Military

I. The Historical Context: A Crisis of Unprecedented Magnitude

The scope of America's drug crisis provides essential context for understanding current policy debates. Over one million Americans have died from drug overdoses since the beginning of the 21st century, with overdose deaths reaching a peak of approximately 114,000 in the 12-month period ending August 2023.⁴ As CDR Salamander notes in his analysis, this death toll dwarfs American casualties in recent military conflicts, representing "two Vietnams each year" at the peak of the crisis.⁵

American drug overdose deaths since 2000

The crisis has been driven primarily by synthetic opioids, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl. Deaths involving synthetic opioids increased dramatically beginning around 2013, with fentanyl-involved deaths reaching 73,838 in 2022.⁶ The proliferation of fentanyl—a synthetic opioid up to 50 times more potent than heroin—transformed America's drug landscape, often being mixed into other substances without users' knowledge.

II. The Legal Framework for Military Force

A. Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations

The legal foundation for military strikes against drug traffickers rests primarily on the designation of major drug cartels and gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.⁹ On February 20, 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated eight organizations as FTOs: Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), Cártel de Golfo (CDG), and Cárteles Unidos (CU).¹⁰

The designations were based on findings that these organizations have "committed or have attempted to commit, pose a significant risk of committing, or have participated in training to commit acts of terrorism."¹¹ Tren de Aragua, in particular, was described as having "conducted kidnappings, extorted businesses, bribed public officials, authorized its members to attack and kill U.S. law enforcement, and assassinated a Venezuelan opposition figure."¹²

B. Non-International Armed Conflict Declaration

In a notification to Congress after military strikes in mid-September 2025, the Trump administration asserted that the United States is in a "non-international armed conflict" with drug cartels designated as terrorist organizations.¹³ The administration argues that drugs smuggled by these cartels kill tens of thousands of Americans annually and constitute an "armed attack" against U.S. citizens.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio defended this framework, stating that the President has authority to order strikes without congressional authorization when addressing "drug trafficking organizations [that] are direct threat to the safety and security of the United States."¹⁴

C. Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act

On March 15, 2025, President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act regarding Tren de Aragua, declaring that the organization "has invaded the United States and continues to invade, attempt to invade, and threaten to invade the country; perpetrated irregular warfare within the country; and used drug trafficking as a weapon against our citizens."¹⁵

The Presidential determination found that Tren de Aragua "operates in conjunction with Cártel de los Soles, the Nicolas Maduro regime-sponsored, narco-terrorism enterprise based in Venezuela" and is engaged in "mass illegal migration to the United States to further its objectives of harming United States citizens."¹⁶

D. Just War Theory Application

CDR Salamander's analysis applies traditional just war criteria to evaluate the ethical use of force against drug traffickers. Drawing on Richard M. Swain and Albert C. Pierce's framework, he examines both jus ad bellum (the justice of going to war) and jus in bello (justice in the conduct of war).¹⁷

Applying the traditional criteria:

• Just cause: The death of over one million Americans from drug overdoses provides a grave reason for action.
• Competent authority: Actions are ordered by the duly constituted Commander in Chief.
• Right intention: The stated purpose is protecting American lives from drug trafficking.
• Probability of success: Debatable, given historical challenges with interdiction.
• Proportionality: Whether military force is proportional to the threat remains contested.
• Last resort: Critics argue non-military alternatives have not been exhausted.

III. Operational Implementation

A. Caribbean Strikes

Between September 2 and October 2025, the U.S. military conducted at least four strikes on suspected drug-trafficking boats near Venezuela, killing at least 21 people.¹⁸ The operations represented a significant departure from traditional Coast Guard interdiction procedures, which involve boarding vessels, confiscating drugs, and taking suspects into custody for criminal prosecution.

The Trump administration deployed substantial military assets to the region, including eight warships, an attack submarine, jet fighters, spy planes, and reaper drones in international waters and skies near Venezuela.¹⁹ President Trump also announced authorization of CIA operations inside Venezuela.²⁰

B. Vessel Identification

Military operations target several types of vessels associated with drug trafficking:

Semi-submersibles: Purpose-built vessels designed to travel mostly below the waterline to avoid detection. These vessels have no legitimate civilian purpose and are exclusively used for smuggling.²¹

Go-fast boats: High-powered speedboats equipped with multiple large outboard motors (often totaling approximately 1,000 horsepower) specifically configured for rapid drug transport. CDR Salamander notes that four 250-hp motors alone cost approximately $100,000—far exceeding the equipment of legitimate fishing vessels.²²

IV. The Venezuelan Connection

A. Official U.S. Position

The September 2025 Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit Countries identified Venezuela as "a major drug transit country," stating that "the criminal regime of indicted drug trafficker Nicolás Maduro leads one of the largest cocaine trafficking networks in the world."²⁴

In July 2025, the Treasury Department sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, describing it as "a Venezuela-based criminal group headed by Nicolas Maduro Moros" that "provides material support to foreign terrorist organizations threatening the peace and security of the United States, namely Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel."²⁵

The reward for information leading to Maduro's arrest was increased to $50 million in August 2025, with the Department of Justice alleging he has been "a leader of Cartel de los Soles, which is responsible for trafficking drugs into the United States."²⁶

B. Cocaine Transit Role

Available evidence indicates that approximately 24 percent of worldwide cocaine production transits through Venezuela.²⁷ The U.S. Coast Guard reported in August 2025 that "many of the interdicted vessels" seized in what was described as the "largest drug offload" in USCG history "left Venezuela."²⁸ The seized drugs were valued at $473 million and were part of $2.2 billion in drugs seized at sea that year.²⁹

A 2024 DEA assessment found that 90% of cocaine reaching the U.S. is produced in Colombia and enters the U.S. via Mexico, with Venezuela serving as a secondary transit route.³⁰ Over 80% of drug seizures in Venezuela in 2024 occurred along the Colombian border.³¹

V. Critical Counterarguments and Unresolved Questions

A. Laws of War and Non-State Combatants

Critics argue that the legal framework for treating narcotraffickers as military rather than law enforcement threats requires more rigorous analysis. The question remains: how do drug traffickers fit into the taxonomy of combatants under international humanitarian law? This requires examination by legal scholars without "testosterone poisoning" who can provide dispassionate analysis rather than assertions demanding acceptance "on his said so."³³

B. War Powers and Congressional Authorization

On October 8, 2025, the Senate voted 48-51 to reject a War Powers Resolution that would have blocked U.S. military engagement with "any non-state organization engaged in the promotion, trafficking, and distribution of illegal drugs" without congressional authorization.³⁴ Senators Adam Schiff and Tim Kaine led the effort, with only two Republicans—Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski—joining Democrats in support.³⁵

Senator Paul has been particularly vocal, arguing: "The U.S. should not be blowing up boats without even knowing who's on them. There's no due process in that—no names, no evidence, no oversight."³⁶

There exists a minority position on War Powers, supported by examination of numerous small-scale operations throughout U.S. history, that the President has considerable discretion as Commander in Chief to conduct operations that do not require additional congressional appropriations.³⁸ The counterargument suggests that even absent congressional declaration of war, the narcotraffickers may have "already declared war on us" through their actions.³⁹

C. Mistaken Identity and Due Process

Venezuelan officials claim that at least some of those killed were not gang members, creating unease in the region.⁴⁰ The government has not provided public evidence about the boats' passengers or contents, though President Trump claimed bags of cocaine and fentanyl were "spattered all over the ocean."⁴¹ Bags of drugs are not clearly visible in aerial videos shared by the administration.⁴²

InSight Crime, a think tank focused on crime and security in the Americas, reported finding "no evidence to date that Tren de Aragua is involved in transnational drug trafficking," noting the gang's activities center on human smuggling, extortion, and "micro-trafficking."⁴³ This raises questions about whether those killed in strikes were actually members of designated terrorist organizations.

D. The Fentanyl-Venezuela Disconnect

The State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2025 (INCSR) makes clear that Mexico is the sole significant source of illicit fentanyl affecting the United States in 2024. Venezuela is not mentioned as a producer, transit route, or relevant actor in fentanyl trafficking.⁴⁴ The report emphasizes that the entire illicit fentanyl supply chain originates in Mexico, where synthetic pills and powders are manufactured using chemical precursors primarily from China.⁴⁵

There are structural reasons Venezuela is unlikely to be involved in fentanyl trafficking: the country lacks the chemical synthesis infrastructure required for fentanyl production, and Venezuelan criminal organizations have historically focused on the Colombian cocaine trade rather than synthetic substances.⁴⁶

E. COVID as Confounding Factor

Much of the recent drug mortality spike was an artifact of COVID-19 disruptions. The pandemic led to breakdown of substance distribution networks due to lockdowns, isolation that exacerbated addiction, and disruptions in treatment services.⁴⁷ The fentanyl crisis emerged substantially from these COVID-era disruptions rather than solely from increased supply.

Critically, fentanyl deaths have been declining significantly since 2023. From a peak in mid-2023, deaths involving synthetic opioids dropped approximately 37% by 2024—falling from over 76,000 deaths to approximately 48,400.⁴⁸ This raises the question: are military strikes addressing a crisis that was already naturally receding, or contributing to its decline?

F. Demand Versus Supply-Side Intervention

A fundamental critique holds that drug policy focused on distribution interdiction constitutes "made-for-TV cosplay" that fails to address the root cause: demand.⁴⁹ Paul Stares of the Brookings Institution has extensively documented the limitations of supply-side interventions.

In his seminal work "Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World," Stares argues that meaningful progress requires addressing larger concerns to which drug problems are inextricably linked—including poverty, social dislocation, lack of treatment infrastructure, and public health approaches to addiction.⁵⁰

Vanda Felbab-Brown's research at Brookings demonstrates that "the cumulative evidence of the outcomes of these policies over the past three decades has proven these basic assumptions of US counternarcotics policies wrong."⁵¹ Supply-side suppression policies—eradication and interdiction—have at most generated a two-year lag before production and supply recovered. The so-called "balloon effect" means that successful interdiction in one area simply displaces production or trafficking to another.⁵²

G. Geopolitical Motivations

Critics suggest this operation may parallel the Iraq WMD precedent: a desired geopolitical objective (regime change in Venezuela) being justified through a public health crisis narrative. Venezuela controls significant offshore oil resources near Guyana, and the United States has long sought Maduro's removal.⁵⁴ The focus on drug kingpins and gang tattoos may be "tarting up" broader strategic objectives with a more palatable public justification.⁵⁵

VI. The Moral Dimension

CDR Salamander offers a candid reflection on the moral complexities faced by military personnel ordered to use force. He recounts his involvement in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1993-94) and Operation Desert Fox (Iraq, 1998), acknowledging the moral ambiguity inherent in military action:

He concludes that Tren de Aragua has "more American blood and misery on their hands than any Haitian did in the 1990s or any Iraqi did in the late 1990s," justifying moral acceptance of current operations.⁵⁷ However, he acknowledges: "Is there a chance that we might accidentally engage a non-drug runner? Of course. This is a human enterprise. Humans make mistakes."⁵⁸

VII. Conclusion: An Unresolved Debate

The deployment of military lethal force against drug trafficking organizations represents a fundamental shift in U.S. counter-narcotics policy. Proponents can point to established legal frameworks—FTO designations, non-international armed conflict declarations, and presidential war powers—as well as the staggering death toll from drug overdoses that has claimed over one million American lives.

Yet significant questions remain unresolved:

• Does the legal framework adequately address the unique status of narcotraffickers under international humanitarian law?
• Are strikes being conducted with sufficient due process and accurate intelligence?
• Why target Venezuelan cocaine trafficking when Mexican-produced fentanyl is the primary killer?
• If overdose deaths were already declining 27% before strikes began, can military action claim credit for this trend?
• Does history suggest supply-side interdiction can achieve lasting success, or will the "balloon effect" simply shift trafficking routes?
• Would resources be better invested in demand reduction, treatment infrastructure, and public health interventions?
• Do geopolitical objectives regarding Venezuela motivate this policy beyond stated drug control rationales?

CDR Salamander challenges critics: "What would you do instead to respond to the death toll above? If your answer is just more of other failed policies, I'm not interested."⁵⁹ This is a fair challenge. Yet it must be met with equal scrutiny: does military interdiction represent a new, effective approach, or simply another failed policy dressed in different uniform?

As Salamander himself acknowledges: "To do nothing is also a choice. It is the choice of acceptance. It is the choice of surrender to violence and chaos. To do more of the same? That is insanity."⁶⁰

The question remains: which category does military strikes against drug boats occupy—genuine innovation or repetition of demonstrably ineffective supply-side interdiction?