Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) - Competition
On 24 November 2015 the U.S. Marine Corps awarded a contract to two companies for the first phase prototypes of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), a wheeled combat vehicle. Each company will build 16 eight-wheeled vehicles to be tested over the next two years to replace the Marine Corps' aging Vietnam-era amphibious assault vehicle. The service will then pick a winner in 2018 to deliver 204 vehicles by 2020. Being able to operate well in water and on land were equal to requirements to carry personnel, as well as protection.
BAE Systems and SAIC beat out three other manufacturers - Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Advanced Defense Vehicle Systems. BAE designed its prototype not as a land vehicle tailored to marine operations, but the other way around, starting with an amphibious vehicle. SAIC's vehicle offered improved traction and blast-mitigating seats that further protect occupants.
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) was briefly known as the Next Amphibious Vehicle (NAV) or the New Amphibious Vehicle (NAV) during the year 2011. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program was intended to meet the US Marine Corps' requirement for self-deploying, fully amphibious vehicles, in order to maintain an amphibious forcible entry capability. The ACV would be included as part of the Marine Corps' integrated and complementary portfolio of combat vehicles critical to the future of expeditionary Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. This portfolio would include both the both the ACV and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). The ACV was to be optimized for joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) and major combat operations (MCO), while MPC would be suited for the fight in restricted terrain against irregular threats. The 2 vehicles together would meet general support lift requirements for Marine Infantry across the full range of military operations.
The Marine Corps' amphibious vehicle requirement was previously intended to have been filled by the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), which was cancelled in January 2011. In place of the EFV, the Marine Corps' developed an Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Upgrade program in 2011 to increase force protection and vehicle survivability levels of the existing capability of the AAV7 family of vehicles, in order to sustain operations ashore against existing threats to extend the service life of those vehicles. Those vehicles would be expected to continue providing amphibious forcible entry capability until replaced by both the ACV and MPC.
The Marine Corps' required the ACV as a replacement for the AAV7 series of vehicles, because of the capability gaps presented by the latter vehicle. The AAV7 family of vehicles could not close to the beach from extended launch distances prescribed in future Navy concepts of operation, could not protect its occupants from improvised explosive devices, could not communicate critical information requirements to the sea base, and could not achieve direct fire overmatch against threat peer vehicles identified in the System Threat Assessment Report. The deficiencies were outlined in the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Initial Capabilities Document published in 2011.
The Initial Capabilities Document also described the ACV as being able to provide sea-based entry and land maneuver capability to come from over the horizon (12-18 nautical miles). By 2012, the requirements outlined for the ACV included being able to maintain effective mobility with other vehicles in the MAGTF (such as the M1A1 Abrams tank), maintain a speed of 8-10 knots in 2 foot significant wave height, and carry 17 Marines (a reinforced Marine infantry squad) to a range of 200 miles after a 12 nautical mile swim. The vehicle would have a gross vehicle weight of approximately 70,000 pounds and be capable of day/night operation. As of 2012, lethality options were under analysis. Options being studied included medium caliber cannon and/or heavy machine guns in manned or unmanned turrets. Also as of 2012, the Marine Corps' estimated the need to purchase approximately 600 ACVs with initial and full operating capabilities expected in 2022 and 2028 respectively. The ACV was not a program of record at that time.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps and the assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the establishment of an ACV Team, which was subsequently formed in January 2013. The mission of the ACV Team was to evaluate the contributions of high water speed and the feasibility of building an affordable, survivable amphibious high water speed vehicle. The team included representatives from Marine Corps Systems Command; Combat Development and Integration; Plans, Policies and Operations; Programs and Resources Department; Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity; Program Executive Officer-Land Systems; and various other commands within the Department of Defense.
About 25 Marines from the infantry and AAV communities gathered between 9 and 11 July 2013 at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, to "rack and stack" capabilities that would help shape the ACV Team's analysis for a new high water speed vehicle. Of 198 requirements evaluated for the ACV, about 30 were deemed "tradable", that is to say capabilities with multiple cost and weight implications, following the Team's initial requirements and engineering analysis. During the 3 day ACV Warfighter Requirements Workshop, the Marines reviewed the tradable requirements to determine the value they placed on various capabilities that might be included in the vehicle. The Marines were divided into small groups where they were given a matrix listing the tradable ACV capabilities, from weapon systems to varying degrees of armor protection. Non-tradable capabilities included items that were safety related or design-specific. For example, one non-tradable capability was transportability, which was the ability to fit on an amphibious ship. The ACV Team was also collecting information through a web-based survey released to Marines in the infantry, AAV, communications and logistics communities on 21 June 2013, which allowed Marines to rank and assess the 30 tradable capabilities.
Between July and August 2013, the ACV Team expected to rank order the preferences provided by the fleet Marines, and apply actual cost and weight data as part of their feasibility recommendations to senior Marine Corps and defense leaders in Fall 2013. The ACV Team also planned to send representatives to all Fleet Marine Forces to conduct Marine Air-Ground Task Force planning considerations sessions. The sessions would give Marine Corps operational planners the opportunity to determine impacts of high water speed in the operating forces as it related to their operational plans.
Lockheed Martin officially introduced its new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1 offering at the Modern Day Marine trade show in Quantico, Virginia, 22 September 2015. The armored, eight-wheel-drive vehicle is designed to transport up to 13 Marines, transition seamlessly between land and water, and provide high levels of blast protection. The Lockheed Martin ACV candidate is a modular, upgradable 8x8 design that allows superior growth for a wide range of variants, weapons, sensors and communications options. Lockheed Martin is the original equipment manufacturer, systems integrator, and final-assembly, integration and test agent for its ACV. The company has selected an experienced team of suppliers for their specific capabilities to enable the production and delivery of a high-quality, affordable solution.
The BAE Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 (ACV 1.1) is an 8x8 platform offering a mix of open-ocean amphibious capability, land mobility, survivability, payload and growth potential to accommodate evolving operational needs. BAE Systems and IVECO Defence joined forces to present a fully amphibious ACV 1.1 vehicle, with 67,500 lbs / 30,617 kg. Gross vehicle weight capable of performing open-ocean ship launch and recovery operations. It is capable of operating in conditions up to Sea State 3 and through a nine foot plunging surf.
It also delivers the internal capacity for 13 embarked Marines plus a crew of three thus meeting the objective requirement for payload. Its automotive drivetrain offers superior land mobility across all expeditionary environments. The BAE ACV 1.1 is employable across the Range of Military Operations and complements the expeditionary capabilities of the Marine Air Ground Task Force’s Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) fleet.
Designed as an amphibious vehicle with open-ocean ship launch and recovery capability, the ACV 1.1 is flexible and highly mobile with capacity for 13 embarked Marines plus a crew of three. Sustainable, networked and wellprotected for all operating environments, it complements the capabilities of the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
The BAE ACV 1.1 is an 8x8 amphibious platform that features the proven IVECO unique H-Drive System to provide full time all-wheel traction both on land and in the surf zone. The range at sea followed by land is up to 12NM followed by 250+ miles on land. The 16R20 tires are common to Marine Corps’ MTVR fleet. The design affords MRAP level survivability [ie, a compromise with mobility] through its integrated armor design A blast resistant hull and energy absorbing seats are key elements of the ACV 1.1 survivability solution that delivers superior mine, improvised explosive device (IED), kinetic energy (KE), and overhead protection. An Automatic Fire Suppression System is also included.
Designed for U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations, SAIC enhanced its Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1 solution, TERREX 2, to transport Marines safely and quickly from ship to shore. For more than 10 years, SAIC has modified and upgraded armored vehicles for the Department of Defense ensuring warfighters are protected during combat, while securing command and control and repair capabilities. TERREX 2, the latest addition to SAIC’s portfolio of enhanced vehicles, is an 8x8 wheeled, armored, ACV with improved mobility that can transport personnel and cargo to and through hostile territory. Meant to be fully employable across the Marine Corps’ Range of Military Operations and complement the expeditionary capabilities of the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) fleet, TERREX 2 is equipped to lighten the Marine Air Ground Task Force with optimized lift requirements and an embarkation footprint that maximizes the surface connector and self-deployment landing plans.
General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics, conducted simulated mine-blast tests in late 2012 that confirmed the ability of its Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) ballistic hull design to meet the U.S. Marine Corps’ ACV mine-blast survivability requirements. Funded through General Dynamics’ internal research and development initiatives, the tests were conducted by National Technical Systems, Inc., at the National Ordnance and Ballistic Test Center in Camden, Ark. The successful tests simulated an underbelly mine-blast event on the forward and aft sections of the General Dynamics ACV ballistic hull. General Dynamics continued work in 2014 on an Amphibious CombatVehicle (ACV) solution for the U.S. Marine Corps.
The US Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) development program presents risks of discovering deficiencies after some systems have already been built, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report warned. The ACV program relies heavily on future plans to increase ACV amphibious capability gradually, in three planned increments known as ACV 1.1, 1.2, and 2.0, but exactly how this capability will be attained has not yet been determined, the report said.
"(T)he Marine Corps is pursuing an accelerated program schedule that presents some risks, including plans to hold the preliminary design review after the start of development — a deviation from best practices," the report, issued on 28 October 2015, warned. This fast track schedule could delay access to necessary information about whether the design performs as expected, the GAO warned. "Moreover, GAO believes that …conducting development testing and production at the same time …could leave the program at greater risk of discovering deficiencies after some systems have already been built, potentially requiring costly modifications," the report continued.
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