Benin - Political Instability
The period of political instability marked the first twelve years of independence. A series of coups followed each other until 1970, when the country was known as the "sick child of Africa". The founding act of this instability was the coup d'etat of Colonel Christophe Soglo, who on 28 October 1963 overthrew the father of independence: Hubert Maga, democratically elected.
Unlike in many African states, in Dahomey a single leader did not emerge to prominence in the early stages of independence to dominate political life. Instead, a three-partite ethno-regional political competition and maneuvering had ensued among three political actors, Hubert Maga, Sourou Migan Apithy, and Justin Ahomadegbe, each of whom soon commanded the loyalties of approximately one third of the country's population of about 3.5 million in 1983, each in three different regions of the country.
It would be difficult to sustain the argument that the three Dahomeean leaders Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga were more committed to the democratic process than the other African leaders and - that they intentionally left the three partite political competition in Dahomey intact. There is considerable evidence to show that each of the three leaders tried continuously to exclude the other two from the political arena but they failed to do so.
The French connection may explain the failure of any of the Dahomean leaders to accomplish what other African leaders, at least in the French-speaking African countries, had accomplished. While in other African colonies the French made an early committment and provided support to one, ussually prominent, African leader, such as Leopold Sedhar, Senghor, Hamani Diori, Houphouet Boigny, and even to Sylvanus Olympio, in Dahomey they did not make the choice, or made the choice but did not provide sufficient support, either because none of the Dahomean leaders was similarly prominent or reliable, or because Dahomey was not considered to be important enough.
Ostensibly to quell incessant political bickering among the three leaders accompanied by ethnic and regional conflicts, military officers intervened six times. The Chief of the Dahomean Armed Forces, then Colonel Christoph Soglo intervened in 1963, to end the Presidency of Maga; Soglo intervened again twice in 1965, once to end an Apithy-Ahomadegbe government, and the second time to prevent the formation of a new two-partite coalition of two leaders against the third; Major Kouandete led a coup In 1967 to end General Soglo's rule, and again in 1969 to end the Presidency of Dr. Emil Derlin Zinsou, a medical doctor from the South-Western town of Ouida, whom the military itself entrusted with Presidential power.
With the new Constitution adopted in November 1960, the general elections, held on the following December 11, consecrated the maintenance of Hubert Maga to the power. But taking advantage of the social unrest in the country, the army took power in 1963. Three months later, the government was entrusted to a civilian government.
Sourou Migan Apithy became President of the Republic and Justin Ahomadégbé his Prime Minister and Vice President. A new constitution was adopted by referendum on January 5, 1964. But these two leaders of the government could not grant their violins. On 1 December 1965, the army forced them to resign. However, civilians retained power. It fell to the President of the National Assembly, Taïrou Congacou. Unsatisfied with his governance, Christophe Soglo, now a general, again propelled the army to the front of the stage.
On December 22, 1965, he proclaimed himself President of the Republic, de facto. He was overthrown in turn by the young military officers on December 17, 1967.
Commander Maurice Kouandété, the brain of the coup d'etat, entrusted Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse Alley three days after the destiny of the country to the chief of the army. In May 1968, presidential elections were organized by the officers to restore the scepter of Dahomey to a civilian authority. However, the country's three traditional political leaders, Hubert Maga, Sourou Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadégbé, were not allowed to introduce themselves. They were calling for a boycott of the elections.
In their absence a stranger was carried by the people. Only the elected candidate, Dr. Basile Adjou Moumouni, gave grain to the soldiers. As an international official of the WHO in Brazzaville, the elected head of state was not from the political seraglio and did not reassure the military. The latter certainly had concerns about the maintenance of their privileges. In doing so, the military pretexted the low turnout to cancel the outcome of these elections. In the wake of the pressures, on July 17, 1968, they installed a spare civil servant for the presidency: Emile Derlin Zinsou.
The new head of state, formerly elected to the Assembly of the French Union, was in fact the fourth political tenor of the country. Accustomed to Dahomean political life, he made a consensus in the Military Revolutionary Committee (CMR).
As the old demons still lived in the army, she once again invited herself into the limelight. Colonel Maurice Kouandété ejected Emile Zinsou from power on December 12, 1969. As usual, he did not direct the country. He entrusted the management to another officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Emile de Souza. In May 1970, the military decided to leave the head of the Executive. To counteract the fate of instability, a new formula was found: a rotating presidency was established. It consisted in the formation of a government led, in turn, by the three main civilian political actors, Maga, Apithy and Ahomadégbé.
The three political leaders of the country, solidly anchored to an electoral region, should succeed the Supreme Judiciary every two years. At the end of Hubert Maga's term in May 1972, Justin Ahomadégbé took over. But the formula was not long recipe. On October 26, 1972, the army seized power again, with Battalion Chief Mathieu Kérékou. He swept away this triumvirate, mocked like a "three-headed monster." This is the beginning of the second strong political moment of the country.
This period is still within the living memory of many Beninese, and seemed to serve as a constant reminder of the risks associated with political transitions. Memories of this period may act as a powerful force promoting compromise and discouraging the tendencies toward political extremism that have accompanied unsuccessful democratic transitions in some other African countries.
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