COMMAND AND CONTROL
There is nothing more important to success on the battlefield than effective command and control. Neither the best of equipment nor the most skilled soldiers are of much value if lost, uncoordinated, or not properly supported. The requirement to synchronize forces and firepower at the critical place and time is a fundamental tenet of AirLand Battle doctrine which is easy to understand yet extremely difficult to achieve in the fog of war. Commanding from a buttoned-up armored vehicle, in MOPP IV, with half the battlefield clouded by smoke, radio nets partially jammed, and some key leaders dead, lost, or not reporting, is not a trivial task. Basics can be gained through study and the use of abstract simulations, but proficiency at battalion level and below comes only with a great deal of practice dealing with the complex interrelationships between soldiers, equipment, weather, terrain, and an uncooperative opposing force.
Command and control must be a major consideration in the planning process and simplicity is a critically important factor. Well thought out, innovative, fully explained plans with likely contingencies and coordination measures discussed thoroughly with subordinates and staff are simple to execute. Simple looking plans without this level of detail are often not simple to execute.
The Second in Command (2IC) concept works well. A key is recognizing that the duties of company and battalion executive officers vary significantly with the phase of the operation -- preparing, conducting, recovering. During the actual conduct of the battle, the company XO is forward in a combat vehicle at a location separate from the commander, helping pass information to higher and adjacent units, and the battalion XO is supervising the critically important functions of the task force TOC. Both are then in a position to take command if needed. During the other phases, they facilitate CSS operations and planning from whatever locations that function can best be accomplished.
To effectively control forces, a commander must "SEE" the battle; i.e., he must know the positions, activities, and status of both enemy and friendly elements. Commanders see by positioning themselves to physically observe as much as possible without becoming personally involved in the battle; by demanding fast, accurate, concise reports; by having the TOC provide processed information, partially from nets the commander cannot monitor; and through the use of scouts, OPs, and patrols.
Negative reports and updated status are important. An indication that a company has reached a critical point without opposition or that there are no obstacles in the pass can be of equal or even greater significance than a contact report. "Bad news" tends to flood nets and prevent identification and exploitation of successes. Simple codes reflecting unit status can help keep the commander informed without clogging command nets.
A disciplined flow of information on the battalion command net is extremely important. Radios must operate properly with relays planned and established as necessary to ensure continuous communication. Frequent short transmissions should be the norm during intense segments of the battle. Ideally, TOCs are stationary at the critical times and in communication with brigade and all supporting and subordinate elements. Prior planning, careful positioning, and short moves during lulls are key. Information overload and underload must both be avoided. TOC reflex responses should include dropping to the internal net of an unanswering company, relaying from distant stations, checking compliance with the commander's instructions, and keeping a radio on old frequencies to police up stations that have not made the change. Cross talk between company commanders is often a prerequisite for success. Given an understanding of the intent of the battalion commander, company commanders must help each other and not depend totally on instructions and information from battalion.
The rapid distribution of well thought out and complete written orders is necessary to provide time for reconnaissance, changes in task organization, rehearsals, and all of the other planning/preparation activities needed to make a solid concept workable under the stress of combat. The liberal use of easily recognizable graphic control measures is recommended; e.g., phase lines, target reference points, trigger lines, engagement areas, numerous checkpoints, and clearly delineated objectives. While warning orders, frag orders, and face-to-face coordination are essential, the contention that there is no requirement for written orders at battalion level is simply not correct. Leaders should be provided a written order or, at a minimum, an annotated overlay in all but the most rapid reaction situations. It is neither an effective use of time nor sufficiently accurate for leaders to copy graphics or take down numerous coordinates and other details.
Providing each company commander sufficient copies of the battalion graphics so that they can be given to key subordinates helps communicate the higher commander's intent. Mimeograph machines are obviously useful. In addition, some units employ minicomputers with printers. Preprogrammed orders permit a junior staff officer to produce a 75% solution that can then be rapidly refined by the commander and full staff. Others have used desk side copiers and civilian AC generators to speed the mechanical process. An overall Army effort is needed to bring orders production/reproduction out of the jelly roll era.
Verbal frag orders must go to everyone in the orders group, not just selected company commanders. If circumstances are such that the TF commander discusses the order with something less than the total group, the S-3 and/or TOC should provide pertinent information and specific implementing instructions to the others; e.g., mortars, ADA, engineers, S-1/S-4.
Good navigation is fundamental to effective command and control. Ironically, the lower you are in the chain of command the more challenging the task. Navigation at battalion level and below is in fact very difficult. When it is not done well, conducting another class in map reading is rarely the solution. Actions required are thorough planning, as much reconnaissance as possible, vehicle and trail marking at night, liberal use of guides, and overall attention to detail. The ideal is for every vehicle in the unit to rehearse every possible move. When that is not possible, a leader reconnaissance or observation of the route from a vantage point are next best. The absolute minimum is a map reconnaissance to the point of significant memorization by every leader. The common sin is to underestimate the difficulty of the task, particularly at night. Example penalities include units that get lost on the way to the LD because the move that looked easy the previous afternoon was far more difficult an hour before first light; the OPORD that was scheduled for 1900 but not given until 0300 because the company commanders could not find the TOC; and the battalion destroyed in a piecemeal attack because commanders did not know where they were relative to the enemy or each other. As an aside, navigational aids on combat vehicles would provide an order-of-magnitude increase in realized combat power.
Limited visibility is the norm, not a special condition of battle, and must always be planned and prepared for; e.g., smoke, fog, dust.
Synchronization of combat power is often best accomplished when battalion directly controls and assigns tasks to attached and supporting units. Combat support elements should be attached to companies only when demanded by the conditions of METT-T. Under most conditions, ITVs (except those in the scout platoon) should be under the control of the senior AT leader; ADA weapons should be employed by the ADA plt ldr/btry CO except for STINGERS attached to selected companies during mobile operations -- a procedure recommended only because of the necessity to provide protected mobility; engineers should be attached only to lead maneuver companies during offensive operations and then only when there are known or suspected obstacles which can be dealt with by less than an engineer company. What is gained by centralizing combat support elements under their chain of command is better overall combat support, mass when it is needed, and less span of control for maneuver company commanders. In the best of circumstances, we ask a great deal of relatively inexperienced company commanders. Anything that can be done to simplify operations at company level is a plus.
The toughest issue is the infantry-armor mix. Pure companies should be the goal, but METT-T conditions will frequently dictate company teams -- particularly in the defense where battalions almost always have very large areas of responsibility. While "chairman of the board" leadership is never appropriate at battalion level, it clearly will not cut it when companies are pure. Inherent in that task organization is the assumption of total responsibility for the coordinated employment of infantry and armor by the battalion commander and S-3. Those two officers must be where they can control the action, normally from separate locations well forward.
Frequent changes in task organization should be avoided. The teamwork advantage is often far more important than a slightly more desirable mix of forces. Also, the timing of a change requires careful analysis. The significant advantage of a daylight linkup and the time required to receive the OPORD and to coordinate SOPs and LOGPACs must be considered.
The consequences of a lack of synchronization are so severe that OPSEC measures should not be permitted to degrade command and control at battalion level. Vehicles must be marked so that their specific identity (e.g., D23) can be determined from the rear and flanks at a considerable distance. Coding is fine so long as signs are large and at least partially nonsubdued. Under most circumstances, it is desirable to use combinations of colored chem lights to identify organizations down to platoon level at night. COMSEC requirements, which complicate command and control for marginal improvements in security, must be culled. Secure nets are wonderful. In additional to dramatically improved OPSEC, more information can be passed in less time.
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