• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

A3W

CVA-67 had been authorized as a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier, but Admiral Rickover was determined to revisit the issue to expand the reach of nuclear propulsion. He was optimistic that the AEC and the Navy could address the problem of expense and mass of nuclear power plants with a newly designed four-reactor plant called the A3W. The new plant could fit in the same space as the propulsion system for the CVA-67.

In December 1962, Rickover asked the Navy’s shipbuilding bureau to examine how to install the A3W plant in the CVA-67. The bureau’s ship design division obliged with a determination that the A3W plant would work in the carrier, but would require significant redesign work to accommodate the necessary changes in the propulsion system.

The A3W reactor was a design for a naval reactor to provide electricity generation and propulsion on United States Navy warships. Like all US naval reactors it was a pressurized water reactor (PWR) design. United States Naval reactors are given three-character designations consisting of a letter representing the ship type the reactor is designed for, a consecutive generation number, and a letter indicating the reactor's designer. The A3W designation stands for: A = Aircraft carrier platform; 3 = Third generation core designed by the contractor; W = Westinghouse was the contracted designer.

The reactor, with 45,000 to 50,000 SHP (estimated, not backed up by source material) was intended for use aboard USS John F. Kennedy. This four-reactor design was intended to reduce the cost involved in the construction and operation, as compared with the Enterprise and its eight nuclear reactors.

Admiral John “Chick” Hayward, Deputy CNO for Development before taking command of the En- terprise carrier group in 1962, was recruited by Navy Secretary Fred Korth to give an operator’s backing to nuclear propulsion.63 Hayward’s January 2, 1963, letter conveyed his belief that USS Enterprise had performed far better than its conventional counterparts in the operations around Cuba during the missile crisis.

He subsequently sent Korth a letter in September, urging nuclear propulsion for the next carrier. His approach was typical of many officers who discounted cost-based arguments in favor of exploiting the latest technologies to ensure future operational victory.

Hayward said that a conventional carrier could fight for 3 1/2 days with its onboard provisions of munitions; Enterprise could fight for a week, emphasizing his argument by saying, “we should build fighting ships, not floating hotels.” In his memoir, however, Hayward admitted numerous problems, including with maintaining the propulsion system and failures of the Talos, Terrier, and Tartar missile systems during President Kennedy’s visit and the subsequent cruise to the Mediterranean.

Rickover next sought the backing of the AEC, pointing out that continued development of power reactor technology was a good in itself, as well as having benefits in military operations. Glenn Seaborg, the AEC chairman, wrote to McNamara on January 7, 1963, seeking his support for a four-reactor plant in the carrier. Reportedly, Harold Brown in DDR&E and Charlie Hitch were also supportive of the switch, in addition to most of the Navy. Secretary Korth added his weight to the argument in a January 23 letter to McNamara in which he reviewed the advantages of nuclear propulsion and the need to maintain a program that kept the momentum going for developing the technology.

McNamara was unconvinced that simple technology development was sufficient to justify the expense of converting the CVA-67 to nuclear propulsion. He wanted the Navy to provide more detailed analysis of the role of nuclear propulsion, based on rigorous number-crunching, not vague claims of operational effectiveness. He asked for a study that would examine how nuclear power would affect the carrier task force’s composition, defensive tactics, use of supply ships, and number of task forces required. He also wanted to know how the Navy proposed to manage the transition to nuclear power given the natural disruptions a completely new model would have as the force structure changed over time.

The study McNamara wanted would take the Navy past the deadline to bid out the construction of the new carrier. The Bureau of Ships was given the task to proceed with drafting a design for nuclear propulsion, in addition to the oil-fired power plant already in hand. The Navy sent forward to McNamara as much analysis as it could muster by early April, which included Secretary Korth and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson’s stated belief that all capital ships of 8,000 tons or more should be nuclear-powered, phasing in construction over the next few years.

McNamara rejected the Navy’s analysis as insufficient to address his concerns and justify adding more than $600 million to the shipbuilding program over the next 5 years. In an April 20 memorandum, McNamara emphasized a point that would come up repeatedly when debating the merits of various military programs: "[The] problem is this: Of course nuclear-powered ships are better than conventional ships, costs not considered. But cost has to be considered because it is a measure of what is being given up elsewhere — elsewhere in the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Federal Government, and the economy as a whole . . . I need to know whether nuclear power for surface warships is a sensible expenditure as part of any budget, or whether your proposal merely makes sense if the implied reductions in other capabilities are neglected."

The Navy spent the summer months gathering more data and marshalling further arguments in favor of nuclear propulsion. In late September, Korth came back to McNamara with the Navy’s concerted opinion that nuclear propulsion provided required advantages in virtually unlimited endurance at high speeds, increased tactical flexibility, the ability to operate in bad weather, or steam around bad weather in ways that a conventional ship would be hard-pressed to do without adequate resupply, the ability to extend the attack across a greater arc, reduced vulnerability stemming from resupply while under threat of attack, and reduced logistical dependence. As for the number of carrier task forces, Secretary Korth asserted that the replacement ratio of nuclear carriers for conventional was five to six, that is, increased combat effectiveness would require one fewer carrier task force for the same result.

McNamara was not convinced, but did not close off future nuclear propulsion. He took the Navy analysis to show that the authorized conventional carrier would not reduce effectiveness and directed proceeding with the program as authorized.

McNamara sent Korth a memorandum on October 9 that noted the Navy had yet to complete the analysis he had requested on the advantages of nuclear propulsion, but stated nonetheless:" On the basis of the analysis available to date, I am not convinced that a net advantage is in prospect. While it is clear that nuclear propulsion would result in some desirable characteristics, the increased cost (particularly in ship construction) remains a serious disadvantage. . . . As a result, I believe the fiscal year 1963 carrier should proceed on the conventionally- powered basis as authorized by Congress. I would like you to take the proper steps to proceed with the construction as soon as possible."

McNamara’s decision on the carrier did not end with his October 9, 1963, memorandum to Secretary Korth. Rickover and his compatriots would mobilize the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to seek to overturn the decision. The committee’s chair, Rhode Island Democrat Senator John Pastore, wrote to McNamara on October 9 to request clarification of the rumors he had heard on the decision to go with a conventional carrier and announced his decision to hold hearings on the topic. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric responded to Pastore on October 11 that no decision had been made yet, although internal to the Pentagon, it was clear that McNamara had done just that. Korth had appealed the decision prior to Gilpatric’s letter to Pastore, but it was not until October 25, 5 days prior to the announced hearings, that McNamara reiterated his decision and informed Congress.

The Navy and the AEC dominated the hearings on October 30. Secretary Korth testified alongside the new CNO, Admiral David McDonald, Rickover, Vice Admiral Vincent De Poix (the first commander of Enterprise), Rear Admiral Hayward, and others. Seaborg represented the AEC, along with several staff members. The lone OSD witness was DDR&E head Brown; McNamara was in Saigon and would testify in mid-November. The committee members were dis- tressed that McNamara had made his decision before the hearings could take place. Even Brown admitted that he had originally supported nuclear propulsion in CVA-67, but also thought more analysis would be needed to back up his inclinations. When McNamara testified 2 weeks later on November 13, he emphasized that Congress had already authorized the carrier as a conventional ship. He was not opposed to nuclear propulsion, but felt Congress had already made its determination the previous year.

The Joint Committee issued its findings early in the New Year, advocating on behalf of nuclear propulsion for CVA-67 and all future first line surface combatants. The committee concluded that “it is an indisputable, demonstrated fact that nuclear propulsion increases the combat effectiveness of our surface warships.” McNamara certainly did not dispute this, but the Committee went on to declare that “increased costs attributable to nuclear power are minor.”

The committee, however, did not have direct jurisdiction over shipbuilding for the Navy, meaning that others would have to carry the banner. Despite a dozen bills in 1964 advocating nuclear propulsion, none passed.

The Kennedy would remain a conventionally-powered carrier, largely due to the timing of the decision more than anything else. McNamara ultimately decided against nuclear propulsion for CVA-67 on cost grounds, claiming that it would cost $440 million compared to $280 million for a conventional carrier. His analysis was not without its flaws. The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy assailed the assumptions in McNamara’s analysis, pointing out that a nuclear carrier could carry 50 percent more aviation fuel and ammunition than a conventional carrier. The Navy’s analysis showed that the total life-cycle cost of a nuclear carrier with its air wing over a 25-30 year lifespan is only 3 percent more than a conventional carrier.

John F. Kennedy is a modified version of the earlier Kitty Hawk-class aircraft carriers but there are enough differences in the Kennedy that the Navy considers her in a single-class of her own. Kennedy was ordered as a nuclear carrier, using the A3W reactor, but converted to conventional propulsion after construction had begun. The island is somewhat different from the Kitty Hawk class, with angled funnels to direct smoke and gases away from the flight deck. Because the plans for the ship did not initially include a funnel, the funnel on the Kennedy protrudes out from the ship at an angle.

The return to nuclear power for carriers came with the Nimitz class's A4W reactor's two reactor per ship design. While the two reactor configuration, with each core providing a greater thermal output, is relatively less expensive than earlier designs, the power plant still represents about half the total cost of the ship.