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Islamic Defence Force - Organization

Since 2007 the Taliban's military structure was centered on two military commissions, one in Quetta and the other in Peshawar, which control East, South East & South, South West Afghanistan respectively. The Taliban's military structure blended a top-down command system with an egalitarian Afghan tribal structure that rules by consensus, making the group more able to withstand HVT operations. The Taliban developed an increasingly centralized organizational structure, a more militarized shadow government and greater professionalism of field units. The overall picture is of a resilient insurgency that has adapted under immense military pressure.

In waging guerrilla warfare, the Taliban’s military structure included provincial and district military commanders, including those at the four levels: large front (loy mahaz), front (mahaz), group (grup), and team (dilghay). The basic sub-unit was the 8-10 man delgai, which was very similar to Western infantry sections. It usually had one LMG, a couple of RPG gunners, and the rest with AKs. When they were up for a serious fight, the Delgai would fight in platoon sized groupings of three to five, sometimes with a roving weapons detachment with more RPGs or an RCL. They could group ten or more delgai into task forces, which would operate in a defined area under a field commander.

Among the most effective and innovative Taliban units were the Sare Qeta (Red Units, Pashto: Sara Kheta), also known as Red Unit, Blood Unit, or Danger Group, which are roughly equivalent to special operations forces trained to operate in small groups. The Taliban's military structure also included al Qa'ida members such as the elite Brigade 055, which consisted of foreign fighters.

The Taliban rotated their forces through the combat area quite rapidly, to mitigate against casualties. They thought six month combat tours were insane. They were usually only in the field for a couple of months at most. What they had deployed on the pointy end was only ever a fraction of their full combat strength, with more fighters coming off deployment, or in reserve waiting to deploy.

Though their organizational structure was fairly centralized, the Taliban did allow local commanders to have some autonomy at the operational and tactical levels—including regarding military operations, financing, and recruitment.

Overall, the number of full-time Taliban fighters ranges from low estimates of 55,000 to higher estimates of 85,000 fighters, though the number of Taliban facilitators and intelligence operatives likely brings the total estimate to over 100,000 personnel.