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Successful integration and synchronization of Army Aviation with ground maneuver forces results from detailed plans, thorough preparation, and aggressive execution using proven tactical fundamentals. Despite adequate current doctrine, aviation units are continuing to be challenged in the following areas:

• Aviation commanders and staff must understand ground maneuver doctrine as discussed in FM 71-3 (The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Brigade) and FM 71-2J, (The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force) in the same manner that ground unit commanders and staff must understand aviation doctrine as discussed in FM 1-100 (Combat Aviation Operations) and FC 1-111 (The Aviation Brigade). Aviation commanders and staffs must actively participate in the supported units "wargaming" process. Additionally, they must plan for the employment and support of ground forces under their operational control.

• A qualified LNO (experienced captain) at brigade/task force level enhances the integration and coordination of attack helicopters.

• At home station, a habitual training relationship with the different ground elements is helpful. This relationship may not be possible during combat operations due to the large area of interest required of aviation units. However, the development of standardized SOPs and LNO techniques, prior to deployment, is invaluable. Aviation leaders down to crew level, should participate in brigade/task force training, AARs, and chalk talks. This training increases the cohesion and confidence required to execute demanding scenarios, especially for the staff level.

• Aviation staffs must accomplish detailed tactical planning and reconnaissance prior to employment. No unit can ever assume that anything will happen automatically!

• Successful aviation commanders and staffs at all levels use the following fundamentals:

  • The military decision making process as discussed in FM 101-5 and FC 71-6, ensuring aviation supports the overall maneuver effort.

  • The five paragraph field order and the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule, ensures complete and easily understood instructions and allows time for leader/crew reconnaissance.

  • The use of the IPB process as described in FM 34-80, chap 4, and FM 34-3, chap 4, to "know the enemy" and "see the battlefield" is critical. The aviation S2 must aggressively seek intelligence products from higher headquarters and be closely involved with the supported units reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance plan. Where possible, the aviation unit should have specific collection tasks as a part of that plan. Finally, the aviation S2 must proactively develop and update intelligence information throughout the operation with input from higher headquarters and aerial/ground scouts. This provides the commander and crews with enemy dispositions and the enemy commander's intent. The IPB is a tool which helps to ensure the unit's success on the battlefield.

  • Aviation leaders at all levels must perform pre-combat inspections of equipment and personnel. FC 71-6, Appendix J (Battalion and Brigade Command and Control), and FC 17-15-3 (Tank Platoon SOP) have pre-combat checklists that can be adapted to aviation units. Additionally, detailed reconnaissance of routes and battle positions is critical.

  • Maneuver. Attack helicopters, massed effectively, maximize destruction and minimize losses. Experience shows attack helicopters must not "hunt" for targets, as they die quickly to dismounted enemy. Commanders must carefully weigh the risk to aircraft and crews anytime they are required to overfly enemy ground.

    • Offense. Aviation should not attack "dug in" targets. Allow ground elements to develop the situation, cause the enemy to move, and then the attack helicopters move forward to reengage.

    • Defense. Attack helicopters use maximum standoff range, mass fires, short engagements, and move rapidly to alternate positions to limit enemy observation and effective fire. Attack helicopters need to engage prior to the main battle area and after the enemy has penetrated the FLOT. They must preplan engagements, to include JAAT, at chokepoints and obstacles. Aviation units need priority of artillery fire and CAS missions forward of the FLOT. This requires detailed staff coordination with the supported maneuver unit prior to the battle.

  • Scouts. Aggressive, disciplined, and coordinated aerial scouts using techniques in FM 17-35 (Aeroscout Procedures) and FM 17-98 (The Army 86 Scout Platoon) contribute significantly to the IPB and decision making process. Aerial scouts need to be a part of the supported units counterreconnaissance plan. In open, unrestricted terrain, aero scouts must dismount and man static observation posts to better provide detailed information to the ground commander concerning enemy dispositions and obstacles.

Successful aviation units at the NTC have done the following to enhance their combat effectiveness:

• Crews boresight MILES weapon systems to standards daily, to include a long range zero at 2000 meters against an actual tank or APC. During FARP operations, boresights are updated. A 2000-meter boresight panel incorporating a MILES belt located at the FARP can be readily used to update the boresight.

• Target acquisition practice and predesignated sectors of fire pay big benefits.

• Gunners must practice often on range estimation to prevent engagements that are out of range.

• Crew coordination is enhanced when commanders stabilize crews.

• Crews need to utilize the drills in FM 17-50-2, Crew Drills for Aero Scout and Attack Helicopters.

• High energy tactics (running fire 30-40 knots) limits dust signatures.

These are not new lessons. Given a sophisticated enemy, aviation leaders at all levels must instill high standards, drill fundamentals, and ensure SOPs are used and understood by the individual soldier. Finally, the aviation team must actively integrate into all combined arms planning.

Table of Contents

Section II: Command & Control

Section IV: Intelligence