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Equatorial Guinea - Political Parties

Although the country is nominally a multiparty, constitutional republic, President Obiang Nguema’s Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea has been in power since a military coup in 1979. The Party controls all but one seat in the Chamber of Deputies and one seat in the Senate. Opposition political parties are severely restricted, and opposition leaders have faced harassment, intimidation and arrest. The president exercised strong powers as head of state, commander of the armed forces, head of the judiciary, and founder and head of the ruling party. The government generally restricted leadership positions in government to select PDGE members or members of a coalition of loyal parties that campaigned and voted with the PDGE.

The PDGE ruled through a complex network of family, clan, and ethnic relationships. Public sector employees were pressured to join the PDGE. The party’s near monopoly on power, funding, and access to national media hampered the country’s opposition parties -- the Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS), UP, Popular Action for Equatorial Guinea, and Citizens for the Innovation of Equatorial Guinea (C.I.). For example, during the year 2015 the PDGE conducted a national campaign with extensive media coverage in preparation for the 2016 elections. Opposition parties, however, had no access to media during this period, contravening the National Pact of 1993, the regulating framework for political parties that stipulates access to media and political financing and that provides for opposition political parties to have free weekly national radio and TV spots.

One-party rule formally ended in 1991 and political activities in Equatorial Guinea were legalized, but the opposition had few electoral successes in the 1990s. In September 1995, the country had its first freely contested municipal elections. Most observers agree that the elections themselves were relatively free and transparent and that the opposition parties garnered between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total vote. The government, however, delayed announcement of the results and then claimed a highly dubious 52% victory overall and the capture of 19 of 27 municipal councils.

After other parties were nominally allowed to organize in 1992, in early January 1996 Obiang called for presidential elections. International observers agreed that the campaign was marred by fraud, and most of the opposition candidates withdrew in the final week. Obiang claimed re-election with 98% of the vote. In an attempt to mollify his critics, Obiang gave minor portfolios in his cabinet to people identified as opposition figures. In the legislative election in March 1999, the party increased its majority in the 80-seat parliament from 68 to 75. The main opposition parties refused the seats they had allegedly won. By early 2000, the President's Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) party fully dominated government at all levels. In May 2000, the ruling PDGE overwhelmed its rivals in local elections.

Behind the curtain the party fairly seethes with intrigue. There are left-right, North-South, East-West, young-old, ethnic-clan, male-female, and regional splits that are bridged only by an old-fashioned African devotion to the chief, and the self restraint of a recently traumatized population.

The opposition parties in the country are advocates for democracy and are often at odds with the government. Ethnic divisions in the country also play a role in the political arena, although they are not as pronounced as in some other African countries. The political situation is relatively stable and many contribute this to the fact that there is a large degree of political repression.

The discovery of large oil and gas deposits in the mid-1990s have in part stimulated the separatist Mouvement d'Autodetermination de l'Ile de Bioko (MAIB) as well as rivalries between the dominant Fang community from the mainland and the minority Bubi natives of Bioko. A number of members of the secessionist MAIB are presently in prison, along with members of the FDR, following the 'attempted coup' in April/May 2002. There is a self-proclaimed ‘Government in Exile’ based in Spain, led by former Minister Severo Moto of the Partido del Progreso de Guinea (PPGE).

On June 4, 2011, 22 prisoners serving long jail terms for plotting against the regime were pardoned, including 5 from the banned Party for Progress of Equatorial Guinea (PPGE). These 22 were in addition to 13 released in October 2010. At the end of 2015 there were four known political prisoners: Cipriano Nguema Mba, Timoteo Asumu Abaga, Ticiano Obama, and Antonio Nkoni. Although not charged with any crime, political leaders Guillermo Nguema Ela and Luis Nzo Ondo were forcibly transported from Malabo to the mainland and were restricted from leaving their hometowns. Political prisoners did not receive the protections accorded them under the law. Although not generally singled out for poor treatment, they were placed in solitary confinement more frequently than were other prisoners. The government often denied international organizations access to facilities where political prisoners were held.

The government held legislative and municipal elections in May 2013. The PDGE won 98.7 percent of seats in the House of Deputies and the newly created Senate. The opposition Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS) won a single seat in each chamber. The PDGE also won 98.1 percent of city council seats throughout the country.

Opposition parties questioned the legitimacy of the voter registration process, and voter registries were not made public in advance of the election. No independent and impartial body existed to oversee the electoral process or consider election-related complaints. The National Electoral Commission has the responsibility to provide for the fairness of elections and to handle postelection grievances, but the commission comprised mostly members of the ruling party, including the minister of interior, who headed the commission. The government restricted opposition parties’ access to media and delayed the provision of constitutionally mandated campaign funding during the campaign.

Voters took three party-slate ballots into the voting booth and chose only one to deposit in the voting urn outside. The two unused ballots were discarded on the voting booth floor. This system required each voter to cast all votes in the municipal and legislative races for candidates of a single party. As a result there was increased pressure on voters to demonstrate loyalty to the ruling party by voting for PDGE candidates exclusively. Furthermore, this system of voting made it impossible to track all ballots printed to safeguard against multiple voting.

The government subjected opposition members to arbitrary arrest and harassment. For example, in mid-March 2015 authorities in Malabo detained Guillermo Nguema Ela, leader of the opposition FDR party, forcibly transported him to his home village near the mainland city of Mongomo, and directed him not to leave the village indefinitely. Authorities arrested FDR member Luis Nzo Ondo several days later while he was distributing information denouncing Nguema Ela’s confinement. Authorities jailed Nzo Ondo overnight and forcibly transferred him to the Mongomo area, directing him not to leave. Although no charges were filed, both Nguema Ela and Nzo Ondo remained in internal exile. During the year 2015 judicial officials investigated highly publicized allegations that CPDS leader Andres Esono Ondo was involved in an implausible plot to pay 150,000 euros to transport a Guinean man suffering from Ebola to Equatorial Guinea to spread the Ebola virus. During the investigation Esono Ondo was restricted from travelling outside Malabo. Opposition members reported discrimination in hiring, job retention, and obtaining scholarships and business licenses. They also claimed the government pressured foreign companies not to hire opposition members. Businesses that employed citizens with ties to families, individuals, parties, or groups out of favor with the government reportedly were forced to dismiss those employees or face reprisals. Registered opposition parties faced restrictions on freedom of speech, association, and assembly. For example, supporters who attended opposition political party campaign rallies were singled out for police interrogation and harassment. Some political parties that existed before the 1992 law establishing procedures to register political parties remained banned, allegedly for “supporting terrorism.” Civil servants were easily removed for political reasons and without due process. In June 2015 both the executive and judicial branches were restructured, with party affiliation a key factor in obtaining government employment. The ruling party conducted a nationwide campaign, and government employees were required to support them to keep their positions. Political parties could receive both private and public funding but were not required to disclose the amount of private funding. In advance of the 2016 presidential elections, only the PDGE received public funding, and the amount was not publicly disclosed. A packet of five new laws governing the political process was passed, an outcome of the 2014 National Political Dialogue. One law establishes an independent National Electoral Commission, which had not been constituted by year’s end despite presidential elections scheduled for 2016. New political parties were encouraged to apply for registration as a result of the dialogue, and the Center-Right Union and C.I. were registered.

Both before and after the 24 April 2016 presidential election, there were numerous credible reports of government security services using excessive force, obstructing and dispersing opposition rallies and intimidating civil society activists. The security services violently attacked the headquarters of the opposition party Ciudadanos por la Innovación (CI) on April 22, two days before the Presidential election, causing serious injuries among those inside. Members of CI had their freedom of movement restricted in Malabo and Bata, and more than 60 people remain detained without charges. Guillermo Nguema Ela, a leader of the opposition party Republican Democratic Force (FDR) was detained on 17 March 2016, flown to his native village near the mainland city of Mongomo, and directed not to leave the village indefinitely. FDR member Luis Nzo Ondo was arrested on March 19 in Malabo while denouncing Mr. Nguema Ela’s confinement. Nzo Ondo was also forcibly transferred to Mongomo and confined to the area. No official charges have been filed against either.