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Fire dictates obstacle siting. Covering fire, particularly direct fire, makes obstacles effective. To maximize synchronization of obstacles and fires:

• Identify engagement areas where direct fire is most effective and then,
• Site obstacles to support the fires.

Maneuver company responsibilities for obstacles are:

• Siting
• Coverage by fire
• Obstacle security

Engineers coordinate the exact obstacle site on the ground with the maneuver company and its FSO.

Obstacles do not, as commonly perceived, cause deployment; direct fire causes Soviet deployment. Attackers in column move faster, retain maximum control, and are in the best formation to pass through a breach. The line provides the least control and must be reformed into column to negotiate a breach. Obstacles providing delay in a kill zone are, therefore, most effective when defensive firepower forces the enemy to deploy.

Flank engagements are more effective than frontal fires. Obstacles placed to the front of weapons positions at maximum effective range are not as effective as closer in obstacles. All weapons cannot be brought to bear and the more vulnerable flanks and rears of enemy combat vehicles are not exposed (compare Figures 3 and 4). The nearer the obstacle:

• The more weapons which can effectively cover the obstacle
• The easier the obstacle is to secure
• The more difficult for the enemy to obscure, because fires are coming from multiple directions

Depth (see Figure 5) can be achieved with obstacles in front of, within, and behind the battle position. Do not sacrifice quality of obstacles for quantity to achieve depth.

Fire reinforces surprise at obstacles by distracting the attacker's attention from the obstacles. Identification of obstacles, particularly ones concealed by reverse slopes or camouflaged by vegetation, becomes difficult for the attacker receiving fire. Crews blunder into minefields and can be knocked unconscious by hitting tank ditches at high speed.

This phenomenon makes the oblique obstacle, rear obstacle, and point minefield effective. The momentum of a deployed attack hitting the oblique obstacle (see Figure 6) generally forces the armored formation into the kill zone. Without fire causing deployment, the attacker may breach the obstacle. Any breach renders the oblique obstacle less effective because vehicles generally enter the first breach they encounter.

The rear obstacle is effective because defensive fires generally have disrupted the attacker's command and control. The rear obstacle delays a disorganized mass of vehicles. TOWs have been extremely effective covering rear obstacles. Companies can also displace to supplementary firing positions to engage the enemy to the rear (see Figure 7).

The point minefield in a defile depends on surprise. The enemy can traverse the defile (see Figure 8) either by cross-country means or more rapidly utilizing existing trails. These smaller trails are less likely to have been reconnoitered. A few vehicles will control the kill zone. Cross-country or on a trail, the attacker is slowed and engaged by flank fires in the kill zone.

Fire creates security, forces the enemy to deploy, and increases the surprise at an obstacle. To maximize synchronization of obstacles and fire, place obstacles where fire is already effective.

Table of Contents

Section V: Fire Support

Section VII: Air Defense