Korea Crisis - Blockade
One potential military option to contain the risks that North Korea might transfer some of its nuclear material to another state or party would be the establishment of a blockade around North Korea that would intercept vessels coming in and out of the DPRK. This option first came to light in mid-to-late April following a failed attempt at talks between the US and North Korea.
Nicknamed "Cuba Lite" for its similarities to the 1962 quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The strategy would be to selectively blockade some North Korean ships rather than applying a full blockade which the North Koreans might consider an act of war.
Intelligence resources would be used to determine what each ship was carrying and naval vessels would be dispatched to interdict those cargo vessels believed to be carrying nuclear materials. An unnamed senior Pentagon advisor was quoted in the Daily Telegraph on April 27, 2003 as saying that the US had "the ability to track anything going in or out of North Korean waters."
This strategy would employ similar tactics as was used in the December 9, 2002 boarding of a North Korean vessel off the Arabian Peninsula that was transporting Scud missiles to Yemen. The vessel, the Sosan, was tracked by US intelligence from the time it left North Korea and was boarded by the Spanish Navy.
An April 2003 raid by the Royal Australian Navy of a North Korean ship, the Pongsu (or Pong Su), believed to have been involved with narcotics is also being looked at as a potential model that could be drawn upon. On April 16 aerial surveillance of the Pong Su began with the task alternating between the RAAF using Hercules and Orion aircraft and Coastwatch. The freighter headed east through Bass Strait and on Thursday (April 17) turned north and headed up the Australian coast.
Civil police launches intercepted but had been unable to board the ship because of heavy seas. The Police approached the ADF; the Navy was tasked to assist.
HMAS Stuart was surged from port after some hasty repair work. In the Tasman Sea on April 19 the Stuart identified the Pong Su on radar and then shadowed out of sight over the horizon as she headed north. In the early morning hours of April 20, 2003 the HMAS Stuart radioed the Pong Su to prepare to be boarded; Special Air Service troops roped onto the ship from a helicopter and also boarded the ship using RHIBs. The troops confined the 30-member crew in the ship's galley and café. Pong Su was taken to Garden Island, declared a Federal Police crime scene and subjected to a thorough search by civilian authorities. The vessel was found to be carrying 100lbs of heroin and another 165lb was found on shore nearby, roughly $80 million of product.
In a further step to reduce the possibility of escalation the United States might also opt to have boarding parties and interdictions carried out by coalition naval forces rather than with US vessels.
On May 31, 2003 at a speech given just prior to the G8 summit President Bush announced the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative which would result in the creation of international agreements and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.
The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic, active approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies.
In June 2003, Japan changed its policy in regard to the ferries operating from North Korea. Nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel Man Gyong Bong-92. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries traveling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. The Japanese policy appears to be part of a large US strategy to involve regional actors in policing North Korean exports.
The Japanese Transport Minister, Chikage Ogi, stated that Japan intends to inspect all North Korean vessels at ports in Japan. On June 11 the 298 ton freighter Namsan 3 was detained at Maizuru and at the Otaru port in Hokkaido the 178-ton Daehungrason-2, carrying crabs, was also detained.
This shift in policy comes as the United States has withdrawn several dozen fighters and bombers from South Korea and Guam, including F-117s, B-52s, B-1Bs and F-15Es, indicating that the administration opted to not pursue air strikes.
On August 08, 2003 the North Korean cargo vessel Be Gaehung was detained at Kaohsiung Harbor in Taiwan after US intelligence notified the Taiwanese government that the vessel was suspected of carrying chemicals associated with rocket fuel, according to the Christian Science Monitor on August 12, 2003. The ship was boarded and inspected and the captain was asked to unload the chemicals on Sunday August 10. The vessel began unloading some 158 barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide which were then confiscated by government officials. Speculation contends that the decision to unload the chemicals and to comply with demands is an indication that prior to the six-party talks, North Korea is pursuing a softer-line.
On August 25, 2003 the North Korean ferry Mangyongbong-92 was prevented by Japanese authorities from departing Nigata, Japan due to 5 safety violations found by more than 100 inspectors from three ministries. The violations, according to the Associated Press on the same day, included not having a fire damper in a kitchen exhaust duct, emergency exit signs meeting height and lighting specifics, a wireless phone for communications during an emergency, a fire extinguisher that uses seawater, and a faulty divider for oil and bilge water. The Mangyongbong-92 was identified during testimony to Congress as being involved in the smuggling of up to 80 percent of the parts used in the North's missile programs. On August 26, 2003, Japanese authorities cleared the Mangyongbong-92 of safety violations and allowed it to leave port.
Establishing a blockade or undertaking a series of inspections and other interdictions does present a number of issues. First, there are questions concerning the legality of undertaking searches and seizures in international waters. North Korea is not a signatory of any treaty that requires states to not produce drugs or to prevent the transport of narcotics.
The Department of Defense is authorized to provide support to law enforcement agencies and military personnel with counter drug responsibilities. DOD provides training, upgrades equipment and maintains a series of intelligence initiatives both in terms of collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence among law enforcement, military and intelligence services, command and control systems that allow allies to communicate that information real-time as well as the ability to assist them with minor infrastructure. It is not clear however whether or not these justifications are sufficient to meet the requirements of international law.
An additional problem relates to the effectiveness of a blockade or naval interdiction. Trying to interdict WMD may prove as difficult as interdicting narcotics. While US sensor capabilities are substantial it is likely that some North Korean shipments will penetrate the blockade.
Conducting a comprehensive blockade of North Korea will require a number of ships. As of mid-June the United States had two carrier strike groups and one amphibious ready group in the Asia-Pacific region consisting of roughly 20 ships. Exluding the aircraft carriers and the Amphibious Ready Group there are two Ticonderoga class cruisers, three Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers (two of which are Flight I's thus do not have embarked helicopter detachments), two Spruance class destroyers, and four Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigates. [This does not include the ships at Pearl Harbor.]
The Kitty Hawk and elements of its strike group returned to Yokosuka in early May and has since begun an extended period of maintenance making the Kitty Hawk unavailable until sometime in November at the earliest. The readiness of the rest of the strike group is difficult to determine as some ships have undoubtedly begun yard periods while others have not.
The USS Carl Vinson and an element of its strike group are currently deployed to insure a credible deterrent while the Kitty Hawk was deployed supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and while it undergoes repairs. During its deployment the Carl Vinson has conducted operations in multiple areas in the Pacific including off the coast of South Korea. While it might conduct operations in the South Pacific elements of its strike group can be retasked for maritime interdiction operations.
While a blockade would also extend to North Korean aircraft and would involve the grounding of DPRK aircraft at airports while they were refueling.
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