COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Current task force level CSS doctrine generally works very well even under demanding circumstances and represents a significant improvement over previous procedures; e.g., the BMO coordinating all maintenance assets and actions; most classes of supply pushed forward in convoy under the control of a leader who can navigate (LOGPAC system); the HHC commander managing activities in the field trains; the combat trains and Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) in close proximity to each other but separate; and the S-1/S-4 well forward in the Admin/Log Center (ALC) coordinating CSS, keeping track of the battle, and serving as the alternate TOC.
Extended distances typically do not permit supporting elements to communicate directly with parent headquarters; consequently, the task force must provide and/or coordinate support for all units operating in its area of responsibility; e.g., engineers, ADA, GSR, and attached tanks or infantry. Emergency resupply and initial repair plus casualty and equipment evacuation are accomplished from the TF combat trains. Routine resupply and forward maintenance occur as a result of close coordination between the ALC, the HHC commander in the field trains, and the parent unit in the Brigade Support Area (BSA). Unit unique repair parts, mechanics, and supplies are integrated into the TF LOGPAC system.
Without effective steady state maintenance, units slowly but surely become combat ineffective during sustained operations. Dedicated blocks of time when much of the chain of command can concentrate on maintenance are not likely to be available. Cleaning, tightening, lubricating, checking, and routine part installation has to be done when and where the opportunities occur. Strong motivation and leadership are key. Vehicle crews simply must accomplish that which they have been trained to do without the benefit of close supervision. It is also necessary for supplies to be pushed forward; e.g., solvent, lubricants, and repair parts.
The detailed prioritization of specific CSS actions is a significant chain of command responsibility. Who gets the last available M113 engine -- a scout ITV, an infantry squad track, or the S-3's command post vehicle? Given insufficient POL to refuel the entire unit, do you top off the vehicle closest to the fuel truck, make a conscious decision to fill some and not others, or employ a specific rationing scheme; e.g., make sure that every tank has at least 100 gallons? When there is a known enemy armor threat in the rear area, how do you distribute your limited supply of Light Antitank Weapons? Experienced S-4s can frequently be overhead saying something like the following to inexperienced company commanders: "Do not tell me what you need. Tell me what you have. I will then tell you what you are going to get based upon the established priorities."
Experience confirms the need for forward maintenance. A dedicated effort is required to prevent the flow of a disproportionate number of maintenance actions back to the BSA. The risk is an unacceptable equipment availability rate and a BSA that cannot move due to the presence of more dead combat vehicles than there are recovery assets to transport them. Repair parts (to include most major assemblies), contact teams, and evacuation vehicles must be pushed forward. There are very few combat vehicle problems short of severe battle damage that cannot be fixed within six hours, given the availability of a skilled mechanic and the requisite repair parts. At least two company PLLs need to be at the Unit Maintenance Collection Point. The periodic rotation of PLLs between the UMCP and BSA is an effective replenishment technique.
Effective CSS requires thorough mission specific planning analogous to that required for successful tactical maneuver. Good SOPs are a vital starting point, but only that. For example, providing for treatment and evacuation of casualties, repair and recovery of damaged vehicles, and resupply of reconnaissance, ADA, and engineer elements working throughout the TF area entails a great degree of detailed planning which varies significantly as a function of METT-T.
Accurate and near real time loss reporting is essential both for prompt repair and for effective synchronization of available combat power. Timely information on overall status and an indication of significant losses are passed to the TOC on the command net with details provided to the ALC shortly thereafter on admin log. Frequent TOC-ALC cross validation of equipment and personnel status is obviously required.
Casualty treatment and evacuation is the weak link in battalion level CSS. Organic medical assets are insufficient and higher level support too slow to handle the surges in casualties likely to occur in intense mounted combat. Buddy aid, rapid movement to a foward aid station for life saving and stabilization, and early aerial evacuation are among concepts currently being developed at the Academy of Health Sciences which should produce needed doctrinal and organizational improvements in this area.
Table
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Mobility,
Countermobility and Survivability
Command
and Control
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