World Wide Amphibious Ships & Operations
Particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Western European navies, no longer under threat from the Warsaw Pact, are increasingly devoting their time to policing missions to counter “security” threats such as drug trafficking, illegal transport of migrants, terrorism at sea and piracy. Furthermore many navies are actively involved in different types of public service tasks with other services with naval platforms, such as provision of humanitarian aid, intervention in the event of natural disasters, search and rescue missions, evacuation of nationals, logistical and medical support, and command and control facilities for on-shore operations (by making available command posts and communication systems).
There are many countries with long-standing maritime traditions with navies well-used to international cooperation through participation in the many exercises organised in the framework of NATO or European cooperation (EUROMARFOR etc.). These navies, which have expanded considerably since the second world war, long had as their principal mission in NATO to pit themselves against the Soviet navy. This involved giving priority first and foremost to anti-submarine warfare in order to protect the transport to Europe of US reinforcement troops.
Now those same navies are reorganising for sea-to-shore power projection missions. The salient factors today are essentially aircraft carriers and on-board attack aircraft capability, frigates or submarines capable of launching sea-to-shore missiles (cruise missile type), amphibious ships (with attack helicopters) and ships for transporting troops and equipment (including Roll-on/Roll-off cargo vessels). Naturally there is also a need for escort ships, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine frigates and support ships such as refuelling and maintenance and repair vessels.
As a consequence of the number of emerging threats associated with littorals, the capability for long-range engagement and the ability to intervene far from the national territory has become one of the most obvious challenges introduced by the new post-cold war strategic environment. Amphibious warfare, which was relegated to a secondary order during the Cold War, has become a primary concern for defense policymakers.
In general terms the tasks of naval forces fall into either one of two main categories: control of the seas and projection. Maritime powers can use the seas to their advantage to send forces to theatres of crisis and deny their enemies its use. The earth for the most part consists of sea: 70% of its surface is covered by the ocean. Transport by sea is the preferred way of sending goods around the world. Today a gradual population drift towards the coasts is observable. Some 70% of the world’s population lives less than 200 kilometers from the sea.
An amphibious operation is an operation conducted from the sea by joint forces and onto an hostile or potentially hostile coast. Projection by sea is often the only means of obtaining access to a crisis zone, especially when neighboring states are not particularly friendly. For the enemy, the coastline constitutes a natural defense line easy to watch, easy to improve by means of artificial obstacles or mines and onto which it is easy to concentrate direct or indirect fire support. A very favorable force ratio in the landing zone (assessed to be at least four to one) is thus essential. It is then easily understandable that the speed of the maneuver execution and the possibilities of re-organization become key factors for the success of the operation.
Amphibious operations require the utilisation of specialised naval shipping and air assets to bring ashore and support forces on a hostile coast that may be held by enemy forces. This type of operation broadly speaking requires a balance of forces favourable to those coming ashore, presupposes surprise and no more than a few days’ vigorous operations.
Amphibious operations are joint operations, in which land forces are landed and supported from the sea as a combat operation prepared to meet armed opposition. Though definitions vary, by one count there were during the 20th Century at least 114 major landings or assaults from the sea into hostile territory. More than 90 of these occurred during the Second World War and over half were in the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA). The vast majority of all attempted assaults have been successful. Only two operations have failed so utterly that they were abandoned before reaching the landing area - the planned Japanese invasions of Port Moresby and Midway in 1942. Another two were never launched, though men, materials and shipping had been assembled - the planned Axis invasions of England (1940) and Malta (1942). The common failing in all these four later cases was that the requirements for control of the sea and air could not be met.
In the 1950's, mines were used with considerable success by North Korea to delay an amphibious assault by the United Nations forces at Wonsan. After eight days with over 200 American casualties and two sunk minesweepers, the force commander, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, reported in a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, that the U.S. Navy had lost command of the sea in Korean waters. Sherman observed, "When you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rockbottom foundation of all our war plans. We've been plenty submarine conscious and air conscious. Now we're going to start getting mine conscious - beginning last week."
Though a huge range of specialised landing vessels was developed or converted for use in amphibious operations the vessels could be roughly divided into those that could reach the assault area under their own power, and those that needed to be carried in other ships. The former category included the Landing Ship Infantry (LSI)45, the Landing Ship Tank (LST) and Landing Ship Dock (LSD) and the larger Landing Craft Tank/Infantry (LCT/LCI). Minor landing craft such as landing craft assault and mechanised (LCA/LCM) and amphibians such as DUKWs and Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) were used to transport the assaulting troops or equipment from the larger ships to the beach. The larger landing ships would normally bring the troops to a 'lowering position', six to eight miles to seaward of the beach and outside the range of coastal artillery. Here they would anchor and lower the smaller landing craft to allow troops to transfer. Troops had to get used to clambering down cargo nets with full kit and boarding the waiting boats as rapidly as possible. The landing craft would then proceed into their allocated beach in a series of waves. Though differences in cargo caused some variation, the 3 to 5 hours taken to unload an LST in some early exercises was reduced to less than an hour for most of the later operations.
Amphibious ship class taxonomies are not precise, have changed over time, and vary from country to country. Amphibious asault ships span a spectrum of capabilities, defined by the relative emphasis on helicopter aviation versus landing craft assets for transporting troops and equipment from sea to shore.
- LST - Landing Ship, Tank: Specialised type for getting tanks or other large vehicles ashore. Unlike other larger amphibious assault vessels, LSTs can beach and discharge directly onto shore.
- Landing Platform, Amphibious [LPA]: Perform the mission of amphibious transport and, amphibious cargo ships. and amphibious dock landing ships. Unlike the LST, the LPA does not beach, but rather carries landing craft on the forward deck and can load cargo from a stern door [the stern is superficially similar in appearance to that of the LSD and LPD, but the deck does not flood].
- Landing Ship Dock [LSD]: Perform the mission of amphibious transports and amphibious cargo ships. Unlike the LST, the LPD does not beach, and unlike the LPA the LPD loads landing craft in an interior well deck. Ships without a docking well must rely on transferring cargo to landing craft via deck-mounted cranes or stern ramps. The effectiveness of either method is heavily dependent on favorable conditions and are generally not feasible above Sea State 1 or 2.
- LPD - Amphibious Transport Dock: Perform the mission of amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships and amphibious dock landing ships. The difference between a Landing Ship Dock [LSD] and a Landing Platform Dock [LPD] in the US Navy has changed over time. Initially the LPD had a helicopter landing deck, whereas the LSD did not. More recently, while the LSD has acquired a helicopter landing deck, it lacks the helicopter hangar found on the LPD. American LSDs typically carry 400-500 troops, while the LPDs carry 700-900 troops.
- LHD - Landing ship, Helicopter Dock: Multi-purpose amphibious assault ships that can deliver, elements of a landing force by air and amphibious craft. In the US Navy, LHDs have a displacement of over 40,000 tons and the latest LPD has a displacement of about 25,000 tons, though in other navies LPDs run as small as 8,000 tons. In general LHDs are larger than LPDs, though in principle the most obvious difference is that an LPD has a superstructure fore of the flight deck, while an LHD has a full length flight deck and a starboard island [like and aircraft carrier] - the ThyssenKrupp MHD-150 Enforcer series demonstrates the overlap between the two types.
- LHA- Landing ship, Helicopter Assault: General-purpose amphibious assault ships that serve both landing craft and helicopters, with a primary emphasis on aviation rather than landing craft.
- LPH - Landing Platform, Helicopter: Designed to support vertical envelopment helicopter assault, LPHs are similar to conventional aircraft carriers, with flight and hangar decks, though no ski jump or catapult for fixed wing aircraft. facilities. Unlike the LHA, an LPH has no well deck. LHA-6 America will be the first modern US Navy amphibious assault ship without a stern well deck, this being replaced by expanded aviation capabilities, and accordingly she should rather be designated as a LPH.
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