Korea Crisis - Bush Administration
In October 2000, the number two man in North Korea's leadership, Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok, signed a joint communiqué in Washington containing this key statement of good intentions: 'Neither government would have hostile intent toward the other.' President Bush later repudiated this objective. During a March 2001 meeting with South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung, Bush rejected his 'sunshine policy' of phased reconciliation with North Korea. Then, a year later, included Pyongyang in his 'axis of evil' with Iraq and Iran.
Despite the ROK government's Sunshine Policy, little progress had been made since March 2001. In South Korea, a rift in public opinion has intensified on most major issues, and suspicion and skepticism have grown about the utility of the existing North Korea policy. Even sympathizers of the Sunshine Policy were disappointed by the North's lack of response. Pyongyang blamed the hardliners in Washington and Seoul for their stalled relations and rebuffed President Bush's policy guidelines that adopt a comprehensive approach. Maintaining its military-first policy, it recently even vowed to strengthen its armed forces. Kim Jong-il apparently saw diminishing returns in his pledged return visit to Seoul. Pyongyang has instead put a higher priority on improving its relations with Beijing and Moscow, presumably to strengthen its negotiating leverage toward Seoul and Washington. It also has become noticeably less eager to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo.
A comprehensive US policy review issued in June 2001 calling for unconditional talks between Washington and Pyongyang on a range of issues including the DPRK's nuclear program, its production and export of ballistic missiles, and the conventional military posture on the peninsula.
In his January 2002 State of the Union speech President Bush said that "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens." Bush said of North Korea, Iraq and Iran: "States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." The president stated publicly that the United States was ready to enter dialogue with North Korea only if it withdrew conventional weapons from the Demilitarized Zone and halted arms exports. Pyongyang responded by cutting off contact with South Korea and many of those projects came to a halt.
Thousands of South Koreans were angered by the deaths in 2002 of two young South Korean girls, struck and killed by a US military vehicle on a training mission. Outrage escalated when a US military court ruled the deaths were accidental. Numerous peaceful rallies have since taken place, with young South Koreans singing songs and chanting slogans by candlelight. They are calling for revisions in the so-called Status of Forces Agreement, which outlines US jurisdiction over US troops stationed in the South.
During the summer of 2002, North Korea again engaged in a series of diplomatic overtures resuming talks with the South, Japan and the United States. That is when the latest crisis hit.
Tensions heightened after the North's surprise admission in late September 2002 that it had continued developing nuclear arms in secret, through uranium enrichment. The United States subsequently urged Japan, South Korea, and China, to help it apply "maximum pressure" to force North Korea to halt the program. So far, none of those countries has shown the commitment that the Bush administration has sought on the issue. North Korea has avoided diplomatic measures that could defuse a showdown with the United States. The US has demanded that the DPRK undertake a "complete and visible dismantling" of its uranium nuclear weapons effort.
The United States says it wants to settle the issue peacefully. Pyongyang has indicated that it is willing to resolve the issue through dialogue, but only if Washington abandons what North Korea calls "hostile US policy."
In explaining why military action was appropriate against Iraq but not North Korea, Secretary of State Colin Powell said "[Saddam] Hussein in recent years has invaded two of his neighbors. He has used these kinds of weapons of mass destruction against his own people, as well as his neighbors. He has resources available to him. It's a very wealthy little country. They've misspent their wealth, but it is a very wealthy little country. And Korea is an isolated country with no wealth, with a broken economy, a broken society, desperately in need, and with neighbors who are not going to be happy with this new development."
North Korea started to tighten public control, conducting military drills and ideological indoctrination. Public military training -- like anti-air raid drills and Red Guard training -- has been underway on a major scale since late October 2002. The National Defense Committee put all the people's armed forces on a "semi-war status" in early November 2002.
In December 2002 North Korea took a series of steps to restart its nuclear facilities, which were shut down under the 1994 pact with Washington. In exchange, North Korea was to receive the two light water reactors and annual shipments of fuel oil. But after Pyongyang told US officials in October 2002 that it had a secret program to enrich uranium, which could be used to make nuclear weapons, Washington and its allies halted the oil shipments.
North Korea removed IAEA security seals and monitoring cameras at all four of Yongbyon's reactors. The UN nuclear watchdog agency warns there is enough spent fuel at Yongbyon to make at least three nuclear bombs within months.
Roh Moo Hyun, the candidate of the governing Millennium Democratic Party who campaigned in favor of continued engagement with North Korea and greater autonomy from the United States, triumphed in South Korea's presidential election on 19 December 2002. His campaign focused on continued engagement with North Korea, despite its threatening nuclear program, and continued the "sunshine policy" of the outgoing president, Kim Dae-jung. He ruled out deadlines for compliance or economic sanctions to force the North to respect its international obligations. The campaign, marked by anti-American demonstrations, set South Korea and the United States on the most divergent diplomatic paths in half a century. People who live close to the demilitarized zone turned out to prefer Roh's more peaceful approach. The losing candidate, conservative Lee Hoi Chang, had for years called for a tough stance against the North. He was seen as a more sympathetic partner for the Bush administration.
Days before the election, Mr. Roh said that "if the US and North Korea start a war, we will stop it," a comment read by some as implying that South Korea would take a neutral position. "We must have dialogue with the North and with the US," Mr. Roh told a crowd in downtown Seoul. "In this way we must make sure that the North-US dispute does not escalate into a war. Now the Republic of Korea must take a central role. We cannot have a war."
On 16 December 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell assured North Korea that the United States has no intention of attacking that country. But he rejected the idea of a non-aggression treaty, which Pyongyang is demanding to settle the crisis over its nuclear weapons program. ''The United States will not enter into dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments,'' Powell said. ''We will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed."
The Bush Administration has refused direct talks with North Korea, saying this would reward bad behavior. The Bush Administration may allow the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take the lead on North Korea, and call for a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the crisis.
The North's defense minister, Kim Il Chol, said that "US hawks" were "pushing the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war."
US officials dismissed the North's demand for a non-aggression pact, ruled out direct talks before disarmament and urged other states to increase Pyongyang's economic and political isolation. A compromise plan developed by South Korea was said to require George Bush to personally guarantee North Korea's security and a resumption of its oil supplies. Washington is favoring a package settlement, as opposed to the phase-out approach favored by Seoul. The difference apparently stems from American mistrust of the North Korean regime, which has violated the Geneva Agreed Framework, a failed agreement in Washington's view, which contained multiple phases toward crisis resolution.
The North Korean nuclear crisis provided China -- Pyongyang's closest ally and main supplier of fuel -- with an opportunity for international diplomacy. In April 2003, Beijing brought together US and North Korean negotiators for a meeting that was inconclusive. Since then, Chinese diplomats shuttled to various world capitals - including Washington and Pyongyang.
South Korea and Japan produced their roadmaps for a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis in earlier meetings, and had been eagerly awaiting for one from the US. Their proposals include detailed suggestions on the timing and ways to implement a set of initiatives to lead North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic and security guarantees. The joint South Korea-Japan proposals also called for the US and Japan to normalize relations with North Korea at the final stage of programs to resolve the nuclear dispute. The three nations agreed on the need to produce a joint North-Korea strategy during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia in June 2003. High-level policy consultations among the allies are through their Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, a channel that coordinates policy toward Pyongyang. US conducted a review on a joint proposal made by Seoul and Tokyo in July 2003, but the details of their proposals were not known.
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi led China's delegation to talks on the North Korean issue in Beijing. The three days of meetings, which start Wednesday, 27 August 2003, include representatives from five other countries - the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia. Russian and US diplomats said they do not believe the talks will yield any immediate major breakthrough. The US team, led by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, brought a detailed proposal for ending the North Korean nuclear program that would address that country's security concerns though without offering the bilateral non-aggression treaty being sought by North Korea.
The US objective is to urge North Korea to commit to the "complete verifiable and irreversible ending of is nuclear arms program" through a peaceful diplomatic resolution. The United States hoped to make clear to the Pyongyang leadership that "if we can move in the direction of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, that there are many things we'll want to talk about, and many opportunities that we hope will develop." According to a background briefing before the meeting, there are "a lot of different aspects" to North Korea's nuclear program, and resolving them will be "a complicated process" which has "a certain urgency. ... There are really four parts of the North Korea nuclear issue. There is the reprocessing of plutonium that may have been done some ten or more years ago; there is the spent fuel rods in whatever amount, perhaps all of them, that have been reprocessed recently and the plutonium; there is the uranium enrichment program that has been proceeding separately; and then there are the reactors and the spent fuel from which further plutonium can be generated. ... "We don't have forever and a day to deal with this issue," the US official said, adding: "I don't think we have any firm timelines on how to do that. But I think it's very important that we see progress." The United States proposed that an inspection team should be formed with five countries to participate in the six-way talks to make an "early inspection" of the DPRK's nuclear facilities and verify the dismantling of its nuclear program.
However, North Korea stated that an "early inspection" is "impossible and unimaginable unless the US drops its hostile policy" toward the DPRK. The DPRK stated it cannot dismantle its nuclear deterrent force unless the US "makes a bold decision to make a switchover" in its hostile policy.
Despite the unlikely alliance between all but the DPRK on the issue of the North's possession of nuclear ambitions, the Americans' avoidance of formal bilateral talks may have backfired, as the agendas of six, vice two, nations had to be addressed. Although both the U.S. and Japan held informal bilateral discussions on the sidelines, neither proved substantially successful. Most parties present in Beijing resumed their typical roles, with Japan focusing on citizen repatriation, Russia remaining on the sidelines with relative ambivalence, South Korea offering economic reward, and the United States and North Korea maintaining hard-line stances. The North aggravated China by threatening to up the ante in the nuclear standoff, which might produce more aggressive efforts by China to influence Pyongyang ahead of the next round of meetings.
After the first six-way meeting in Beijing in August 2003 ended without a breakthrough, North Korea said it was not interested in further talks. However, in October 2003 it changed its stance after talks with Chinese leaders. Still, no date for a new round had been set, although many diplomats expect talks to take place in Beijing sometime in December 2003.
A security guarantee from the United States has been one of North Korea's key demands in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons programs. In October 2003 Pyongyang said it would consider President Bush's offer of a written assurance from Washington as well as North Korea's neighbors. Previously North Korea had demanded a non-aggression treaty with the United States, which Washington ruled out. In late Novmber 2003 South Korean and US diplomats began going over the wording of a proposed security guarantee for North Korea. South Korean Assistant Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck and US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly discussed possible wording for a "documented security assurance" for North Korea.
An unofficial visit by American Congressional staffers and Korean experts to Pyongyang and Yongbyon took place in January 2004. Interestingly, the former head of the Los Alamos research program who participated in the track two mission returned from his visit repudiating North Korea's claims that they have the capability to transform nuclear material into a working bomb. One wonders what advantage the DPRK would gain by allowing American voices to disprove Pyongyang's long-standing nuclear assertions. Either Kim is in fact bluffing, and America hopes to 'wait it out' during President Bush's reelection campaign and not push any provocative buttons just as Kim hopes to see a change of leadership in Washington, or the DPRK does in fact have the capability to create a nuclear weapon and wasn't prepared to prove it until they can verifiably do so - through a test. President Bush's State of the Union address contained surprisingly little with regard to North Korea - only a one-sentence reiteration that they dismantle and noticeably less emphasis than one might expect after the first of three 'Axis of Evil' founding members has fallen.
At the second round of talks, which took place 24-28 February 2004, North Korea offered to freeze its nuclear programs in exchange for economic compensation and security guarantees. The United States has remained firm in its demand for North Korea's "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantling of its nuclear programs before it will enter discussions on aid. The meeting led to the creation of low-level working groups that would address verification and other issues. An expected joint communiqué failed to materialize, however, because North Korea disagreed at the last minute with some of the proposed wording. A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he believed the talks were successful in moving ahead toward the goal of convincing North Korea to "completely, verifiably and irreversibly" dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. He said that goal was essentially accepted by all participants, other than North Korea itself. However, a story in the Washington Post by Glenn Kessler on March 4, 2004 titled "Bush Signals Patience on North Korea is Waning" indicated that failure to produce a joint communiqué was due to President Bush's instructions to the US delagation that they make clear that the administration's patience in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through negotiations could run out. The President's instructions were passed along to the other delagation on the third day of the talks as the various parties were drafting the communiqué. The result was that efforts to conclude a detailed communiqué were halted.
The Washington Post article also described the "coordinated steps" the Administration said that it was willing to take if North Korea agreed to dismantle its programs. The first stage would be the US willingness to discuss multilateral security assurances if North Korea made a commitment for the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of its nuclear program. The US delagation indicated that once the North Korean program was nearly dismantles, the United States would be prepared to enter negotiations leading to diplomatic relations. The North Korean delagation responded that it wanted compensation for dismantling its nuclear programs (a condition that some of the other participants said could be met provided that North Korea met certain conditions). North Korea also stated that it would abandon its nuclear program if the United States ended its "hostile policy" of referring to the DPRK as part of the Axis of Evil. Efforts to conclude a joint declaration calling for the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula were complicated by North Korea's seeking language asserting that there were significant differences between the US and North Korea and that the other nations at the talk would work to "narrow them". This language was rejected by the US and others.
With regular predictions of North Korean economic collapse and active, somewhat successful Chinese diplomacy, it is easy to see the logic behind the wait and see approach. However, the slowly, but steadily increasing ties with South Korea, continued support from China and some modest economic growth are keeping the lights on in the North. While most want to see Kim fall from grace, none of his neighbors want to bear witness to a total social and economic collapse. Barring an enforced embargo by all major players or an exceptionally long winter, Kim should be able to scrape up enough financial support (through donation or arms sales similar to the Scud sale to Yemen last year) to last longer than many speculate, drawing out the nuclear dispute for another year. Or, worst yet, Kim was hedging his bets on playing the most dangerous, yet effective, card to date - a nuclear test in 2004.
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