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Military


Civil War - Later War Tactics

Poor training may have contributed to high casualty rates early in the war, but casualties remained high and even increased long after the armies became experienced. Continued high casualty rates resulted because tactical developments failed to adapt to the new weapons technology. Few commanders understood how the riflemusket strengthened the tactical defensive. However, some commanders made offensive innovations that met with varying success.

When an increase in the pace of advance did not overcome defending firepower (as Hardee suggested it would), some units tried advancing in more open order. But this sort of formation lacked the appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared positions and created command and control problems beyond the ability of Civil War leaders to resolve.

Late in the war, when the difficulty of attacking field fortifications under heavy fire became apparent, other tactical expedients were employed. Attacking solidly entrenched defenders often required whole brigades and divisions moving in dense masses to rapidly cover intervening ground, seize the objective, and prepare for the inevitable counterattack. Seldom successful against alert and prepared defenses, these attacks were generally accompanied by tremendous casualties and foreshadowed the massed infantry assaults ofthe Great War.

Sometimes, large formations attempted mass charges over short distances without, halting to fire. This tactic enjoyed limited success at Spotsylvania Court House in May 1864. At Spotsylvania, a Union division attacked and captured an exposed portion of the Confederate line. The attack succeeded because the Union troops crossed the intervening ground very quickly without artillery preparation and without stopping to fire their rifles. Once inside the Confederate defenses, the Union troops attempted to exploit their success by continuing their advance, but loss of command and control made them little better than a mob. Counterattacking Confederate units, in conventional formations, eventually forced the Federals to refinquish much af the ground gained.

As the war dragged on, tactical maneuver focused more on larger formations: brigade, division, and corps. In most of the major battles fought after 1861, brigades were employed as the primary maneuver formations. Eut brigade maneuver was at the upper limit of command and control for most Civil War commanders. Brigades might be able to retain coherent formations if the terrain were suitably open, but most often, brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poorly coordinated regimental lunges through broken and wooded terrain Thus, brigade commanders were often on the main battle line trying to influence regimental fights.

Typically, defending brigades stood in line of battle and blazed away at attackers as rapidly as possible. Volley fire usually did not continue beyond the first round. Most of the time, soldiers fired as soon as they were ready, and it was common for two soldiers to work together, one loading for the other to fire. Brigades were generally invulnerable to attacks on their front and flanks if units to the left and right held their ground or if reinforcements came up to defeat the threat.

An example of this sort of brigade maneuver occurred at Chickamauga on the morning of 20 September 1863 when the Confederates attacked the extreme left of the Union line. Major General John C. Breckinridge’s Division attempted to turn the Union left, while Major General Patrick R. Cleburne”s Division attacked frontally. Two of Breckinridge’s brigades, led by Brigadier General Daniel W. Adams and Brigadier General Marcellus A. Stovall, turned the Union flank and threatened its rear, but Brigadier General Benjamin H. Helm’s brigade ran into Major General George H. Thomas’ main line and made no gains. Meanwhile, Cleburne’s three brigades, under Brigadier Generals Lucius E. Polk, James Deshler, and S. A. M. Wood attacked into the strength of the Union line. Union reinforcements, hawever, drove off Adams and Stovail while the main line easily defeated the frontal attacks.

Two or more brigades comprised a division. When a division attacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, from left to right ar vice versa-depending on terrain, suspected enemy location, and number of brigades available to att’ack. At times, divisions attacked with two or more brigades leading, followed by one or more brigades ready to reinforce the lead brigades or maneuver to the flanks. Two or more divisions comprised a corps that might conduct an attack as part of a larger plan controlled by the army commander. More often, groups of divisions attacked under the control of a corps-level commander.



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