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Sealift Readiness Program [SRP]

The Sealift Readiness Program [SRP] was a standby contractual agreement between Military Sealift Command and US ship operators for voluntary provision of private ships for defense use. Call-up of ships may be authorized by joint approval of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation. The Sealift Readiness Program was a formal agreement, pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, between U.S.-flag, dry-cargo carriers and the government for the acquisition of ships and related equipment under conditions of less than full mobilization. U.S.-flag carriers committed half of their cargo capacity to the program during wartime in return for operating subsidies and the opportunity to bid on military shipping contracts during peacetime.

Military Sealift Command [MSC] manages Department of Defense ocean transportation. MSC functions include chartering, operating and managing DOD common user ocean shipping, fleet support and special mission vessels; planning for contingencies; coordinating sealift enhancement programs/transportability issues; initiating action to obtain sealift augmentation from MARAD or through the use of the DOD Sealift Readiness Program in wartime; and operating Military Sealift Command Offices.

In 1967, the Department of Defense recognized a need for sealift augmentation for contingencies such as Vietnam. The Committee of American Steamship Lines, proposed a system of prenegotiatedactivation procedures to provide commercial sealift resources to the Department of Defense. Originally called the Commercial Sealift Augmentation Program (CSAP), beginning with its July 1969 contract solicitation for ocean services, MSC required ocean carriers to commit ships to the CSAP to be eligible for contact awards, though there was no requirement for a specific number or percentage of ships. The program was renamed the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) in 1971, with the criterion for eligibility in the program set at committing 50 percent of fleet assets.

In 1978, the Maritime Appropriations Act directed "that all vessels receiving either a federal construction or operating subsidy must be enrolled in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), whether or not they received Department of Defense peacetime business. Any call- up of ships under the SRP would be initiated by both the Commander, Military Sealift Command, who would determine if additional sealift would be required, and the Maritime Administration, which would assess the impact of the call-up on commercial trade."

Because of the size and weight of some Army watercraft, they can be transported only on certain types of vessels. For example, the lOO- to 250-ton crane barges can be transported only on SEABEE ships. As of 1979 there were only three SEABEEs in the US maritime inventory. As with all barge ships, the SEABEE requires no dock or pier to load or unload cargo. In addition to nearly eliminating port delays, the barge's ability to maneuver in shallow water allows service to be offered to areas which otherwise would be inaccessible to large oceangoing vessels.

The Department of Defense obtained commercial ships for a less-than-full mobilization contingency through the Sealift Readiness Program, administered by Defense through the Military Sealift Command. Under this program, the participating carriers made a certain percentage of their fleet available at the call of the command. However, the carriers were not required to provide certain types of ships, such as the SEABEE. However section 2 of the Maritime Appropriation Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979 (Public Law 95-298, 92 Stat. 339) provided that any vessel receiving a construction or operating subsidy for fiscal year 1979 must be offered for enrollment in this program. Unless this provision was included in Maritime Appropriation Authorization Acts for future years or unless permanent legislation is enacted requiring ships needed by the Army to transport watercraft be enrolled in the Sealift Readiness Proqram, there would be no assurance the SEABEEs will be part of the Sealift Readiness Program.

Even in a full mobilization situation, there may be several days' delay before the three SEABEE ships can be made available to the Army, depending on their location at the time they are mobilized and the priority assigned to the Army. Under full mobilization, priorities for the number and types of vessels needed would be set if and when the time arose.

Prior to the late 1970s, sealift was heavily dependent on the US flag fleet and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of mothballed World War II-era ships. The procurement of APS, FSS, and RRF ships in the 1980s offset the decline in availability of militarily useful commercial shipping and the deteriorating condition of the NDRF. Sealift forces were sized for a global war growing out of a conflict in the Persian Gulf in which the initial Army deployment in the Gulf would be supported entirely by U.S. shipping. The eight SL-7 fast sealift ships were designed for rapid deployment of a heavy division. Deployment of succeeding divisions would depend on activation of the RRF, use of US flag ships in the Sealift Readiness Program, charter of commercial vessels, and, if necessary, requisition of additional US flag ships.

By 1982 the US Merchant Marine provided the bulk (288 ships) of the ready sealift capability to support military operations. During emergencies short of mobilization, US flag ship owners are committed to provide sealift resources (125 ships as of 1982) to MSC under the Sealift Readiness Program. Upon mobilization, the US flag fleet can be requisitioned for defense purposes. Additionally, during a NATO emergency, it was planned that part of the sealift support to reinforce NATO will be provided by NATO-member merchant fleets.

The contribution of strategic sealift was one of the major success stories of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991. A responsive charter market reduced the need for activation of the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) or ship requisitioning. DoD did not even need to activate the 132 ships in the Sealift Readiness Program. The SRP was never activated because of concerns that the program's participants would lose market share to foreign shipping lines. DoD officials also found that many commercial ships were available for charter. DoD set up the Special Middle East Sealift Agreement, which contracted for about 30 percent of the container capacity aboard commercial liners to transport military supplies. SMSEA was used to move over 37,000 forty-foot containers. That plan minimized disruption to business because it allowed commercial ships to continue their regular schedule of deliveries. About 55 percent of the dry-cargo ships enrolled in the SRP moved U.S. military cargo under the terms of the special agreement.

In January 1992 the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) published A Review of DoD's [Department of Defense's] Strategic Mobility Programs Commercial Sealift Support. This report assessed DOD policies and practices for augmenting organic strategic sealift assets with commercial capabilities, and evaluated the overall utility of the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). The report stated that DOD needed to revitalize its SRP to meet the lift requirements of future emergencies and that the method the Military Sealift Command used to procure commercial sealift services (direct competitive bidding) precluded effective military/industry contingency planning, a key ingredient for a sound sealift augmentation program.

In 1993 the Commander of the United States Transportation Command was directed to establish and maintain relationships between the Department of Defense and the commercial transportation industry to develop concepts, requirements, and procedures for the Contingency Response Program, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and the Sealift Readiness program. Any procedures so developed shall take effect upon their approval by the Secretary of Defense.

The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) was established in 1997 as an alternative to the existing DoD Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). VISA originated from the decision not to activate SRP during Desert Storm.