SECTION II
COMMAND & CONTROL
(FM 71-2J, Chap 2)
The NTC drives home the lesson that combat multipliers can spell the difference between victory and defeat. A well-executed obstacle plan can slow or stop the enemy and allow his destruction by friendly AT systems. The air defense element must understand what the scheme of maneuver is and the commander's priority of air defense to properly position Vulcans and Stingers to support the force.
The key is that combat support element leaders must fully understand their role in supporting the commander's intent and the scheme of maneuver. Therefore, the commander must give them specific instructions in terms they understand. Maneuver commanders tend to assume that everyone understands maneuver terms and graphics, but this is not always the case. It is true that units which habitually train, wargame, and plan with the same "slice" element leaders have an easier time communicating the commander's concept; any change to the team's composition complicates the communication process. Exchanges of unit SOPs or SOP extracts are essential to close coordination between supporting and supported units. Habitual relationships developed and refined during training are critical in fully exploiting the potential of combat support assets.
Coordination can be improved in several ways. One way is for the commander or S3 to demand that the combat support subordinate leader give a briefback during the planning process. If the subordinate leader is required to, "Tell me what I told you to do and how you will do it in your own words," potential misunderstandings surface and can be clarified before mission execution begins.
Another technique is to get the combat support leader to explain what he thinks terms like "overwatch," "suppress," and "assault" mean. This gives a common meaning to terms between maneuver and combat support leaders. This is not as desirable as the backbrief because it is not nearly as thorough.
Though the burden of fully integrating all combat and combat support assets rests squarely on the maneuver commander and his S3, the combat support leader has the responsibility of demanding clarification of any tasks or missions he does not fully understand. The time to clear up "fuzzy" guidance is before, not after mission execution begins. If it is not completely clear what the commander wants in the way of fire support, for example, the FSO must go back and ask specific questions. If combat support leaders do not do this, the maneuver commander will probably assume that everyone understands what he wants, and any problems will not surface until the execution phase. By then, it may be too late to sort things out and exploit the full potential of all the available assets.
The newer a team member is, the more attention that must be paid to ensuring he fully understands the scheme of maneuver and his part in it. This communication process must work both ways; the maneuver commander must explain missions in terms everyone understands, and combat support leaders must ask for clarification on any points they do not fully comprehend. This will help the unit to fully integrate all of its combat multipliers and makes victory much easier to achieve.



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