Mali - France Relations
After a French-led military intervention ousted jihadists who were taking control of northern Mali in 2013, French troops remained to provide support for anti-terrorist operations. But deteriorating relations with Mali's new military leaders, who seized power in a 2020 coup, prompted France to reconsider its role in the country. Diplomatic relations between Mali and its former colonial power deteriorated since Colonel Assimi Goïta ousted Mali’s president, the late Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, in the August 2020 coup. Over the next few months, the Malian junta repeatedly accused Paris of interference in the country's affairs. Nationalist sentiments in the country have risen with the junta’s increasing regional and international isolation. The security situation in Mali deteriorated, with Russian mercenaries engaging in their first fight against jihadist groups in the Mopti region.
In a joint announcement from the Élysée Palace on 17 February 2022, France and allied nations announced that they were withdrawing troops from Mali due to a breakdown in relations with the ruling junta after nine years of fighting a jihadist insurgency. Multiple obstructions" by the ruling junta meant that the conditions were no longer in place to operate in Mali, said a joint statement signed by France and its African and European allies. “Victory against terror is not possible if it’s not supported by the state itself,” the French leader told a press conference alongside European Union and African Union officials.
Amid heightened tensions between Mali and France, Mali’s transitional authorities asked for a review of the 2013 bilateral defence accords between Paris and Bamako. Slapped with tough sanctions that effectively shut Mali’s borders and facing Western condemnations over the presence of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, Mali officially asked France for a review of the bilateral defence pact. The request, which included suggested amendments, was made at the end of December 2021. The Malian defence minister’s public announcement of the review request means the stakes are increasing and the situation is much harder, and getting more and more complicated with France.
Relations between France and Mali had plummeted since the West African regional bloc ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) on January 9 announced tough sanctions on Mali over the junta’s delayed election timetable. The junta, which seized power in August 2020, is under regional pressure to return the country to civilian rule. The sanctions, which are backed by France and the EU, have effectively shut the landlocked nation’s land and air borders, with the UN and Air France announcing a temporary suspension of flights into Mali.
In an interview with Malian state TV television late Saturday, Mali’s interim prime minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, openly criticised the military deal, calling it "unbalanced” and noting that Mali “cannot even fly over its territory without France's permission”. On 12 January 2022, Mali denounced what it called a "clear breach" of its airspace by a French military plane that flew from Ivory Coast to Mali. The French military however maintains the agreements on air traffic regulation exist to avoid midair collisions between military aircraft. French Defence Minister Florence Parly told reporters that the restrictions under the new sanctions do not cover military flights.
President Emmanuel Macron on 09 December 2021 questioned the legitimacy of the Malian authorities overseeing a transition to elections after two coups in just over a year. "What the Malian prime minister said is unacceptable. It's a shame. And that dishonours what isn't even a government." In June 2021, Paris began re-organising its forces deployed in the Sahel under "Operation Barkhane", including by pulling out of its northernmost bases in Mali at Kidal, Timbuctu and Tessalit. Mali's Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga charged that the French move justified his government "seeking other partners", an apparent reference to Bamako having asked private Russian companies to boost security in the conflict-torn country.
Mali and France one enjoyed close relations of confidence, not only for historical and cultural reasons but also because of the large Malian diaspora in France. Sixteen French companies are present in Mali, including subsidiaries of BNP Paribas, Total and Laborex. Mali receives 3.3% of French exports to the Africa and Indian Ocean region. France is the country’s second-largest supplier, ahead of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.
In June 2021 France suspended its joint military operations with Malian forces and stopped providing defence advice after the junta in Mali staged another coup and deposed the civilian figures of the transitional government. Macron denounced the coup and demanded the return of civilian rule and the promise of elections next February to be held. Nevertheless, Colonel Assimi Goita, was sworn in as interim president. Mali’s second coup in nine months was a striking reminder to Paris of the importance of political stability in the fight against militancy.
Announcing the killing of Bah Ag Moussa, described as the military commander of the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM), French Defence Minister Florence Parly on 13 November 2020 called it “a major success in the fight against terrorism". Ag Moussa was killed on Tuesday in an operation involving ground troops and helicopters around 100 kilometers from the town of Menaka in eastern Mali, according to the French army. But his death was announced on Friday, the fifth anniversary of the November 13, 2015 Paris terrorist attacks that killed 130 people. The killing of the major al Qaeda-linked militant has been hailed as a major boost for the thousands-strong French Barkhane force stationed Africa’s Sahel region for over half a decade in a grinding fight against multiple jihadist groups who are often also fighting each other.
Tensions between France and Mali have mounted amid major policy differences over how to tackle the former French colony’s endemic jihadist violence. French troops have been engaged in military operations since January 2013, after northern Mali fell to jihadist control. Amid a rising anti-French sentiment in the country, Malian authorities and community leaders have been advocating dialogue with the militants. But France has made a distinction between engaging with armed groups that have signed peace accords, and "terror groups".
Paris disagrees with the transitional government but also with what the Malians have expressed. In 2017, there was a conference of national accord, and in 2019, an inclusive national dialogue, and each time the Malian population expressed support for dialogue with the jihadists, notably Iyad Ag Ghaly, the head of the GSIM, and Amadou Koufa. There is a gap that is widening between Paris and Bamako. It is extremely difficult for France to move in this direction in view of the efforts invested since 2013. For the moment, the choice is that of a dynamic of attack on the military field. This raises the question of the future of relations between France and the new Malian government.
In the security field, France contributes to the European training and advisory missions (EUTM Mali for the armed forces and EUCAP Sahel Mali for internal security forces). At bilateral level, France provides Mali with military cooperation officers. It supports the Peacekeeping School (École de maintien de la paix, EMP) in Bamako and the Military Administration School (École militaire d’administration, EMA) in Koulikoro. France supports the strengthening of Mali’s armed forces, including through the creation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
The defence agreements between France and Mali were signed in March 2013 following the launch of the French military operation in Mali on January 11, 2013. Nearly a decade ago, when northern Mali fell to local rebel and jihadist groups, Malian authorities officially requested a French military intervention as insurgents advanced on the capital, Bamako. France complied, deploying around 4,000 troops under Operation Serval. A year later, the military mission was expanded to cover anti-insurgent operations in Mali and the wider Sahel region under Operation Barkhane.
Before the March 2013 defence agreement, the security partnership between France and Mali was defined by a technical cooperation agreement, signed in 1985, which provided for possible deployments of French soldiers on training missions or under operations supervised by Malian army command. The 2013 bilateral security pact gave French forces the legal status to facilitate their intervention on Malian soil.
The 2013 agreement, which was signed in a rush as insurgents advanced on the Malian capital, was ratified on July 16, 2014, in Bamako during a visit by France’s then defence minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to Mali. Modeled after similar accords between Mali and several of its African partners (Cameroon, Togo, Central African Republic, Gabon and Senegal), this agreement aims to establish strengthened security cooperation in the long term. It provides for a contribution to “lasting peace and security...particularly by securing border areas and fighting terrorism". The deal also allows access to Malian territory, "including its territorial waters and airspace", with the prior consent of the state.
The treaty is valid for a five-year period, after which it is automatically renewed. It however specifies that "the Parties [sic] may, at any time and by mutual agreement, amend the present treaty in writing". The deal was reviewed in 2014, when Operation Serval gave way to Operation Barkhane. It was reviewed again in 2020, with the launch of the Takuba Task Force, composed mainly of special forces units from several EU nations.
A special effort is made for the benefit of Mali, which hosts one of the sixteen national regional schools (ENVR) that France supports throughout the world. The main mission of this school is the training of executives and more specifically that of officers and non-commissioned officers of the armed forces. Dynamic and open, French defense cooperation aims to be realistic and responsive, capable of responding to partner requests on short notice depending on the situations and threats encountered. With around ten advisers and instructors that it sets up within the various entities, on land and in the air, the contribution of the defense cooperation mission is intended to be both diversified and coherent.
When the French colonised the region at the turn of the 19th century, Tuareg Muslims mounted fierce resistance, winning some decisive battles, but in the end, had to accept the superiority of France’s weaponry. The dismemberment of the territory under France, and the introduction of foreign governance and economic systems, together with desertification in the north, reduced people to extreme poverty and ethnic conflict that simmers to this day.
France is Mali's third largest bilateral donor behind the United States and Canada. Mali and France maintain close and trusting relations both for historical and cultural reasons and because of the presence in France of a large Malian diaspora. Political relations have become denser in recent years and since 2013 have had many bilateral visits. Mali is one of the 16 priority countries of French development policy. In October 2015, at the donor conference at the OECD, 360 million euros of French commitments were announced for 2015-2017, including nearly 80 for the northern regions.
In the field of security, France participates in European training and advisory missions EUTM Mali (armed forces) and EUCAP Sahel Mali (internal security forces). On a bilateral basis, France provides military co-operatives and supports the Bamako Peacekeeping School and the Koulikoro Military School. It supports the rise of the Malian armed forces in the framework of the military partnership for cross-border cooperation set up with the G5 Sahel states.
Anti-government and anti-French sentiment is not the sole purview of the Muslims – rather it extends to other ethnic groups in the economically crippled north and is grounded in valid grievances.
France’s interests in the region are primarily economic. Their military actions protect their access to oil and uranium in the region – all of which are required to sustain the demands of consumerism. French energy giants like Total control many of the downstream oil distribution networks in Mali, which arise in the Taoudeni Basin, a massive oilfield that stretches 1,000 km (600 miles) from Mauritania across Mali and into Algeria. An incredible 75 percent of France's electric power is generated by nuclear plants that are mostly fuelled by uranium extracted on Mali's border region of Kidal – a region beset with violence between French-backed troops and forces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
Mali is Africa’s third largest gold producer, and there are several multinational mining companies, including Randgold (UK), AngloGold Ashanti (South Africa), B2Gold (Canada) and Resolute Mining (Australia), that have huge operations there.
The conflict in Mali involves several players, including the Malian army, which relies on support from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as French forces with the tacit support of the US and the UK, and other allies. The dominant colonial player, France, is supported by the United States through three covert bases. The US also funds a variety of ‘hearts and minds’ programs including radio stations and counter-extremism initiatives, in the same manner as elsewhere in Africa under the banner of “aid”. The Malian people face the constant threat of armed drones operated by France under the pretence of incinerating the “militant” who “dissimulates himself amidst the civilian population”.
These forces up until very recently were pitted against various violent groups – like the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Al Dine (AAD) – but those have now united under Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), or the Group to Support Islam and Muslims. Groups opposing the French-backed militarisation of the country use anti-colonial language from an Islamic perspective, and their message is: you have to chase the French coloniser who hates Islam.
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