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The inability of a unit to "close-the-loop" in the fire planning process results in poor execution. The missing link in this process is the failure to wargame the fire plan with the artillery TOC/FDC. After the brigade FSO reviews the input from the task force FSOs to ensure the plan reflects the brigade commander's intent and is complete, he transmits this to the field artillery TOC/FDC. Many units consider this to be the completion of fire planning. Units should require the brigade FSO to conduct face-to-face coordination with the artillery unit. This artillery wargaming cuts down confusion at execution time. Key players, besides the brigade FSO, are the field artillery battalion commander, XO, S2, S3, and fire direction officer (FDO). A well executed wargaming process results in the artillery unit being proactive rather than reactive. This process can take place at the artillery TOC/FDC or brigade TOC. Key areas that need to be addressed are:

• Identifying the brigade commander's intent and concept of the operation

• Analyzing the fire support plan from an artillery perspective and wargaming how it will be executed.

  Problems with the plan which are identified through this process can be resolved on the spot or referred to the appropriate commander for resolution. Unresolvable problems are reported to the maneuver commander quickly so that he can consider them in his planning process. A good technique is the reverse planning concept. This concept requires the artillery unit to prioritize its execution process, ensuring fires are delivered on the key targets identified by the maneuver commander. Once this is completed, they reverse plan from there.

• Considering ammunition constraints: The artillery staff analyzes the ammunition and tubes available to meet the maneuver commander's intent and criteria for effects to determine the CL V resupply aspects. Consideration like prepositioning, ammunition resupply vehicles, and priorities of resupply are some of the areas that need to be addressed.

• Positioning considerations: Initial and subsequent battery and TOC locations must be carefully wargamed to ensure the key targets are fired on time and firing units are not interfering with maneuver operations. To do this requires the artillery unit to think the entire battle through from LD to objective and beyond. A technique that units utilize is to convert the reverse planning process into an artillery execution matrix (to be discussed later in the article). A unit can only fire a few missions before it has to make a survivability move. Thus, the brigade FSO, working closely with the artillery S3, coordinates land based on the original order and overlay for artillery units with the brigade S3 to include convoy and MSR routes.

• Command & Control: Good communication is necessary to command and control. Proper positioning of subordinate units with communication as a major consideration cannot be over emphasized. The artillery CESO ensures communication is maintained between the batteries, artillery TOC/FDC, and FSO/FSE elements by recommending positions based on line of sight and utilization of the RETRANS vehicle.

• Fire direction considerations: The battalion FDO, along with the commander and S3, analyze the fire plan to ensure:

  • The battalion can shoot the targets.

  • Battery moves do not interfere with planned fires in support of the commander's concept.

  • The person (FSO, FO, etc.) who will trigger the mission is clearly identified to include nets and call signs.

  • The artillery S3 or FDO resolve any conflicts in the fire plan with the brigade FSO.

  Then, the battalion FDO meets face-to-face with the battery FDOs and discusses how the fire plan will be executed. The meeting must address:

  • What targets each battery will shoot.

  • Who triggers the mission.

  • How the command and control of all fire missions will occur.

  • What are the ammunition requirements.

  • What are the maneuver and field artillery commanders' concepts for the battle.

  • Who assumes control of fires if the battalion FDC is destroyed or loses communications.

Close coordination between the battalion FDO and the brigade FSO prior to the battle results in a well executed fire plan. The NTC demonstrates that the battalion FDC and brigade FSO are the key players in the execution of fire support.

The involvement of the artillery S2 in this wargaming process is critical. The artillery S2 must coordinate with the supported unit S2s to ensure his data matches theirs. Upon receipt of the target overlay from the brigade FSO, he compares it with his template to verify all avenues of approach, TAIs, NAIs, and high value targets (HVT) are covered. The artillery S2 can also advise the S3 whether groups, series, or other fire support means are aligned correctly based on the enemy formations. This will ensure the time sequence of the fire plan corresponds to the enemy's anticipated rate of march. Often, a fire plan looks great on paper but fires are late because no consideration was given to the enemy's march rate and the required mission processing time.

The field artillery commander and S3 ensures a coordinated wargaming process to include dissemination. A technique to disseminate this information is the artillery execution matrix (See Table 1). Similar to the fire support matrix, it uses decision points to influence tactical actions or moves. Phase lines, checkpoints, groups, or series are the decision points. In the defense, enemy timelines provided by the S2 are the decision lines. These timelines depict the enemy rate of advance, modified by terrain constraints. In the offense, movement of friendly units are the decision points to influence actions or moves.

* AOF: Azimuth of fire
** AZ: Azimuth
*** Considerations should be made to move the trains first.

The keys to this matrix are good communications, a well-developed wargaming process, and close coordination with the brigade FSO. The brigade FSO must keep the artillery TOC informed as to when the maneuver units cross key decision points. The matrix allows anyone to continue the battle if the S3 is killed. The S3 is responsible to coordinate the battalion's survey priorities with the reconnaissance survey officer (RSO).

This artillery wargaming process can be conducted at any level.

Too often, artillery batteries fail to analyze the distance to travel, the terrain to traverse, and unit capability (training) before determining their convoy movement technique. In the desert, distances of more than 9-10 km, even on valley floors, are more quickly traveled in a column formation on a road (based on METT-T), as outlined in FM 6-50. Some disadvantages of using this formation are:

• Poor visibility because of the dust.
• Column formation dust creates a signature.
• Vulnerable to air attack.
• Control of convoy interval and speed due to length.

When METT-T does not allow the utilization of the column formation or the move is 3-8 km, a good technique used at the NTC is the "desert-wedge" formation (See Figure 1). The formation maximizes command and control, as well as reaction time. The "desert-wedge" places the howitzers abreast with the battery fire direction center (FDC) in the middle. The interval between the vehicles depends on METT-T. The ammunition carriers (M548) in a self-propelled unit will follow the wedge. The combat service support vehicles under the 1SG follow at a greater distance and join up later.

Advantages of the "desert-wedge" formation are:

• Improve visibility on dusty terrain.
• Reduce vulnerability to ambushes.
• Improve response times for emergency missions. (See Figure 2)
• Increased survivability due to lateral dispersion.
• Improve all around security at halts.
• Improve command and control due to decreased convoy length (day only).

A lack of radios complicates communication within the "wedge" at night. Some units have solved this problem by obtaining hand-held walkie talkies or PRC-68, small unit transceivers. Additional advantages of hand-held walkie talkies are:

• Convoy control
• Laying of the battery in hasty occupations
• Providing internal communications for battery leadership

The successful execution of a fire plan is directly proportional to the amount of prior planning and rehearsing. Units, as a whole, plan and coordinate fire plans well but very few units take the time to rehearse them with the maneuver plans. Rehearsing a fire plan is not different than wargaming a maneuver commander's concept of the operation. In fact, both require the same thought process and players. This thought process must ensure synchronization of fire support to enhance the maneuver commander's intent of fighting the battle. When rehearsing a fire plan, the following areas must be addressed:

• Who is responsible to initiate the mission and over what net?

• What is the redundancy in execution?

• Who clears fires?

• How is the maneuver commander made aware of the voids in fire support due to artillery units moving, mission processing times, etc?

• What are the capabilities and limitations of field artillery?

• How many missions can the artillery fire before moving?

• How many targets of opportunity can be fired without interfering with the execution of the fire plan?

Units use two techniques to rehearse a fire plan. They are the sand table and terrain sketch. Both techniques use the same thought process. The sand table technique requires more preparation time, but it gives the commanders, staff, and other elements of the combined arms team a better perspective of how the fire plan will be executed. Using this technique, the maneuver commander walks through the concept of the operation and depicts (based on the fire plan) where and when he wants fire support. As the maneuver commander identifies a target:

• The person shooting it explains where and when he executes the mission, what net and call signs he uses, and what effects he anticipates on the target.

• The alternate shooter addresses the same questions.

This rehearsal continues until the fire plan is completed. This tests whether the fire support plan supports the task force commander's scheme of maneuver. Other successful tactics, techniques, and procedures to execute fires are:

• To assign targets (high value targets, groups, series, etc.) to a commander for execution, not to the FSO. In most cases, the FSO is going to be co-located with the commander and will actually do the requesting and adjusting. The smart maneuver commander ensures his subordinates know how the fire plan is synchronized with the battle plan. A maneuver company commander, given the mission to fire group A1B at PL RED, will certainly be at the right place, at the right time, to do just that. He will also probably ensure his FSO has good communications with the FDC and the mission goes as planned.

• To control the target of opportunity missions that are fired during the battle by the maneuver commander with close coordination with the FSO.

• To rehearse the fire plan by the field artillery battalion. This plan must be from a processing time perspective to ensure sufficient time is allowed for the artillery to execute the fire. For example, the battalion fire direction officer (FDO) will process the mission from the observer and send it to the battery FDC(s) who will compute it and send it to the guns as a dry fire mission. Some fire plans cannot be shot because they do not allocate enough time to process the missions.

A well-planned, coordinated, and rehearsed fire plan produces devastating results on the battlefield.

The direct support mission of the field artillery is the most common support relationship between the field artillery and maneuver. The most successful units totally integrate the combined arms team players. This team attitude extends not just to the task force FSO-maneuver commander relationship, but to the whole field artillery battalion command and staff structure. Several techniques utilized at the NTC to exploit the experience and expertise of artillery battalion personnel are:

• Successful artillery battalion commanders spend the majority of their time as the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). He attends all brigade orders, participates in the maneuver wargaming process, and constantly advises his maneuver counterpart on all aspects of fire support. The artillery battalion commander has two responsibilities in combat operations: he is the artillery commander and the senior FSCOORD to the brigade. The artillery commander can be found in the brigade TOC following the flow of battle. This gives him the capability to make key decisions expeditiously and allows him to keep his TOC updated on the current situation. If the mission dictates, he can be forward with the brigade commander. He may also be found in the artillery TOC executing the fire plan and actively fighting the current battle.

• A few units successfully used the executive officer (XO) as the 2IC during the battle and positioned him in the artillery TOC. The artillery XO is a critical player in both tactical and logistical problem solving. During the preparation, planning, and consolidation phases, the XO is deeply involved in coordinating CSS. During the battle, he is following the conduct of the battle, reporting to higher headquarters, integrating CSS into the overall plan, and planning for future operations. The advantage here is that he is in a position to quickly and effectively assume command of the battalion should the artillery commander become a casualty. The XO is also in a position where he cannot only orchestrate the actions of the staff assigned to the TOC, but can also monitor CSS activities between the trains and the firing batteries.

• The artillery S3 is primarily controlling fires while maintaining a close liaison with the supported brigade. During the preparation and planning phases, the S3 makes face-to-face coordination with the brigade staff. In the execution phase, the S3 is in the artillery TOC fighting the current battle.

Field artillery delivered scatterable mines, the Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM), and the Remote Antiarmor Mine System (RAAMS) give maneuver commanders a flexible and effective weapon that can be used in both defensive and offensive operations. Their primary purpose is to delay, channelize, disrupt, shape, and disorganize enemy forces. The planning and coordinating of FA scatterable mines is a joint responsibility of the maneuver commander, S3, S2, the engineer officer, and the FSO. The commander and S3 plan, based on the engineer and S2 recommendations on location and timing of employment. The FSO advises on availability, technical aspects of deliver, cost of employing FA scatterable mines, and other fire support considerations. Some of the areas the FSO must address are:

• Tactical considerations:

  • Terrain: ADAM/RAAMS effectiveness is greatly reduced when employed in heavy woods, built-up areas, on steep slopes, and on hard surfaces.

  • Weather: Deep mud and snow (2-3 inches for ADAM and 6-8 inches for RAAMS) greatly reduces effectiveness.

  • Restrictions: Employment authority should consider restricting ADAM/RAAMS use in areas that would limit their abilities to execute maneuver plans.

  • Range: maximum range 17,000 meters.

• Logistics: Normally, 155 mm field artillery units carry short self-destruct (SD) ADAM/RAAMS as part of their basic load. Long SD ADAM/RAAMS are used primarily for planned minefields in support of obstacle plans. Use of long SD ADAM/RAAMS requires advance logistical coordination because it has a significant impact on the resupply of artillery ammunition. The number of projectiles required to achieve the desired area density of a 400 x 400 meter minefield are shown in Table 2.

* Mines per square meter
** Carrying capacity for three medium density minefields.

The above factors allow for estimation of ammunition transportation requirements for selected minefield densities.

• Delivery times: These times can vary from situation to situation; however, the times indicated in Table 3 are for planning purposes. Times include planning, coordination, technical data computation, and firing times for a 400 x 400 minefield.

A standard 400 x 400 meter minefield is fired at high angle. Low angle is used for a 200 x 200 meter minefield.

When employing ADAM/RAAMS, the maneuver commander must consider that:

• The limited number of tubes requires the supported maneuver commander to establish relative priorities among ADAM/RAAMS, DPICM, ILLUM, etc.

• Logistical requirements increase for field artillery units when firing ADAM/RAAMS. Maneuver commanders may need to request additional vehicles to support the delivery of ADAM/RAAMS. If vehicles are not available, an alternate solution is to establish the ammunition transfer point (ATP) as far forward as possible. This would reduce the turnaround times of resupply vehicles. Another technique is to prestock ammunition when targets are preplanned.

• Due to the volume of fire necessary to emplace a minefield, a survivability move for the firing unit is essential. The requirement of continuous fire must be considered when timing moves.

• Delivery error and safety may limit its use. The nearest aimpoint should be no closer to friendly troops than 425 meters (if adjusted) and 700 meters (if non-adjusted).

The following are some successful tactics, techniques, and procedures in employing FA delivered scatterable mines:

• Ground maneuver units must observe and cover the minefield with direct and/or indirect fires (it's not a killer by itself).

• The minefield must be tied in with other engineer obstacles and terrain.

• In the offense, the ADAM/RAAMS must not interfere with the friendly scheme of maneuver. Two techniques successfully used at the NTC are:

  • To isolate the objective by hindering the withdrawal of enemy forces or the enemy's ability to reinforce the objective area.

  • To supplement flank security forces in protecting flanks along avenues of approach into friendly areas.

• In the defense, ADAM/RAAMS is used to reseed breached minefields, reinforce existing obstacles or terrain, and slow down the second echelon.

Table of Contents

Section IV: Intelligence

Section VI: Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability