Shermans versus Tigers
Shortly before the drive into Germany, the American press broke the story that American tanks were inferior to those of the enemy. Hanson W. Baldwin in the New York Times [January 5, 1945] and the editor of the Washington Post demanded to be told why; and the story traveled to Europe. Questioned by American correspondents at a press conference in mid-March 1945, General Patton publicly defended American tanks. He also wrote a letter to Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, which the War Department released to the American papers, stating that while the Tiger would destroy the Sherman head on, the Sherman could usually manage to attack from the rear and avoid a slugging match; moreover, the Sherman was incomparably more reliable and long-lived, as well as easier to ship and handle, than the Tiger.
Patton wrote the letter because he wanted to stop what he called "the foolish criticism" of American tanks which he believed was having a bad effect on the morale of the soldiers at the front. But privately he had stated to a visiting Ordnance officer, just, after the Battle of the Bulge, "Ordnance takes too God Damn long seeking perfection at the expense of the fighting men, and you can tell that to anyone at Ordnance." The officer believed that Patton was expressing the feelings of the using arms. It was natural enough for the tankers at the front to blame Ordnance for the heavy casualties they had suffered fighting in the Shermans.
The German offensive of 1939 changed the perception of the threat assault by armored vehicles. The early German success can be attributed to both technological advancements since the Great War and the use of combined arms tactics with the Panzer. Guderian’s refinements incombined arms tactics focused on using the armored force as the primary means of projecting striking power, providing shock effect en masse. This fostered the perception that the Panzer was the master of the battlefield. Initial allied assessments of the rapid collapse of France attributed the success of the German army entirely to the tank, not truly grasping the impact of the supporting arms in exploiting the breakthrough and facilitating the advance. The result was a scramble to develop an effective means to defeat the German Panzer.
The "tanks" that equipped American armored units reflected the armored division’s intended role. This formation was designed to envelop enemy positions and operate throughout an opponent’s rear area. Vehicle designs therefore emphasized maneuver and mobility over firepower and armor protection. Indeed, light tanks constituted much of the early armored divisions’ tank strength, and by modern standards might more appropriately be categorized as cavalry fighting vehicles rather than tanks. The M3 light tank (Stuart), later upgraded to the M5, carried a 37mm gun, could achieve tactical speeds of 35 miles per hour and proved easy to maintain. However, as the war progressed and the armor and armament of German tanks and self-propelled guns increased, the light tank became increasingly vulnerable. It became relegated to reconnaissance and security roles, and its numbers within the armored division fell in favor of greater numbers of medium tanks.
The M4 medium tank (Sherman) became the principal American tank of World War II. Nearly 50,000 were built during the war, equipping both American and Allied armies. Like the M3/M5 light tanks, it proved mechanically reliable and mobile. It became the workhorse of the U.S. Army, providing close infantry support, spearheading armored attacks, performing anti-tank missions and acting as auxiliary artillery. However, its 75mm main gun lacked sufficient armor-piercing ability, and it sacrificed firepower and armor for greater mobility.
Even when upgraded to a 76mm, the M4’s armament could not penetrate the frontal armor of the more heavily armored German tanks and assault guns. Therefore, standard tactics for a five-tank platoon engaging German Tiger and Panther tanks required one section to draw the Germans’ fire, while the other section maneuvered to the flank and engaged the German tanks from the side or rear. Such tactics were not morale-builders for tank crews. Nor could the M4’s armor protect it from the high-velocity 75mm and 88mm guns commonly carried on German tanks. In such engagements, American tank units relied on support from aircraft, artillery and tank destroyers.
The pursuit of effective anti-tank measures was the logical course of action, resulting in the conceptof the Tank Destroyer. This was a rapidly deployable, speedy, and heavily armed vehicle solelyresponsible for defeating enemy tanks. Doctrine emphasized employment of tanks in an infantrysupport role, and there was a call to develop units specifically with an anti-tank mission. The pursuitof a tank killer was born.Anti-tank doctrine dictated the new vehicle needed armament powerful enough to defeat theGerman armor while remaining light enough to be fast moving to engage and withdraw. The development of improved weaponry and the development of this new armored vehicle was linkedtogether for better or worse. To give this vehicle its striking ability, the U.S. developed the 76-mm Gun M1. The vehicle designed to carry out the mission would be the M18 “Hellcat” Tank Destroyer.
It was not until after Normandy that the 76-mm Gun saw use in both Tank Destroyers and latemodel M4A3 Sherman tanks. This was possible only when a shift in perception took root that a tank would certainly need to defeat other tanks encountered during combat. Doctrine stated that the role of a tank was for infantry support, not fighting other tanks. Armored Forces Field Manual: Tactics and Techniques (FM 17-10) listed tank versus tank combat as “special operations” with less than a page devoted to the subject. The 75-mm Gun was retained for use in tanks because of the performance of its High Explosive Shell. The M61 75-mm armor piercing capped [APC] was the anti-tank armament used in U.S. medium tanks, in spite of the inability to defeat the frontal armor of a Pz IV.
The U.S. Army got a first look at the Panther tank in 1943 after the Russians captured someon the Eastern front. The improvements were noted, but the Panther was not considered a tremendous threat since there were not great numbers produced in at the time.
Operation Overlord was at the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944. No 76-mm Sherman tanks were in the invasion because of the reluctance to trade HE anti-personnel lethality for armor penetration performance. This error would become apparent as the U.S. Army pushed inland from the beaches. The Pz IV was produced by the Germans in the greatest number and for the longestduration over the course of the Second World War and was modified and continuously upgraded. Allied armor had the greatest probability of encountering a Pz IV than any other German Panzer onthe battlefield.
A limited number of Sherman tanks including the M1A1 76-mm anti-tank gun arrived in European Theater of Operations (ETO) in April 1944. The perception of the tank as an infantry support tool had not changed, so commanders were reluctant to accept them, given that the predecessor 75-mm HE was loaded with twice as much explosive as its 76-mm anti-tank counterpart.
The 76-mm gun with the M62A1 APC would have had little difficulty defeating earlier model German Panzers. However, by the time the M1A2 76-mm arrived in the ETO in the summer of 1944, the Pz IV received several upgrades in armor and armament. The Pz IV used face hardened armor (FHA) exclusively at first but switched to rolled homogenous armor (RHA) later in the war. The Panther initially had face hardened steel frontal armor, but later production switched to a homogeneous steel plate. Further complicating the matter was the loss of a reliable source of molybdenum for the Germans as the war progressed, leading to a brittle plate that was prone to cracking on impact. There was significant variation in the quality of armor in the Panther tanks. Improper temper caused some plates to be susceptible to shatter on impact. The good quality armor was much tougher.
The 75-mm was completely inadequate against improved German armor. The 76-mm APC could not defeat the Panther in front attacks even at point blank range. The inability of the 3 in. and 76-mm to penetrate the frontal armor of the Panther sent a shockwave through allied command. General Omar Bradley recalls of General Eisenhower’s consternation in July of 1944,“Ordnance told me this 76mm would take care of anything the Germans had. Now I find you can’t knock out a damn thing with it”.
Attack from the flank and rear fared much better. The slope of the hull armor appears to be the defining characteristic that prevents penetration of the front hull. The Tiger would be difficult to defeat, but the low probability of an encounter and defeat via attrition negated the threat.
During the First Army breakthrough battles in July and August 1955, the 2d Armored Division tankers had learned how to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks with their M4 Shermans. They knew that the ammunition of the 75-mm. gun with which most of the M4's were armed (a low-velocity shell about 13 inches long, as compared with the 28- to 30-inch high-velocity 75-mm. shell of the Panthers) would not penetrate at any range the thick frontal armor of the Panthers and Tigers, but could damage the sides and rear.
Therefore the tankers had used wide encircling movements, engaging the enemy's attention with one platoon of tanks while another platoon attacked from the rear. They had suffered appalling losses: between 26 July and 12 August 1944, for example, one of 2d Armored Division's tank battalions had lost to German tanks and assault guns 51 percent of its combat personnel killed or wounded and 70 percent of its tanks destroyed or evacuated for fourth echelon repair. But by using flanking tactics and by enlisting artillery support to fire directly on enemy tanks, the Americans had won their battles and even managed to inflict heavy losses on the Germans.
By the time the Roer offensive began in November 1944, the 2d Armored Division's firepower had been stepped up to some extent. About half the division's M4's were armed with the 76-mm. gun. With this gun, firing the new but scarce tungsten-carbide-cored HVAP ammunition, the tankers could penetrate the front belly plate of the Panther at 300 yards and at 200 yards had a sporting chance (about one to four) of penetrating the front slope plate. The division's tank destroyer battalion had also recently been equipped with the new M36 destroyers mounting the 90-mm gun.
The battle at Puffendorf on 17 November 1944 — "the biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience" — was tank against tank: on both sides the infantry was pinned down by artillery fire. The Germans had the advantage of position: the Americans were hemmed in by sloping ground that made flanking movement impossible. The Shermans fought back desperately, stepping up to attempt to slug it out with their 75-mm and 76-mm guns, but the tanks that got close enough for their guns to be effective were quickly cut down by enemy fire. And when the American tankers did score direct hits on the German tanks, their shells ricocheted off the thick armor and went screaming into the air. One Sherman fired fourteen rounds of 76-mm ammunition at a Tiger before it had any success at all—and the next moment was destroyed by another Tiger.
When some companies were down to three or four tanks and ammunition was running low, both battalions sent back for the 90-mm tank destroyers to come up. With the help of these "can-openers," as the tankers called the tank destroyers, the Germans were beaten off, but at heavy cost to the two battalions in tanks and men. The day's action on the Roer plain cost the 2d Armored Division 38 medium tanks, destroyed or knocked out, and 19 light tanks; 56 men killed, 281 wounded, 26 missing; and all but a few of these losses were incurred at Puffendorf.
The tankers, deprived by the terrain and mud of their ability to outflank the enemy, by the congestion in the area of their usual artillery direct support, and by bad weather of much assistance from the air, had fought magnificently; but they had become disillusioned about the ability of their tanks to defeat German armor. "Our men no longer have as much confidence in their armor and guns as they used to have," one of the 2d Armored Division tankers said two days after the Roer plain offensive. Another said, "The Germans have been improving steadily ever since we met them in Sicily," and "Our Ordnance Department needs to get on the ball."
Tank Destroyer vehicle requirements unintentionally led to compromises that severely curtailed the primary function of the M1 76-mm Gun, which was defeating enemy tanks. The British had no doctrine imposed limits dictating cannon weight. They incorporated their own 76-mm gun, dubbed the 17 pounder, the most effective allied anti-tank gun of the war. Three times the amount of propellant coupled with alonger barrel than the US M1 76-mm meant that the muzzle velocity obtained by their Sherman tank mounted weapon was significantly higher than their American counterparts. The armor piercing discarding sabot (APDS) round for the 17 pounder had a muzzle velocity of 3950 fps. Ramping up the M93 to the 3950 fps results in a weapon capable of defeating all German armor at ranges well beyond the average tank engagement in the ETO. Given the 17 pounder was mounted on the same Sherman tank chassis as the M1 76-mm, this is an entirely plausible and effective solution to the Panzer upgrade problem.
The benefit of the 76-mm hyper-velocity, armor-piercing tracer (HVAP-T) shot is that the front of the Panther Turret was vulnerable at typical combat ranges in the ETO. The first 2,000 rounds of 76-mm HVAP-T were air delivered to France in August 1944. The M18 Tank Destroyers of the 704th and 603rd Tank Destroyer Battalions engagedGerman tanks soon after on 18 September near Lunéville, France. The M18s were able to destroy eight Panthers during the fight with no losses of their own. American soldiers were aware of the limitations of a frontal attack against German armor. Attacking the thinner armor in the rear would offer better odds. Tactics evolved along with technology. The M1 76-mm Gun and the HVAP shot played a significant part in evening the odds and ensuring victory during the Battle of the Bulge. This 76-mm ammunition continued to make a difference for the duration of the Second World War.
Efforts to field a more powerful tank finally resulted in the M26 (Pershing) heavy tank. Design and development work began on the M26 Pershing in May 1943 inresponse to the evolving threats from German tanks, such as the Mark V Panther and Mark VI Tiger families of tanks, but only 20 entered combat before the war’s end. For most tank units, combined arms tactics became vital to success against German armor.
In early 1944, the US Army faced a critical decision regarding its armored forces: should it retain the M4 Sherman as its primary tank or accelerate production of the new M26 Pershing heavy tank? Although many armored commanders favored the Pershing, the tank debate continued until Lt Gen George S. Patton, the Army’s leading tank "expert," entered the fray. Patton favored the smaller (and supposedly more mobile) Sherman, noting that "tanks were not supposed to fight other tanks, but bypass them if possible, and attack enemy objectives in the rear." Ultimately, senior Allied commanders — including Gen Dwight Eisenhower — backed Patton and decided to increase production of the Sherman. It remains one of the most disastrous choices of World War II — arguably, a decision that lengthened the war and became a literal death sentence for thousands of tank-crew members.
The consequences of the Sherman decision are brutally detailed in Belton Cooper’s vivid memoir Death Traps. A maintenance officer who served in the legendary Third Armored Division ("Spearhead"), Cooper was charged with the critical task of locating damaged Shermans, directing their recovery, and ensuring the flow of new or repaired tanks to frontline units. American tank crews discovered in combat the Sherman was badly outclassed by German medium and heavy tanks, most notably the Mark V Panther and the Mark VI Tiger. With their heavier armor, the Panther and Tiger were almost impervious to rounds fired from the Sherman’s 75 or 76 mm main gun; conversely, the 88 mm gun on the German tanks usually made short work of their American opponents.
Over the next 11 months, the Third Armored Division, which began the Normandy campaign with 232 M4 tanks, would see 648 of its Shermans destroyed in combat, with another 700 knocked out of commission before being repaired and returned to service—a cumulative loss rate of 580 percent. Casualties among tank crews also skyrocketed, producing an acute shortage of qualified personnel. By late 1944, Cooper recalls, the Army was sending newly arrived infantrymen into combat as replacement tank crews. Some of these recruits received only one day of armor training before being dispatched to the front in their M4s.
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