developments has brought us to the threshold of what I believe will become a true revolution in conventional warfare." The battlefield experiences with air- and ground-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGM’s) in both recent conificts were viewed by many as an empirical confirmation that advances in technology offer NATO an opportunity to improve, perhaps substantially, its ability to deter and defend conventionally.
Such analyses seem to suggest that NATO no longer need be forced to choose between defense policies which either rely on nuclear escalation and the potential destruction of Western Europe or demand the enormous expenditures likely to be required if NATO is to match the heavy Soviet investment in conventional military capabilities, especially in armored formations. Rather, precision-guidance technologies, especially modern antitank guided munitions (ATGM’s), appear to offer a potentially effective counterbalance to growing Soviet military capabilities by enhancing the inherent advantages of the defense, improving flexibility, and reducing cost.
The contention that precision-guided antitank munitions inherently favor the defense is founded upon the notion that the events of recent wars indicate that target acquisition is now the key to success on the battlefield. If a target can be seen, it can be hit with a modern ATGM. And for many targets, hitting is equivalent to destroying. Hence, concealment has become an important feature of the battlefield. If a target moves, it can be seen. If it can be seen, it can be destroyed. Generally speaking, the attacker must concentrate his forces for an advance, usually through unfamiliar territory. His forces are thus exposed to detection and attack. On the other hand, it is usually much easier for the defender, operating in familiar terrain from prepared positions, to remain concealed.
Some defense specialists, however, suggested that the technical limitations of ATGM’s, coupled with developing countermeasures and Soviet tactics designed to offset the apparent advantages of such weapons, indicate that ATGM’s may be far less useful as a means of providing NATO with an adequate defense against conventional aggression than was immediately apparent after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
The gunner and the weapon are vulnerable to enemy fire, both direct and indirect, during target acquisition and tracking. Firing is marked by a distinctive signature. ATGMs have a slow rate of fire relative to tank cannons and relative to the speed of enemy armor in the assault. ATGM travel time to target is much slower than tank cannons, though the ability of tank crews to dodge. Vegetation, firing over water, and lack of armor protection severely restrict ATGMs that are ground or vehicle mounted. ATGMs should be employed in a combined arms role to protect the gunners.
The Soviets were, in fact, were very much concerned with the ATGM defenses of NATO and the possible damage it could do to a Soviet offensive. However, while they did fear NATO's anti-tank defense -- the basic characteristic of the Soviet offensive doctrine continued to be the use of tank-heavy forces in the European area. The main problem for the Soviets became one of how to-defeat or counter NATO's antitank (AT) capabilities in order to insure the tank's primacy in offensive operations and the high rates of advance dictated by Soviet offensive doctrine.
TOW missiles (BGM-71 Series) are combat proven munitions that provide heavy anti-armor/assault capability to the Army's Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) and Armor Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). TOW missiles continue to be used as the weapon of choice in precision combat engagements. TOW missiles are also the primary heavy anti-armor/ assault missile for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and more than 43 allied nations. Warfighters also employ TOW missiles against buildings and field fortifications, taking advantage of the missile's precision assault capabilities. The TOW Weapon System includes the ITAS launcher, TOW missiles, and associated tactical training aids/devices. The ITAS is a combat proven TOW missile launcher that provides long-range, lethal anti-armor and precision assault fires capability for Active, Reserve, and National Guard component Infantry and SBCT across a spectrum of operational environments. The USMC employs the TOW missile from its ITAS derived M41A7 Saber launchers, ATGM vehicles, and AH-1W Cobra helicopters.
Beginning in the 1970s, DARPA began the Tank Breaker program in response to deficiencies identified by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps in their existing infantry anti-tank weapon. The Army evaluated two Tank Breaker designs by industry participants against alternatives in a shoot-off conducted in 1987-1988. The results led to selection of the Texas Instruments (later Raytheon) solution to the tank warfare challenge. Department of Defense officials approved it for full-scale development in 1989 under the Army’s Advanced Anti-armor Weapon System-Medium (AAWS-M) program. The Army later renamed the weapon Javelin, which entered full-scale production in 1997. It was the world’s first medium-range, one-man-portable, fire-and-forget anti-tank weapon system.
The Javelin possessed an extremely high hit probability from launch out to its maximum range. The system is manportable and found in the Javelin Section of the Anti-Armor Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion. The Javelin incorporates fire-and-forget technology in it’s design which increases the survivability of crews by eliminating the tracking time required of the TOW and Dragon gunner. Many of the other limitations of wire-command linked ATGMs are no longer considerations with this system.
Israeli Defense Forces use the Trophy, which is an active-protection system [APS] emplaced on the Merkava Mk4 MBT. This system uses radar to detect incoming ATGMs, RPGs and even highexplosive anti-tank rounds. It then immediately deploys multiple explosiveformed penetrators in a similar manner to buckshot to destroy the incoming round. Of note, these systems will not prevent any sort of tungsten armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot-tracer rounds. This system was already proven in combat, during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, while equipped on the Merkava tanks.
The U.S. Army and several civilian companies assessed the Trophy system, and civilian industry developed a similar system called Quick Kill. While these systems can provide 360-degree security against anti-armor weapons, they pose harm to nearby dismounted infantry or scout support. Quick Kill claims to minimize the effect on nearby dismounts by blowing the initial blast upward so that it then targets the incoming projectile in a downward motion – unlike Trophy that just blows out laterally. Shrapnel from the blast is still a concern to consider. Nevertheless, either system could potentially alter small-unit tactics when it comes to the employment of tanks in restricted or urban terrain equipped with these systems.
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