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Operation Juniper Shield II ??

As of November 3, 2025, no military operations have been conducted. The situation remains at the threat and preparation stage, with diplomatic tensions escalating between the United States and Nigeria. The Trump administration ordered the Department of War to prepare for possible action but has not publicly disclosed specific operational plans, target lists, or deployment orders.

The United States possesses the military capabilities to conduct operations against Islamic militant groups in Nigeria should political leaders order such action. Available assets include unmanned aerial strike platforms, special operations forces, conventional rapid reaction units, and extensive intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The primary targets would be Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province installations in the Sambisa Forest region, Lake Chad Basin, and Mandara Mountains. Operational concepts could range from limited precision airstrikes to more extensive ground operations depending on political objectives and acceptable risk levels.

. US force posture in Africa changed significantly in August 2024 when all US forces withdrew from Air Base 201 in Niger following the military junta's termination of cooperation agreements. This withdrawal eliminated the closest US military installation to northern Nigeria and significantly constrains operational capabilities for any potential Nigeria operations.

However, significant operational challenges include the requirement for Nigerian government cooperation, the geographic scope and difficult terrain of the operational area, the presence of civilian populations, intelligence collection requirements, logistical sustainment needs, and the fundamental question of whether military operations can achieve lasting security improvements given the complex political, economic, and social dynamics driving militancy in the region. As of November 3, 2025, no actual military operations have been conducted, and the situation remains at the threat and planning stage with substantial uncertainties about whether threats will translate into action.

Should the United States proceed with military action against Islamic militant groups in Nigeria, operational planners would likely develop a phased campaign combining unmanned aerial strikes, special operations raids, intelligence gathering, and potentially limited ground force deployments. The primary targets would be Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province installations in the Sambisa Forest region, Lake Chad Basin, and Mandara Mountains areas of northeastern Nigeria. Available US military assets in Africa include drone capabilities based in Niger and Djibouti, rapid reaction forces from the 173rd Airborne Brigade stationed in Italy, special operations units, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms already conducting counterterrorism missions across the Sahel region.

In early November 2025, President Donald Trump issued unprecedented threats of military intervention against Nigeria, accusing the West African nation of failing to protect Christians from Islamic terrorist attacks. Trump designated Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern on November 1, 2025, and subsequently threatened to halt all U.S. aid and potentially launch military strikes against Islamic militant groups operating in the country. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that the Department of War had begun preparations for possible military action. The threats have been met with strong denials from the Nigerian government and skepticism from security analysts who dispute the characterization of violence in Nigeria as primarily targeting Christians.

President Trump has designated Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern" due to what he describes as mass slaughter of Christians by radical Islamists. Trump stated that 3,100 Christians were killed in Nigeria in recent years compared to 4,476 worldwide, representing a disproportionate concentration of anti-Christian violence. The President declared that "Christianity is facing an existential threat in Nigeria" and warned the Nigerian government to "move fast" or face US military intervention described as "fast, vicious, and sweet."

War Secretary Pete Hegseth responded affirmatively to Trump's directive, stating "The killing of innocent Christians in Nigeria—and anywhere—must end immediately. The Department of War is preparing for action. Either the Nigerian Government protects Christians, or we will kill the Islamic Terrorists who are committing these horrible atrocities." The Trump administration has requested Congressional appropriations review through Congressman Riley Moore and Chairman Tom Cole of the House Appropriations Committee.

Threat Assessment: Islamic Militant Groups in Nigeria

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)

ISWAP represents the most capable and organizationally sophisticated Islamic militant faction operating in northeastern Nigeria. The group split from Boko Haram in 2016 and has since eclipsed its parent organization in territorial control, military capability, and administrative governance. ISWAP has escalated operations significantly since January 2025, launching at least twelve coordinated attacks on military bases across Borno State and demonstrating unprecedented tactical sophistication including the use of kinetic drones and employment of foreign fighters.

In May 2025, ISWAP conducted a highly successful offensive campaign dubbed the "holocaust of the camps," overrunning fifteen Nigerian military supercamps and seizing substantial quantities of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles including main battle tanks. The group has established four to five governorates centered at Lake Chad, Sambisa Forest, Timbuktu Triangle (Alagarno Forest), Tumbuma, and Kerenoa, each with its own wali (governor) and governing structures. ISWAP maintains more control over large swaths of the countryside than the Nigerian government itself.

Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS/Boko Haram)

Following the death of long-time leader Abubakar Shekau in May 2021 during ISWAP's invasion of Sambisa Forest, remnant Boko Haram forces under new leader Bakura Doro have regrouped and currently control territories in the northern Lake Chad islands and portions of the Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Unlike ISWAP's more bureaucratic governance model, Boko Haram continues its tactics of indiscriminate attacks on both Christian and Muslim civilians, pillage, kidnapping, forced marriage, child soldier recruitment, and deployment of suicide bombers including women and children.

Recent intelligence indicates renewed conflict between ISWAP and Boko Haram factions in the Sambisa Forest region, with commanders including Abba Tukurre, Bunjumma, Ali Kalumbo, and Abu-Rijal (Ba-Sulhu) conducting inter-factional warfare. Despite organizational setbacks, Boko Haram remains capable of devastating attacks including mass kidnappings and suicide bombings targeting displaced persons camps, mosques, and civilian markets.

Key Strongholds and Operating Areas

Islamic militant strongholds are concentrated in four primary geographic zones:

Sambisa Forest: A 2,400 square mile expanse of dense forest, swamps, and caves in southern Borno State. Historically served as Boko Haram's primary headquarters until ISWAP seizure in May 2021. Currently contested between ISWAP governance structures and residual Boko Haram elements. Contains extensive cave networks, training camps, weapons caches, and administrative centers. Approximately 700 kilometers from Lagos on the Bight of Benin coast.

Lake Chad Islands: Marshy islands and reed-covered waterways in the northern portion of Lake Chad provide concealment for militant camps, smuggling routes, and logistics bases. Predominantly controlled by Bakura Doro's Boko Haram faction following successful pushback against ISWAP since late 2022. Strategic location at Nigeria-Niger-Chad tri-border area facilitates cross-border operations and resupply. Distance from Bight of Benin coast approximately 900-1,000 kilometers.

Mandara Mountains: Rugged mountainous terrain along the Nigeria-Cameroon border provides defensible positions for Boko Haram elements. Natural caves and difficult terrain have historically frustrated military operations. Contains training camps and serves as refuge for fighters retreating from lowland operations.

Tumbun Islands/Timbuktu Triangle: Forested region between Borno and Yobe states known as the Timbuktu Triangle covered by Alagarno Forest. ISWAP maintains significant presence with established governance structures. Strategic corridor between Lake Chad basin and more southerly population centers.

US Military Capabilities for Nigerian Operations

SSGN Tomahawk Strike Operations from Bight of Benin

The United States Navy operates four Ohio-class guided missile submarines: USS Ohio (SSGN-726), USS Michigan (SSGN-727), USS Florida (SSGN-728), and USS Georgia (SSGN-729). Two are homeported at Bangor, Washington (Ohio and Michigan) and two at Kings Bay, Georgia (Florida and Georgia). Any of these vessels could be tasked for West African operations, though the Atlantic Fleet boats from Kings Bay offer shorter transit times.

SSGN Technical Capabilities: Each Ohio-class SSGN carries up to 154 Tomahawk Block IV or Block V cruise missiles loaded in seven-shot Multiple-All-Up-Round Canisters in 22 of the submarine's 24 converted Trident missile tubes. The submarines displace 18,750 tons submerged, measure 560 feet in length, and can operate at depths exceeding 800 feet. SSGNs employ dual crew rotation allowing extended forward deployments up to two years duration. Beyond missile firepower, SSGNs can host up to 66 special operations personnel with dedicated lockout chambers and capacity to deploy Dry Combat Submersibles or SEAL Delivery Vehicles.

Tomahawk Missile Specifications: The BGM-109 Tomahawk is a subsonic, long-range cruise missile optimized for precision strikes against high-value fixed targets in high-threat environments. Block IV variants deployed since early 2000s have ranges of approximately 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles), while the latest Block V versions introduced in early 2020s extend range beyond 1,800 kilometers (1,120 miles) with advanced survivability features. The missile employs a Williams F107 turbofan engine for cruise phase, flies at speeds around 880 km/h (550 mph), and maintains low-altitude flight profiles of 30-90 meters to evade radar detection.

The Tomahawk guidance system combines inertial navigation, GPS satellite positioning, terrain contour matching (TERCOM) radar, and digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC) for terminal accuracy within 5 meters. The WDU-36/B 1,000-pound class blast fragmentation warhead contains 265 pounds of PBXN-107 high explosive. Block IV missiles feature two-way satellite data links enabling in-flight retargeting, loitering over target areas, and transmission of battle damage assessment imagery back to commanders.

Bight of Benin Operating Area: The Bight of Benin extends approximately 640 kilometers along the West African coast from Cape St. Paul in Ghana eastward to the Nun outlet of the Niger River in southwestern Nigeria. Water depths in the Gulf of Guinea portion suitable for SSGN operations range from 200 to 4,000 meters, providing ample depth for covert submarine positioning. An SSGN could operate submerged anywhere in the Bight of Benin with direct unobstructed launch geometry to targets throughout northeastern Nigeria.

Launch Geometry and Range Considerations: From a submerged launch position in the central Bight of Benin (approximately 5°N, 3°E) off the Nigerian coast near Lagos:

- Distance to Maiduguri (Borno State capital): approximately 700 kilometers
- Distance to Sambisa Forest militant strongholds: approximately 700-750 kilometers
- Distance to Lake Chad basin targets: approximately 900-1,000 kilometers
- Distance to Mandara Mountains: approximately 800 kilometers
- Distance to Timbuktu Triangle: approximately 750-800 kilometers

All primary militant strongholds in northeastern Nigeria fall well within the 1,600+ kilometer range of Tomahawk Block IV/V missiles launched from the Bight of Benin. The submarine's position would be approximately 150-200 nautical miles offshore in international waters, ensuring full compliance with freedom of navigation principles while maintaining covert posture.

Operational Concept: SSGN Strike Package

Phase One - Opening Salvo (H-Hour): An SSGN positioned in the Bight of Benin would launch an initial volley of 50-80 Tomahawk missiles targeting the highest-value ISWAP and Boko Haram command nodes, training facilities, weapons storage sites, and communications infrastructure. Launch sequence would occur over 10-15 minute period with missiles programmed for coordinated time-on-target arrival to maximize shock effect and minimize warning time for militant dispersal.

Missiles would transit overland Nigeria at terrain-following altitudes, using GPS and TERCOM guidance to navigate around Nigerian air defense radars and populated areas. Flight time from launch to impact would be approximately 60-90 minutes depending on specific target locations and routing. The supersonic arrival of multiple Tomahawks would provide no meaningful warning time for target evacuation.

Target Set Priority One - Leadership and Command: ISWAP wali headquarters and shura council meeting locations in Lake Chad, Sambisa Forest, and other governorate centers. Boko Haram leadership compounds associated with Bakura Doro and senior commanders. Communications nodes including satellite communication facilities, radio relay stations, and propaganda media production centers. Estimated 15-20 Tomahawks allocated.

Target Set Priority Two - Military Infrastructure: Training camps, weapons manufacturing facilities, improvised explosive device factories, vehicle maintenance depots, and ammunition bunkers. Particular emphasis on facilities storing captured Nigerian military equipment including armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and heavy weapons. Cave complexes in Sambisa Forest and Mandara Mountains serving as defended strongholds. Estimated 25-35 Tomahawks allocated.

Target Set Priority Three - Economic Assets: ISWAP-controlled markets, taxation checkpoints, fuel storage facilities, and revenue-generating infrastructure that funds operations. Smuggling route chokepoints along Lake Chad waterways. ISWAP administrative centers managing governance functions. Estimated 10-15 Tomahawks allocated.

Target Set Priority Four - Symbolic Targets: Former captured Nigerian military installations serving as propaganda symbols, ISWAP khilafah cadet schools for child soldier indoctrination, and high-visibility sites featured in militant propaganda videos. Estimated 10-15 Tomahawks allocated.

Air Force Strike Assets

Tomahawk strikes from the SSGN would be coordinated with follow-on Air Force strikes conducted by bombers and fighters operating from various regional bases. US Air Force assets available for operations would likely include:

B-52H Stratofortress: Long-range heavy bombers could conduct follow-on strikes carrying 70,000 pounds of ordnance including JDAM precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, and area-saturation weapons. B-52s would launch standoff strikes outside Nigerian airspace using AGM-86 or AGM-158 JASSM missiles.

B-2 Spirit: Stealth bombers provide capability to penetrate any air defenses and conduct precision strikes with 80 GBU-31 JDAMs or Massive Ordnance Penetrators for hardened underground facilities. B-2s could operate from both continental US bases and forward locations in Europe or Diego Garcia.

F-15E Strike Eagles: Multi-role fighters provide tactical air support, precision strike, and close air support capabilities. F-15Es could forward deploy to Niger Air Base 201 (if access negotiated with Nigerien junta government) or operate from more distant bases in Djibouti, Sicily, or elsewhere in theater.

AC-130J Ghostrider Gunships: Armed with 30mm and 105mm cannons plus precision-guided munitions, AC-130s excel at destroying personnel and light vehicles in close air support roles. Would be critical for follow-on strikes after initial suppression of defenses.

Special Operations Forces

Special operations elements would play supporting intelligence, reconnaissance, and direct action roles:

SEAL Teams: Naval special warfare operators could deploy via the SSGN itself, utilizing the submarine's lockout chambers and SEAL Delivery Vehicle capability to conduct covert reconnaissance of coastal areas or river infiltration operations along the Niger River delta approaching inland targets.

Army Special Forces and Delta Force: Small teams could conduct targeting, battle damage assessment, and direct action raids against high-value individuals. Coordination with host nation forces or unilateral operations depending on Nigerian government cooperation level.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): MQ-9 Reaper drones, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, and signals intelligence aircraft would provide targeting data, real-time strike assessment, and pattern-of-life analysis on militant leadership.

Available Bases and Forward Operating Locations

Challenges with Niger Air Base 201

US forces completed full withdrawal from Niger in September 2024, removing all personnel and equipment from Air Bases 101 (Niamey) and 201 (Agadez). This represents a major strategic setback as Air Base 201 was specifically constructed for MQ-9 Reaper operations targeting Islamic militant groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin. The base featured hardened aircraft shelters, extensive fuel storage, sophisticated communications infrastructure, and ideal geographic positioning just 450 kilometers from the Lake Chad region.

Alternative Operating Locations

Without Niger basing, US forces would need to rely on less optimal alternatives:

Cameroon: Cooperation with Cameroon provides limited access for drone operations and special forces staging, though facilities are less developed and distances to targets are greater. Cameroon's military has ongoing cooperation with US forces in counter-Boko Haram operations, but political sensitivities limit publicity of American presence.

Chad: The Chadian government maintains complex relationship with US counter-terrorism cooperation. Access to N'Djamena facilities possible but politically uncertain given Chad's 2024 threats to withdraw from Multinational Joint Task Force. Chad's immediate proximity to Lake Chad targets offers advantages, but host nation approval uncertain.

Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: The primary US military installation in Africa, but located 3,700 kilometers from northeastern Nigeria—too distant for efficient tactical air operations, though feasible for intelligence collection, drone operations with aerial refueling, and bomber staging.

NAS Sigonella, Sicily: US naval air station could support ISR operations, P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (repurposed for overland surveillance), and serve as logistics hub, but 3,200 kilometers from theater requires aerial refueling for strike aircraft.

SSGN as Self-Contained Platform: The Tomahawk-armed submarine represents the most viable immediate strike capability precisely because it requires no host nation basing, operates covertly from international waters, and delivers overwhelming firepower without political complications of land-based operations. The SSGN can remain on station for extended periods, launching multiple strike packages as targeting data becomes available.

Weapon Systems and Munitions

Precision-Guided Munitions

AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles: Primary weapon for MQ-9 Reaper drones, the Hellfire provides 20-pound warhead precision capability against vehicles, buildings, and individual targets. Laser-guided variants offer excellent accuracy but require clear line of sight, while AGM-114R multi-mode seekers provide all-weather capability.

GBU-31 JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition): GPS-guided 2,000-pound bomb provides large blast radius for destroying buildings, bunkers, and area targets. Near-all-weather capability with accuracy within 13 meters. Primary strike weapon for F-15E and heavy bombers.

GBU-38 JDAM: Smaller 500-pound version offers reduced collateral damage with same GPS guidance accuracy. Optimal for urban or congested areas where minimizing civilian casualties is priority.

GBU-54 Laser JDAM: Combined GPS and laser guidance provides maximum precision (within 3 meters) for attacks on specific buildings or vehicles in close proximity to protected structures.

GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb: 250-pound weapon allows aircraft to carry more munitions with reduced collateral effects. Eight can be carried on single weapons station. Ideal for multiple targets in single strike sortie.

GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator: 30,000-pound bunker-buster bomb delivered exclusively by B-2 Spirit. Designed to penetrate 200 feet of earth or 60 feet of concrete. Would be employed only against the most hardened cave complexes in Sambisa Forest or Mandara Mountains if intelligence confirms critical leadership bunkers.

Operational Challenges and Risks

Intelligence Limitations

Accurate targeting of mobile leadership and dispersed militant forces requires extensive intelligence preparation. Without persistent overhead ISR from Niger bases, US forces must rely on satellite imagery with less frequent revisit rates, human intelligence from Nigerian government sources of uncertain reliability, and signals intelligence requiring specialized collection platforms. Militant leaders employ strict communications security and frequently relocate to avoid targeting.

Nigerian Sovereignty Concerns

Unilateral US military strikes on Nigerian territory without host nation approval would constitute violation of Nigerian sovereignty and likely provoke significant international diplomatic backlash. However, Trump administration's November 1 warning implicitly threatens such action if Nigerian government fails to take effective counter-terrorism measures. Any operations would need careful diplomatic management to frame as either invited assistance or response to Nigerian government's failure to protect its Christian population.

Risk of Civilian Casualties

Islamic militant strongholds in Sambisa Forest, Lake Chad islands, and rural areas often include presence of civilians—both supporters, hostages, and residents of militant-governed territories. ISWAP particularly has established administrative control over population centers where civilians conduct daily economic activities under insurgent taxation. Strikes on governance structures, markets, or training camps risk civilian casualties that would undermine stated mission of protecting Christian populations and provide propaganda value to militants.

Historical precedent includes January 2017 Nigerian Air Force accidental bombing of IDP camp at Rann, killing dozens of civilians mistaken for Boko Haram fighters. US operations must employ stringent positive identification procedures, pattern-of-life analysis to identify periods of minimal civilian presence, and collateral damage estimation before weapon release.

Limited Strategic Effect

Cruise missile and air strikes can destroy fixed facilities and kill leadership present at targeted locations, but may have limited long-term impact on fundamentally decentralized insurgent organizations. Both ISWAP and Boko Haram have demonstrated resilience to leadership decapitation, with new commanders emerging from experienced cadre. Without complementary ground operations to exploit strikes and secure terrain, militants may simply disperse during attacks and reconstitute afterward.

More fundamentally, strikes do not address underlying drivers of insurgency including government corruption, economic marginalization of northeastern Nigeria, breakdown of traditional governance structures, and ideological appeal of jihadi narratives among disaffected youth. Military action alone cannot solve what is partially a political and economic crisis.

Regional Stability Implications

US military intervention in Nigeria could destabilize the already fragile regional security architecture. The Multinational Joint Task Force has weakened significantly with Niger's 2025 withdrawal and Chad's threat to exit. US strikes might be perceived as foreign aggression by nationalist elements in Nigerian military and population, potentially strengthening insurgent recruitment narratives about Western crusaders attacking Muslims.

Conversely, perception of Nigerian government as unable to defend its territory might embolden militants, undermine government legitimacy, and accelerate state fragmentation. Neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger host refugee populations and cross-border militants who could exploit regional chaos.

Likely Operational Concept of Operations

Based on US military doctrine, available forces, and stated political objectives, a potential operation would likely follow this sequence:

Phase One - Positioning (D-14 to D-Day): Ohio-class SSGN would transit from Kings Bay, Georgia or forward position through Atlantic to Bight of Benin operating area. Submarine would establish covert patrol position in international waters off Nigerian coast. Intelligence assets would intensify surveillance to develop high-confidence target folders on militant leadership locations, headquarters, training camps, and weapons facilities. Final strike package would be developed and approved at National Command Authority level.

Phase Two - Initial Strike (H-Hour): SSGN would launch 50-80 Tomahawk missiles in rapid sequence targeting highest-value targets across northeastern Nigeria. Missiles would follow pre-programmed routes optimizing terrain masking and avoiding populated areas. Time-on-target would be coordinated to achieve simultaneous impacts across wide geographic area, preventing warning and dispersal. Satellite and drone ISR would monitor strikes and begin battle damage assessment.

Phase Three - Follow-On Strikes (H+2 to H+72 hours): Based on battle damage assessment from Phase Two, additional SSGN-launched Tomahawks would strike surviving high-value targets or newly-identified time-sensitive targets such as leadership fleeing damaged facilities. Long-range bomber strikes would conduct follow-on attacks against area targets and bunker complexes using heavy penetrating munitions. Special operations forces could conduct raids against particularly high-value individuals or facilities requiring sensitive site exploitation.

Phase Four - Sustained Operations (D+3 to D+30): Depending on operational objectives and political guidance, US forces could conduct sustained precision strike campaign using MQ-9 Reapers deployed from available regional bases, continued SSGN Tomahawk strikes, and fighter-bomber missions. Intelligence gathering would focus on identifying reconstitution efforts and fleeing leadership. Nigerian military would be encouraged to conduct complementary ground operations to exploit US strikes and secure cleared terrain.

Phase Five - Transition (D+30 onwards): US strikes would gradually decrease as target set is exhausted and tactical effect achieved. Operations would transition to advisory role supporting Nigerian and regional forces in sustaining pressure on degraded militant organizations. ISR coverage would continue to identify emerging threats and monitor reconstitution efforts.

Assessment of Probable Operational Outcomes

A US military strike campaign against Islamic militants in Nigeria launched primarily via submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles would achieve certain immediate tactical effects while facing significant limitations in strategic outcome:

Near-Certain Tactical Achievements: Destruction of identified fixed facilities including headquarters buildings, training camps, weapons storage bunkers, vehicle parks, and communications infrastructure. High probability of killing substantial numbers of militant fighters and mid-level commanders present at struck locations. Severe disruption to ISWAP's administrative governance structures and Boko Haram's command networks. Temporary degradation of militant operational capabilities through loss of captured Nigerian military equipment, ammunition stockpiles, and logistics infrastructure. Demonstration of US reach and willingness to conduct strikes despite lack of local basing.

Uncertain Middle-Term Effects: Elimination of top leadership depends entirely on intelligence accuracy regarding their locations at time of strike. Both ISWAP and Boko Haram leadership employ sophisticated operational security and frequent movement patterns that complicate targeting. Organizations have demonstrated resilience to leadership losses with rapid replacement from experienced cadre. Militant dispersal into smaller units or temporary retreat into remote areas may preserve combat power for later reconstitution. Nigerian military's ability to exploit US strikes through complementary ground operations remains questionable given their poor performance record against insurgents.

Problematic Long-Term Strategic Impact: Without sustained follow-on operations and complementary political solutions addressing root causes of insurgency, tactical military strikes alone are unlikely to produce lasting strategic defeat of Islamic militant presence in northeastern Nigeria. Historical examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria demonstrate that precision strikes can disrupt but rarely eliminate decentralized insurgent organizations operating in ungoverned spaces with local population support or acquiescence. The fundamental drivers of insurgency—economic marginalization, government corruption, absence of security, and ideological appeal—remain unaddressed by kinetic strikes.

Assessment of November 2025 Scenario

As of November 3, 2025, President Trump's threats and War Secretary Hegseth's confirmation of planning represent escalatory rhetoric that may or may not result in actual military operations. Several scenarios are possible:

Scenario One - Coercive Diplomacy Success: Trump's threats successfully pressure Nigerian government into more aggressive counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP, reducing violence against Christian populations without requiring US strikes. This achieves policy objectives through deterrence rather than actual use of force.

Scenario Two - Limited Demonstration Strikes: US conducts highly selective strike package using SSGN Tomahawks against 10-15 highest-confidence targets to demonstrate resolve and capability without large-scale campaign. This satisfies domestic political pressure to "do something" while limiting operational commitment and risk.

Scenario Three - Substantial Strike Campaign: US launches major attack involving 100+ Tomahawk missiles, bomber strikes, and follow-on operations as outlined in operational concept above. This represents full commitment to degrading Islamic militant capabilities in Nigeria regardless of strategic ambiguity about long-term outcome.

Scenario Four - Rhetoric Without Action: Trump's threats remain unfulfilled as operational realities, diplomatic concerns, intelligence limitations, or shifting political priorities lead to decision against military intervention. This risks credibility damage to US deterrent threats.

From military-operational perspective, the lack of Air Base 201 in Niger represents significant constraint on sustained operations, making SSGN-launched Tomahawk strikes from the Bight of Benin the most viable immediate capability for any potential US action. However, Tomahawk strikes alone—no matter how precisely executed—cannot solve the complex political, economic, and security crisis underlying Islamic insurgency in northeastern Nigeria.