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The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces
November 2004

CHAPTER 3. Lower-Cost Alternatives
to the Navy's Plan for Amphibious
and Maritime Prepositioning Forces

As Chapter 2 described, the Navy faces a funding challenge with its plans for shipbuilding as a whole and for amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships in particular. The Navy could ameliorate that situation in many ways. To illustrate some of them, the Congressional Budget Office constructed four alternative plans for modernizing those ships at a lower cost than under the Navy's plan. All of the alternatives would result in a smaller amphibious force than exists today.

The first two alternatives would modernize the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces within historical spending levels--an average of $1.1 billion a year, in 2005 dollars--by purchasing either fewer but more-capable ships (Option 1A) or more but less-capable ships (Option 1B). Those approaches represent the most drastic change from the Navy's plan. The other two alternatives would cost about 36 percent more (an average of $1.5 billion a year). Option 2 would reduce the number of expeditionary strike groups from 12 to eight but make those eight capable of conducting sea-basing operations, in conjunction with Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships, by 2035. Option 3, by contrast, would abandon the sea-basing concept and focus on providing forward presence with ESGs. Under that alternative, the amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces in 2035 would look much like they do today, though somewhat smaller.

This chapter describes in detail the different force structures that would result from those approaches. Chapter 4 examines how capable the alternative force structures would be in peacetime and wartime compared with today's expeditionary warfare fleet and with the one envisioned in the Navy's plan.

These options focus only on issues related to shipbuilding. None would change the number or size of Marine Corps units or the total end strength of the Corps (now 175,000 active officers and enlisted personnel). Consequently, they would not alter the quantities of air and ground equipment that the Marine Corps plans to procure in coming years.⁽¹⁾ Nor would any of the alternatives adopt rotational crewing concepts, such as Sea Swap. Chapter 4, however, describes the effect that Sea Swap would have on maintaining forward-deployed expeditionary strike groups.)
 

Option 1A: Buy Fewer, More-Capable Ships Within Historical Spending Levels

The first two options that CBO considered are driven mainly by funding issues. Since 1980, the Navy has devoted an average of about $1.1 billion annually to constructing amphibious ships. (It has devoted little to constructing maritime prepositioning ships because most of those vessels are leased from private firms.) CBO estimates that the Navy's plan would require spending an average of $2.4 billion over the next 30 years to build amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships. The service faces funding challenges in other areas as well. Its programs for attack submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft carriers all require more spending than has been available in recent years. (In particular, the Navy wants to buy large numbers of a new small, fast surface combatant called the littoral combat ship. Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, has called that ship the Navy's "most transformational effort and number one budget priority.")⁽²⁾ Since the Navy cannot buy all of the ships it would like at its current level of funding, CBO developed two options to show the implications of modernizing amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces within the $1.1 billion historical funding level--or about half of what the Navy's plan would cost.

Option 1A would continue to pursue the transformational vision of sea basing while reducing the size of the amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces. This approach would gradually cut the number of expeditionary strike groups by half (from 12 to six) and the number of maritime prepositioning squadrons by one-third (from three to two). One of those squadrons would be configured to support sea-based operations, and the other would consist of conventional cargo vessels along the lines of today's maritime prepositioning ships. Although ship purchases would be smaller in this option than in the Navy's plan, the same types of new, more-capable ships would be procured: the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship, the LSD(X) dock landing ship, and the sea-basing-capable MPF(F) ship (as well as replacement cargo ships).

Thus, in modernizing the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces within the historical funding level, this approach emphasizes quality over quantity. (Option 1B, which is discussed in the next section, takes the opposite tack.) The L-class force, although much smaller than today's, would be replaced with modern and more-capable ships. The maritime prepositioning force would also be cut (though less dramatically) but would include one squadron with new aviation and sea-basing capabilities.

Shipbuilding Under Option 1A

Overall, this alternative would construct an average of 0.7 amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships a year between 2005 and 2035--less than half the 1.6-ship average under the Navy's plan. For L-class amphibious warfare vessels only, the shipbuilding rate would be 0.3 per year under this option, compared with 0.9 under the Navy's plan, which is also the historical rate.

With an approach such as this, in which the level of resources is the driving factor, the Navy could choose among many different programs resulting in different compositions for the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces. A key factor in determining the potential mix of ships would be the balance between L-class vessels and MPF(F) ships and between the types of ship within each of those categories. With respect to L-class ships, this alternative tries to take a balanced approach, maintaining relatively equal numbers of LPDs, LSDs, and LHA/LHDs. Likewise, with respect to the second category, it buys both MPF(F) ships with sea-basing capabilities and conventional maritime prepositioning ships.

Specifically, Option 1A would shrink the LPD-17 program from 12 to seven ships. It would delay the start of the LHA(R) program until 2025, 18 years later than under the Navy's plan, and would buy only four of those ships by 2035 instead of 10 (see Figure 3-1). The LSD(X) program would be delayed until 2023 and then only five ships would be purchased, compared with 12 under the Navy's plan. The MPF(F) program would be split between buying one squadron's worth (eight ships) of the "constrained" sea-basing-oriented design, which is capable of operating and supporting helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft, and purchasing one squadron (five ships) of conventional prepositioning cargo vessels, similar to the ones in the force today.

Figure 3-1.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: The steady-state requirement is the annual purchases or spending needed to keep the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces at the planned level (in the case of Option 1A, 31 ships) indefinitely. MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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Under this option, the total number of amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning ships would decline from 51 in 2004 to 31 in 2035 (see Figure 3-2). The number of L-class vessels would remain at the planned level of 36 through 2010 but then fall steadily until 2035, when the force would settle into its new steady-state size of 18 ships--seven LPDs, five LSDs, and six LHA/LHD class ships (compared with 12 of each under the Navy's plan). The number of maritime prepositioning ships would decline from 16 now to 13, although eight of those 13 would be sea-basing ships.

Figure 3-2.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: MPS = maritime prepositioning squadron; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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Lift Capability Under Option 1A

As described in Chapter 2, the Navy's plan would eventually provide enough lift for the equivalent of 5.5 Marine expeditionary brigades: 2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift, 2.0 MEBs of lift on sea-basing ships, and 1.0 MEB of sealift on cargo ships. By comparison, this option would provide 3.25 MEBs of lift overall: 1.25 MEBs of amphibious lift, 1.0 MEB of sea-based lift, and 1.0 MEB of sealift.

Costs of Option 1A

Under this alternative, the Navy would spend an average of $1.1 billion a year on ship construction from 2005 to 2014, $1.1 billion from 2015 to 2024, and $1.2 billion from 2025 to 2035--for an annual average of $1.1 billion over CBO's projection period (see Table 3-1). Including operation and support (O&S) costs for those ships, Option 1A would require an average of $3.4 billion in annual spending during that period. Those costs are much lower than under the Navy's plan, which would spend $3.1 billion on ship construction between 2005 and 2014, $2.3 billion between 2015 and 2024, and $1.8 billion between 2025 and 2035--for an overall average of $2.4 billion a year, or $5.5 billion including O&S costs. As another point of comparison, if the ships in this option were bought at a steady-state rate (the number of ships in the force divided by their 40-year service life), this approach would require slightly more than $1.1 billion in annual funding (see Figure 3-1).

Table 3-1.

	2005- 2014		2015- 2024		2025- 2035		Total, 2005- 2035
Navy's Plan
Ship Construction	3.1		2.3		1.8		2.4
Ship Construction and O&S	6.0		5.5		5.0		5.5
Option 1A: Buy Fewer, More-Capable Ships
Ship Construction	1.1		1.1		1.2		1.1
Ship Construction and O&S	3.8		3.3		3.0		3.4
Option 1B: Buy More, Less-Capable Ships
Ship Construction	1.1		1.2		1.0		1.1
Ship Construction and O&S	3.9		3.7		3.4		3.6
Option 2: Create a More Survivable Sea-Basing Force
Ship Construction	1.6		1.3		1.6		1.5
Ship Construction and O&S	4.3		3.5		3.5		3.8
Option 3: Deemphasize Sea Basing in Favor of Forward Presence
Ship Construction	1.4		1.3		1.8		1.5
Ship Construction and O&S	4.2		3.8		4.4		4.1
Source: Congressional Budget Office. Notes: O&S = operation and support. By comparison, between 1980 and 2004, the Navy spent an average of about $1.1 billion per year (in 2005 dollars) on construction of amphibious warfare ships. (It mainly leased rather than built maritime prepositioning ships.)

 

Option 1B: Buy More, Less-Capable Ships Within Historical Spending Levels

If the Navy is forced to fund amphibious ships at the historical average of about $1.1 billion a year but is loath to cut the L-class force to the extent envisioned in Option 1A, it can maintain a larger number of ships by not investing in any new designs. This option illustrates that approach: it would keep the future amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces at a greater size than under Option 1A but would not pursue the enhanced sea-basing capability sought by the Navy and Marine Corps. In other words, for the same amount of money as Option 1A, this alternative would emphasize quantity over quality.

In this alternative, the number of ESGs would gradually be cut by one-quarter, from 12 to nine (leaving 50 percent more ESGs than in Option 1A). The number of maritime prepositioning ships would be reduced by a little more than half a squadron. Amphibious warfare ships would be replaced by ships similar in size and capabilities to existing classes, and maritime prepositioning ships would be replaced by modern cargo ships with no sea-basing capabilities.

Shipbuilding Under Option 1B

Overall, this alternative would construct an average of 1.0 amphibious warfare or maritime prepositioning ship a year between 2005 and 2035, compared with 0.7 ships under Option 1A and 1.6 under the Navy's plan. The shipbuilding rate for only L-class vessels would be 0.6 per year under this approach--twice the rate in Option 1A but one-third less than in the Navy's plan.

With respect to specific programs, this option would terminate the LPD-17 program at nine ships. It would delay the start of the LHA(R) program by six years, until 2013 (see Figure 3-3). Six of those ships would be purchased through 2035--twice as many as in Option 1A. The LSD(X) program would start in 2020, and a total of nine ships would be purchased. This option would also buy 12 conventional MPF(F) ships, enough for about 2.5 maritime prepositioning squadrons. Unlike in Option 1A, those squadrons would not have any sea-basing capabilities. With those changes, the steady-state amphibious warfare force would number nine LPDs, nine LSDs, and nine LHA/LHD class ships (compared with 12 each under the Navy's plan and seven, five, and six, respectively, under Option 1A).

Figure 3-3.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: The steady-state requirement is the annual purchases or spending needed to keep the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces at the planned level (in the case of Option 1B, 39 ships) indefinitely. MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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The total size of the amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces would decline throughout the 2005-2035 period under this option (see Figure 3-4), though not as precipitously as under Option 1A. The number of L-class vessels would drop from 36 in 2005 to 27 by 2035, although it would hover in the low 30s through most of that period, falling to the steady-state level only near the end. The maritime prepositioning force would decline from 16 ships now to 12 ships by the 2020s. Thus, the overall force would number 39 ships in 2035, compared with 31 under Option 1A and 57 under the Navy's plan.

Figure 3-4.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: MPS = maritime prepositioning squadron.

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Lift Capability Under Option 1B

This approach would result in about 30 percent more lift capability than Option 1A: a total of 4.2 MEBs (1.8 MEBs of amphibious lift and about 2.4 MEBs of sealift) rather than 3.25 MEBs. However, that figure would still fall short of the Navy's planned total of 5.5 MEBs (2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift, 2.0 MEBs of sea-based lift, and 1.0 MEB of sealift). Because this alternative would not procure any ships with sea-basing capability, it would not provide any sea-based lift.

Costs of Option 1B

As in Option 1A, the cost of building L-class vessels and maritime prepositioning ships would average $1.1 billion a year over the 2005-2035 period under this alternative--the same amount that the Navy spent, on average, between 1980 and 2004 and much less than the $2.4 billion annual average needed to fund the Navy's plan (see Table 3-1). During the first 10 years of the projection period, construction costs would average a bit less than $1.1 billion. They would vary slightly in succeeding decades, averaging $1.2 billion between 2015 and 2024 and a little less than $1.0 billion between 2025 and 2035. Those procurement costs compare reasonably well with the steady-state spending level of about $1.3 billion a year required to keep the amphibious and maritime prepositioning force at 39 ships indefinitely (see Figure 3-3).

Because this approach would operate more ships than Option 1A, it would entail larger operation and support costs. With both O&S and construction included, this alternative would cost an average of $3.6 billion annually over 30 years, versus $3.4 billion under Option 1A.
 

Option 2: Create a More Survivable Sea-Basing Force

As noted in Chapter 2, the Navy is considering not only modernizing the amphibious warfare force but also shrinking it as part of a reduction in the number of expeditionary strike groups from 12 to eight. To illustrate some of the implications of such a decision, this option also cuts the number of ESGs to eight.

At the same time, this alternative attempts to address the issue of the survivability of MPF(F)s that was raised in Chapter 2. The Navy plans to build those ships to an enhanced commercial standard (apparently something less than Level I survivability), which is equivalent to the survivability of the Navy's cargo ships, but it intends to use the sea-basing-capable MPF(F)s in potentially demanding wartime environments. This option would instead build those ships to a higher level of survivability than the Navy plans, although less than that of amphibious warfare ships (Level II).⁽³⁾

Under this approach, the Navy would modernize both the amphibious warfare force and the maritime prepositioning force but would cut the number of ESGs by one-third and the number of maritime prepositioning squadrons by two-thirds (from three to one). The remaining squadron would be composed of MPF(F)s of the constrained sea-basing design, built to enhanced levels of survivability and capable of operating and supporting helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft. Because both this option and the next one are meant to emphasize issues other than funding pressures, CBO did not constrain them to the historical level of spending on amphibious ships. Instead, it chose simply to keep costs substantially below the level that the Navy's plan would require.

One of the arguments that the Navy and Marine Corps use to justify the need for sea basing is that, in the future, ballistic and cruise missiles could pose too great a threat to a land base in a theater of operations. In time (or perhaps at the same time), however, those missiles could prove just as threatening to MPF(F) ships. Such vessels would be the second largest ships in the theater (if one of the Navy's large aircraft carriers was also operating there) but would have the lowest level of survivability. Moreover, MPF(F) ships would be some of the most detectable and thus targetable ships in the fleet and would operate much closer to shore than aircraft carriers would.

The Navy argues that Sea Shield--the network of defensive capabilities provided by its ships, aircraft, and sensor and electronic warfare systems--would protect MPF(F) ships from threats posed by missiles, mines, small boats, and submarines. However, an important component of employing Sea Shield would be destroying the sites of ballistic and cruise missiles early, before the missiles could be launched to threaten U.S. forces. Doing that would give an advantage not only to U.S. sea-based forces but also to the land base that sea basing is supposed to replace. The issue, then, seems to rest on whether "leakers"--any surviving missiles that were not destroyed at the point of origin--would pose a greater threat to a land base than to a sea base. As noted in Chapter 2, a strike by a single conventional missile against a land base would probably do less damage to ongoing military operations than would the same strike against an MPF(F), which would represent one-eighth of all of the capabilities of a sea-basing squadron. In addition, land bases, once established, would not be threatened by any mines or submarines that might have escaped the notice of Sea Shield.

Shipbuilding Under Option 2

This alternative would construct an average of 0.8 amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships per year between 2005 and 2035--half as much as under the Navy's plan. The building rate for L-class vessels would be 0.5 ships per year--versus 0.9 under the Navy's plan.

The LPD-17 program would end at eight ships instead of 12 under this approach. The LHA(R) program would be delayed from 2007 until 2022, with six ships purchased through 2035 (see Figure 3-5). The LSD(X) program would begin at the same time as in the Navy's plan (2020), but only eight ships would be bought rather than the 12 now envisioned. This option would also purchase eight constrained-design MPF(F) ships, with sea-basing capabilities and enhanced survivability, starting in 2009. (The potential cost of upgrading the survivability of the MPF(F) is discussed below.)

Figure 3-5.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: The steady-state requirement is the annual purchases or spending needed to keep the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces at the planned level (in the case of Option 2, 32 ships) indefinitely. MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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Under this alternative, the amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning forces would reach their steady-state sizes--24 L-class ships (eight LPDs, eight LSDs, and eight LHDs/LHAs) and eight MPF(F) ships--between 2022 and 2024 (see Figure 3-6). That overall force of 32 ships would be 24 less than in the Navy's plan.

Figure 3-6.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: MPS = maritime prepositioning squadron; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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Lift Capability Under Option 2

This approach would result in 1.7 MEBs of amphibious lift, 1.0 MEB of sea-based lift, and no sealift, for 2.7 MEBs overall. That total is only half of the level in the Navy's plan: 5.5 MEBs overall (2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift, 2.0 MEBs of sea-based lift, and 1.0 MEB of sealift).

Costs of Option 2

Although it would require more spending on ship construction than either Option 1A or 1B, this alternative would cost substantially less than the Navy's plan, particularly in the next 20 years (see Figure 3-5). Between 2005 and 2035, this option would spend an average of $1.5 billion on ship construction, or $3.8 billion with O&S costs included. By comparison, annual costs under the Navy's plan would average $2.4 billion and $5.5 billion, respectively.

Average construction spending would vary in each succeeding decade of the projection period: $1.6 billion from 2005 to 2014, $1.3 billion from 2015 to 2024, and $1.6 billion from 2025 to 2035. Those averages compare well with a steady-state funding requirement of $1.4 billion per year for a 32-ship force.

Because the MPF(F) ships in this option would be built to higher survivability standards than the Navy intends, they would have a higher price tag than their counterparts in the other options. L-class ships, which are built to Level II survivability, cost about $80 million per thousand tons (see Table 3-2). The estimates for lead ships in the analysis of alternatives conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses--which CBO used for its options--suggest that sea-basing MPF(F) ships would cost about $40 million per thousand tons. To illustrate what a more survivable version might cost, CBO priced the MPF(F) ships in this option at about $60 million per thousand tons. At that price, eight ships of that class would cost about $2.2 billion apiece, on average--comparable with the LHD-8 and the LHA(R). CBO did not analyze or estimate specific survivability enhancements to the MPF(F) designs proposed in the analysis of alternatives. Rather, the higher price per ton is intended to illustrate the potential effect on the Navy's budget of addressing concerns about survivability.

Table 3-2.

		Light-Load Displacement (Thousands of tons)		Average Unit Cost (Billions of dollars)a		Cost per Thousand Tons (Millions of dollars)b
Ships Under Construction
LPD-17		17.0		1.3		80
LHD-8		28.3		2.2		80
Proposed Ships
LHA(R)c		30.5		2.4		80
LSD(X)		15.0d		1.2		80
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
	Replacement-cargo-ship version (Navy's plan and Options 1A, 1B, and 3)	32.0		0.7		20
	Sea-basing-capable version (Navy's plan and Option 1A)	38.0		1.6e		40e
	More-survivable version (Option 2)	38.0		2.2f		60f
Source: Congressional Budget Office. a. Rounded to the nearest $100 million. b. Rounded to the nearest $10 million. c. Based on the aviation-variant design. d. CBO's estimate. e. Estimate from the Center for Naval Analyses' analysis of alternatives for the MPF(F) program. f. Derived from the sea-basing-capable version.

CBO cannot show in any measurable way how much more survivable these MPF(F) ships would be than the less expensive ships purchased under the other options and the Navy's plan. More-survivable ships clearly cost more, but not all survivability features of L-class vessels could be incorporated into the MPF(F), even if the Navy wished to do so. For example, design elements that increase a vessel's survivability include greater compartmentalization and watertight doors. However, because an MPF(F) would need to serve, at least in part, as a floating warehouse, it could not easily be designed and built with numerous watertight compartments. Nevertheless, the combat logistics ships that operate with carrier battle groups are built to a Level II survivability standard and thus are able to "fight hurt." CBO envisions that the MPF(F) ships in this option will have a greater ability to fight hurt, depending on the actual level of damage, than their counterparts in any other option or in the Navy's plan.
 

Option 3: Deemphasize Sea Basing in Favor of Forward Presence

Under this approach, the Navy would modernize both the amphibious warfare force and the maritime prepositioning force but with none of the sea-basing capability envisioned in the Navy's plan. The number of ESGs would be cut by one-sixth (from 12 to 10), and the number of maritime prepositioning squadrons would remain at three, although they would not be designed for sea basing. Once implemented, this option would provide much the same peacetime forward presence and maritime pre-positioning capabilities as today's fleet.

The logic behind this approach is that the Navy's and Marine Corps's desire to develop a sea-basing capability could prove too expensive or difficult (or both) to achieve. In the most ambitious vision of sea basing, the military would have the ability to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom without using Kuwait as a staging area.⁽⁴⁾ A more modest version would involve the ability to deploy two reinforced infantry battalions 110 nautical miles from their supporting ships. As noted in Chapter 2, that would require a large investment in sea-basing-capable MPF(F) ships--which, according to the Center for Naval Analyses, would cost two to four times more than a conventional replacement cargo ship. A host of new technologies would also be required to make sea basing work, including potentially costly heavy-lift rotary-wing aircraft and other ship-to-shore support craft (see Box 1-2). Even if the investments necessary to produce those craft were made, it is not clear from current analyses that Marine Corps units could be deployed and adequately sustained from the sea in a variety of operating environments. In addition, although the likelihood of mounting an opposed amphibious assault in the future is unclear, it appears limited.

For all of those reasons, this approach emphasizes the peacetime crisis-response capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps rather than their ability to conduct an opposed amphibious assault. The Navy's amphibious ready groups (now expeditionary strike groups) have responded frequently to crises around the world. Between 1991 and 2000, amphibious and (occasionally) maritime prepositioning ships took part in at least 55 operations, ranging from wars to various humanitarian operations. Cutting the crisis-response capability provided by amphibious ships in order to buy the new sea-basing capabilities of the MPF(F) may not make sense.⁽⁵⁾ The Navy and Marine Corps would argue that the new MPF(F) ships would also be able to perform crisis-response missions, either independently or in conjunction with L-class amphibious ships, although that ability would depend on the design and operating concept of MPF(F) ships, which are still undetermined. Nevertheless, the ships of an expeditionary strike group are more versatile than the proposed sea-basing ships, can respond more quickly, and are far better equipped to handle unexpected problems or threats. Sacrificing the sea-basing capabilities of maritime prepositioning ships in exchange for a larger L-class force may therefore represent a viable alternative to the Navy's approach.

Shipbuilding Under Option 3

This alternative would construct more amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships than any of the other options that CBO examined: 1.2 per year between 2005 and 2035, compared with 1.6 under the Navy's plan. The building rate for L-class vessels would be 0.7 per year, which is close to the historical rate of 0.9 ships per year that the Navy's plan would provide.

With respect to specific programs, this option would end the LPD-17 program at 10 ships instead of 12. It would also delay the start of the LHA(R) program until 2013 and buy eight rather than 10 of those ships through 2035 (see Figure 3-7). The LSD(X) program would be delayed until 2022 and, as with the LPD-17, only 10 ships would be bought instead of 12. The MPF(F) program would include enough ships for three full squadrons, but they would be prepositioned cargo ships along the lines of today's vessels.

Figure 3-7.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: The steady-state requirement is the annual purchases or spending needed to keep the amphibious and maritime prepositioning forces at the planned level (in the case of Option 3, 45 ships) indefinitely. MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).

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This option represents a smaller decline in fleet size relative to the Navy's plan of 57 ships than any of the other options examined in this study. The total expeditionary warfare fleet would remain at around 50 ships through 2013 and then decline to its steady-state level of 45 ships in 2023 (see Figure 3-8). That steady-state fleet would comprise 30 L-class ships--10 LPDs, 10 LSDs, and 10 LHA/LHDs (instead of 12 each under the Navy's plan)--and 15 conventional maritime prepositioning ships.

Figure 3-8.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based in part on data from the Navy.

Note: MPS = maritime prepositioning squadron.

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Lift Capability Under Option 3

This alternative would result in nearly as much lift capability as the Navy's plan and about the same as exists today: 5.0 MEBs overall (2.0 MEBs of amphibious lift and 3.0 MEBs of sealift) compared with the Navy's planned total of 5.5 MEBs overall (2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift, 2.0 MEBs of sea-based lift, and 1.0 MEB of sealift). Like Option 1B, this approach would not provide any sea-based lift because it would not procure any ships with sea-basing capability.

Costs of Option 3

With respect to average annual costs, this alternative would be much less expensive than the Navy's plan, but its costs would be higher than the historical funding level for amphibious ships. Between 2005 and 2035, this option would require spending an average of $1.5 billion a year to build new amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships. That spending would average $1.4 billion over the next 10 years, $1.3 billion from 2015 to 2024, and $1.8 billion from 2025 to 2035 (compared with $3.1 billion, $2.3 billion, and $1.8 billion, respectively, under the Navy's plan). With operation and support costs included, the Navy would need to spend an average of $4.1 billion a year on its expeditionary warfare force under this option (see Table 3-1).
 

Effects of the Options on the Industrial Base

Any change in production plans for amphibious ships would have implications for the industrial base that builds those vessels. Assessing the precise impact over the next 10 years is difficult in the absence of data about how many man-hours would be needed to build the different MPF(F) designs. However, some studies have shown that overcapacity exists in the shipbuilding industrial base, in that today's 293-ship Navy could be supported with fewer than the six private shipyards that make up that base.⁽⁶⁾

Two shipyards--Bath Iron Works (owned by General Dynamics) and Avondale Industries (owned by Northrop Grumman)--are capable of building LPD- or LSD-sized amphibious ships. However, under a recent agreement brokered by the Navy, Bath will not receive any LPD-17 work; instead, it will build all of the remaining DDG-51 destroyers, the last three of which were authorized in the 2005 budget. Bath also anticipates receiving orders for the new DD(X) destroyer to provide it with work after the DDG-51s are completed. Under current plans, the second DD(X) is to be awarded to Bath (the lead ship of that class was awarded to Northrop Grumman), but that will not happen until 2007 or possibly later, depending on the progress of the program. In the case of Avondale Industries, reductions in LPD-17 work could lead the shipyard to cut its workforce by 2,000 people--and fall below the level it considers necessary to maintain its viability--by 2007 unless it receives new orders to take the place of the reduced LPD-17 work.

Ingalls Shipbuilding (also owned by Northrop Grumman) argues that the Navy's plan, which would authorize the LHA(R) in 2007, will reduce its workload in 2007 and 2008 below what it considers viable. Delay or cancellation of the LHA(R) program could prolong that period, depending on the final status of other ship programs, particularly the DD(X).

The MPF(F) could provide additional work to any of those shipyards, but the first ship of that class is not scheduled to be authorized until 2009, and major production on it would not ramp up until 2010. Moreover, none of those yards has built logistics ships for the Navy in recent years. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (owned by General Dynamics) is one of the Navy's traditional suppliers of sealift-type ships and hopes to participate in the MPF(F) program. That shipyard currently builds the T-AKE logistics ship, the last of which is scheduled to be authorized in 2007. However, it may receive or share in orders for the four T-AOE(X) combat logistics ships planned for 2009 and 2010.

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1.	For details about those plans, see Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2005 (September 2004).

2.

Scott C. Truver, "Navy Plans to Develop LCS Fleet with `Lightening Speed,'" Sea Power (May 2003). For more details about that ship, see Congressional Budget Office, Transforming the Navy's Surface Combatant Force (March 2003); and Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress, Report for Congress RS21305 (Congressional Research Service, July 30, 2004), and Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, Report for Congress RL32109 (Congressional Research Service, September 3, 2004).

3.	For an explanation of the Navy's survivability standards for ships, see Box 2-2.

4.

According to Marine Corps Commandant Michael Hagee, "We come into the [Persian] Gulf, we do the arrival and assembly, we do the reception, staging, onward movement and integration at sea." Quoted in John T. Bennett, "Marine Corps Commandant, DSB Describe Visions of Sea Basing Concept," Inside the Pentagon, October 30, 2003, p. 1.

5.	See, for example, Jason Ma, "Admiral Touts ESG's Quick-Response Capability for War on Terror," Inside the Navy, October 11, 2004.

6.

See Industrial College of the Armed Forces, ICAF Industry Studies 2003: Shipbuilding (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2003), p. 8, available at www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/IS2003/. In addition to the four shipyards mentioned below--Bath Iron Works, Avondale Industries, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company--Electric Boat Corporation (owned by General Dynamics) and Newport News Shipbuilding (owned by Northrop Grumman) also build Navy vessels.

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