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Madagascar - French Relations

Close Franco-Malagasy ties formed the cornerstone of Madagascar's foreign policy in the early independence years, as witnessed by the signing of fourteen agreements and conventions with France. An Economic and Financial Cooperation Agreement signed in June 1960 specified and regulated Madagascar's status as a member of the Franc Zone. Other economic agreements ensured the sanctity of existing French economic interests and, therefore, continued strong levels of French influence over Madagascar's economy. The Malagasy role was largely limited to the impact of decision makers in the upper echelons of government and input at the grass-roots level by small-scale farmers producing for subsistence or export. Other sectors by and large remained the domain of French trading conglomerates, large-scale agriculturalists, or Chinese and Indian intermediaries.

In the realm of security, defense agreements underscored France's willingness to provide strategic protection for Madagascar. France was allowed access to military bases and installations in Madagascar. These included the natural harbor of Antsiranana at the northern end of the island and the Ivato airfield near Antananarivo. France also enjoyed complete freedom of movement in the island's airspaces and coastal waters. In return for these benefits, France provided military aid, technical assistance, and training for Malagasy security forces. French influence was equally strong in the cultural realm. The country's intellectual elite was French-speaking, and many prominent Malagasy studied in French lycees and acquired degrees from French universities. Newspapers and periodicals published in French as well as Malagasy circulated in Antananarivo and other major cities. French was the language of instruction for higher education, and many teachers were French. At secondary and higher levels, the curriculum was modeled closely on that of France.

The strengthening of ties with France was complemented by a desire to enhance links with other Western countries, including Britain, Italy, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) , and most notably the United States. In October 1963, the Tsiranana regime consented to the construction of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellite tracking station near the old airport outside the capital. In return, the United States initiated a modest foreign assistance program that guaranteed private investment in the island's economy and made available a number of fellowships to students from Madagascar. Madagascar also established diplomatic links with other newly emerging nations, particularly former French colonies in Africa, and strengthened relationships with Asian countries, most notably Japan, India, and Indonesia.

A significant shift occurred in Madagascar's foreign policy after the downfall of the Tsiranana regime in 1972. In a series of diplomatic moves that three years later were embraced by the Ratsiraka regime as the cornerstones of the Second Republic, the Ramanantsoa regime pronounced Madagascar's commitment to nonalignment, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, and antiracism in international affairs. In the context of the privileged Franco-Malagasy relationship, these themes translated into harsh rhetoric concerning the necessity of revoking the "slavery agreements" of the Tsiranana regime, followed by the uncompensated nationalization of all French banks and insurance firms in June 1975, contributing to the dramatic cooling of diplomatic relations.

Moreover, in June 1976, the Ratsiraka regime laid claim to small, rocky, French-held islands around Madagascar, including the Glorieuses (claimed concurrently by Comoros), Juan de Nova, Europa, Bassas da India, and Tromelin (also claimed by Mauritius). Originally administered as part of French-ruled Madagascar, these possessions were split off just prior to independence in 1960 and include some minor military facilities.

Diplomatic links also soured with other Western powers, such as Britain, which closed its embassy in 1975. In the case of the United States, the immediate cause of strained ties was the Ratsiraka regime's decision to close the NASA tracking station. Another source of friction was the frequent verbal assaults by the Ratsiraka regime against the United States military presence at Diego Garcia Island. The Malagasy position was that, in accordance with a UN resolution passed in 1971, the Indian Ocean should be a demilitarized, nuclear-free zone of peace. Nonetheless, trade relations remained essentially unaffected, and diplomatic relations continued, albeit at the reduced level of charges d'affaires.

The democratization movement altered the nature of the Franco-Malagasy military relationship. On August 15, 1991, French president Francois Mitterrand ordered the withdrawal of French military advisers who were in charge of the personal security of Malagasy president Ratsiraka. This action occurred after the Presidential Guard opened fire and killed thirty-one demonstrators at a prodemocracy rally. Relations between the two countries improved after Zafy was elected president in early 1993, and French security technicians provided him with an independent communications system.

In the historically anti-French atmosphere of Madagascar, there are always conspiracy theories and rumors of dastardly French intentions; they are, indeed, the norm here. Separating that ambient background noise from what is really afoot here is therefore not simple. Added to that is the fact that Ravlalomanana was often strongly anti-French, as evidenced by his expulsion of their previous ambassador and his refusal to grant agrement to his proposed successor. Ravalomanana's famous embrace of the English language, the U.S. and Germany, and his general opening-up of Madagascar to the world, as evidenced by his joining SADC and contracts he assured went anywhere but to France, were seen by many as anti-French moves, when in fact they probably were much more pro-Malagasy, pro-globalization, pro-balance, and pro-free-market initiatives.

They were also offset by his continuing interest in the OIF, including lobbying hard -- and successfully -- to get the 2010 Francophonie Summit to take place here. Nonetheless, tongues were wagging that Rajoelina and the High Transitional Authority (HAT) had been financed by French interests from the start, that the announced departure from SADC is intended to benefit historical French economic interests with a return to historic monopolies and autarky, that the Education Minister's abrupt cancellation of Ravalomanana's education reform initiative was motivated by a desire to return to French-language instruction (rather than Malagasy), etc, etc. Following Sarkozy's words in March 2009 calling the coup a coup, the French seemed determined to minimize the consequences of what had happened. While agreeing on the need to move quickly to elections, their brand-new ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner appealed to the SADC Troika delegation not to move toward sanctions, calling them "part of the problem not the solution." The SADC ministers, for their parts, stressed that sanctions are a last resort, not something they hope to employ. Chataigner made it clear here that the French had no intention to suspend any aid or other program here.

France was quite prepared to resume business-as-usual with the new authorities as soon as possible, if indeed they had not already done so. It was also likely that many French economic interests would be pleased to see their historic advantages and access restored, and that many of them were reaching into their pockets to support this outcome. Local Karana -- Indo-Qtani -- economic interests were clearly doing the same.

With over 20,000 citizens on the ground here, the French can say with truth that they have important interests to protect here and thus have to be "pragmatic." The danger for the French -- and for any who follow their lead -- is that the HAT and its president will probably prove exceedingly ephemeral, and that whatever regime follows will have a very long memory about how easily and quickly France abandoned basic principles in the name of that pragmatism.