Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
The civil war in Sierra Leone started in 1991. In 1997, 50% of the population was displaced, rebels controlled more than half of the territory, and Sierra Leone placed last in the UNDP Human Development Index. In 2002, safe access to the entire country had been restored and peaceful development was resuming. This was in part the result of the long process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) started in 1997 with the first of 3 phases. Phase II was launched in October 1999, as indicated by the Lomé peace agreement, with the support of the World Bank, and the British Department for International Development (DFID). Phase III ran from May 2001 to January 2002. Over the three phases, in four years, 72,500 combatants were disarmed and demobilized; 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed. The long process was eventually crowned by political elections in May 2002.
Demobilization was needed to break the RUF chain of command, to discourage any thoughts of regrouping for violence, and to encourage the reintegration of these former combatants as productive members of society. The successful demobilization and reintegration of former combatants poses a challenging task for the Sierra Leonean government and international community. While the former combatants turned in their weapons, they have not yet dispersed and returned to their home communities. This was true of both the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), although it is impossible to disperse the CDFs given the fact that most of them fought in their own communities. RUF soldiers remain concentrated in their former strongholds, due to a fear of returning to their home communities and a preference for remaining among friends.
The conclusion of the Disarmament and Demobilization (D&D) of combatants from all warring parties in January 2002, marked the official end of the civil war in Sierra Leone. D&D was part of a larger disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, implemented by the Government of Sierra Leone with the support of the World Bank, together with other international institutions and NGOs.
In February 2004, the Government declared the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process completed after UNAMSIL and its partners had disarmed more than 75,000 combatants. The success of the DDR programme prompted the World Bank Country Office in Sierra Leone to observe that officials from neighbouring countries and even the Great Lakes region were visiting Sierra Leone because it “is considered as the best practice example throughout the world of a successful disarmament, demobilization [and] reintegration programme.” While a “one person-one gun” criterion can lure single soldiers away from rebel groups, it can be considered aggressive and unfriendly by rebel commanders. “Group disarmament” proved faster and more efficient but allowed commanders to falsify the number of combatants and/or weapons being turned in. The improvement of security conditions helped to bring disarmament sites closer to the rebels and to make them more “user-friendly” both to staff and beneficiaries. Decentralized and secure disarmament sites proved much more effective and speeded up the process.
Improved security also allowed for a quicker return of ex-combatants to their areas of origin. A “fast track” procedure could be adopted, limited to distribution of IDs and repatriation of the soldiers. “Fast track” procedures are much cheaper and simpler and can be taken in charge by local authorities. On the other hand, they limit the opportunities for fundamental pre-discharge orientation, medical screening and education. Rapid reinsertion can swamp reintegration programs, thus compromising their effectiveness. The distribution of reinsertion allowances proved controversial but helpful. To avoid allowances being regarded as “cash for weapons”, they should be distributed to ex-combatants on their return home.
The majority of the over 6,800 demoblized child soldiers were reunited with their families. Some 3,000 were absorbed into the community educational programmes run by UNICEF. As a result of these arrangements, Sierra Leone’s model for demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers is widely considered as success that could be applied to other peacekeeping operations.
More than 12,000 ex-fighters opted for formal education and were placed in schools, colleges and even at the local university. Their course fees were paid for and they were given a living allowance for between one to three years, depending on when they registered with the programme. The remaining ex-fighters found jobs in farming and other activities. The entire programme, according to the Government, cost $36.5 million. International donors provided most of the money.
The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program played an important part in securing peace and security. However, in the haste to secure peace and take the process forward some people through no fault of their own missed the opportunity to participate in the program. There are many reasons for this, some ex-combatants did not benefit from the process because they failed to meet the qualification criteria, despite the fact that they participated actively in the war. To add to the problem many also failed to secure the training opportunities afforded to those that were included in the program. This left a number of ex-combatants feeling disgruntled and understandably unhappy.
The success in disarming and demobilizing combatants was not equally matched with efforts to reintegrate and find them decent jobs. Most have now joined the large pool of the unemployed and unless the economy generates more jobs, the presence of former fighters roaming the streets will continue to be one of the Government’s major challenges.
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