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INTELLIGENCE

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Task Force IPB Tips
(FM 34-80, Chap 4; FM 100-2-1)

The Task Force IPB is a continuous process which begins prior to the warning order and continues through the completion of the task force mission. The IPB is a significant part of what may be described as the "Staff Preparation of the Battlefield." As such, the S2 closely coordinates its development with the remainder of the task force staff throughout the operation.

The task force IPB process usually begins with some hard intelligence from subordinate units and higher headquarters. The process works in conjunction with reconnaissance and surveillance. During the defense, avenues of approach and go/no-go terrain are physically checked. In the offense, the initial templates provide the basis for the reconnaissance plan, once the enemy's weapons and obstacles are located by physical reconnaissance. Templates are continually refined throughout the battle and changes are passed to the commanders.

The task force IPB is as elaborate as the time available allows. It is significantly more streamlined at the task force than at higher echelons. Following the warning order, the S2 provides the commander a current situational template and a hasty analysis of the area of operation and forecasted weather with which he can begin developing his concept of the operation. The S2 examines the factors of METT-T from the enemy's perspective. He addresses the following imperatives:

Offensive Operations

• Where are the enemy's forces? His obstacles? His infantry positions? His fire sacks? His antitank weapons and other reserves? What is the intent of his defense?

• Where is the enemy's likely counterattack routes?

• What are his weaknesses?

Defensive Operations

• What information does the enemy have about you? What will he do to gain information about your defenses? What will his intell objectives be? What will be the routes and techniques he uses to get this information?

• What are the possible mounted, dismounted, high speed air and attack helicopter approaches he can use? How many forces can he deploy on each approach? Where are possible SP artillery and ATGM overwatch positions? Where is he most vulnerable on each approach?

• What are his likely tactics? Which approaches can he use? Where is he likely to deploy? Where is he going to move and how will he use his second echelon? What will he target for preparatory fires?

The S2 must then look at the operation from his own commander's perspective. He considers both the enemy's strengths and weaknesses with regard to how the task force can bring to bear its combat power against the enemy's weaknesses. The hasty intelligence estimate will enable the commander and S3 to begin developing the concept of the operation while the S2 refines his templates and surveillance, counterreconnaissance, and reconnaissance plans.

The S2 can now begin the process of refining the IPB templates to be used for the upcoming operation. There are a considerable number of sources within the task force TOC from which he can draw expertise:

• The task force FSO with his TACFIRE system and fire support nets can provide information about the types and locations of targets and battle damage assessments from missions fired. He is also a valuable source for the enemy indirect fire employment doctrine and weapons' capabilities.

• The task force engineer can provide information on trafficability and avenues of approach within the task force sector.

• The ADA officer, Air Liaison Officer (ALO), aviation air battle captain, and S3 air can provide air avenues of approach.

• The chemical officer can provide information on the use of chemicals, smoke, and their effects. He is also a source of information on the effects of weather and terrain on chemical operations.

• The S3 and commander can provide advice on the conversion of doctrinal templates to a situational template based upon their greater tactical experience and knowledge of the effects of terrain on the employment of weapons systems.

Weather

Weather is a significant variable in determining how the commander will fight the battle being planned. The S2 looks at weather to assess how it will assist and hinder both his unit and the enemy. When briefing weather, he focuses on the significant impact it will have on each subordinate unit. The S2 highlights the impact on the task force of illumination, windspeed and direction, precipitation, time of sunrise and sunset and its direction relative to the task force, humidity, and temperature gradient. For example:

• "Team Alpha, there will be a heavy ground fog around sunrise which should help conceal your movement at OBJ BOB."

• "Team Bravo, your reconnaissance patrol can expect a clear but moonless night. There will be about 2% illumination. Navigation and target detection will be difficult."

• "Smoke generator section, the winds tomorrow will be from the northwest at 8 kph and we anticipate inversion conditions to last about 2 hours beginning at 0500 hours."

Terrain

The S2 analyzes terrain using OCOKA. A useful technique is to conduct this analysis in terms of how we anticipate the enemy will operate. The S2 mentally walks through each avenue of approach at the enemy rate of movement in the given terrain. For example, during defensive operations some of the questions he may consider are:

• What routes is he most likely to take?

• At what points must he slow down?

• Where can we first see him?

• Where will he first see us?

• Where can we best be positioned to engage him with our weapons systems (primary, alternate, supplementary positions)?

• What are the high payoff target priorities?

• How will he come down these approaches? Mounted? Dismounted? What type of formation?

• Where can we best reinforce the terrain with obstacles (to include FASCAM)?

• How can indirect fires best support this battle? What part of the enemy is most vulnerable and, if hit, best gives us the biggest gain (high payoff targets)? What tasks should be given? Who should have responsibility for shooting these fires?

Development and Use of NAIs

Another aspect of the IPB is the development of Named Areas of Interest (NAI). In the task force area of operation there will be many potential named areas of interest. Simply stated, an NAI is a place where the enemy must do something. The task force S2, in conjunction with the S3 and commander, must identify those NAIs which are critical to support the commander's concept of the operation. The commander's decision on how he will fight the battle largely determines which NAIs are critical. The NAIs are chosen to identify those enemy actions to which the commander must respond. Some of these NAIs may become target areas of interest (TAI) later as the plan develops. A critical aspect in the development of NAIs is the ability to adequately monitor them.

The task force has several assets available to provide surveillance of the selected NAIs. Some of these are:

• Scouts

• Dismounted patrols from maneuver companies

• Aerial observers

• GSRs

• Deep reconnaissance patrols (from maneuver companies or scouts) in stationary OPs arrayed throughout the depth of the task force area of operations.

• REMS

Once NAIs are selected, they not only must be monitored, but the intelligence gathered from them must be transmitted to the staff and commander so that appropriate actions may be taken. NAIs, by definition, are selected so as to enhance our knowledge of Soviet intentions.

"Wargaming"

The commander, XO, S2, S3, S4, and FSO (and occasionally other members of the staff) now wargame courses of action. Wargaming underscores fire support and other combat support assets, as well as maneuver. A common mistake is to wargame only the maneuver aspects of the operation. The S2 develops the enemy's possible courses of action. This "wargaming" process is a continuously revolving discussion among the participants. The most important result of this wargaming process is the commander's concept of the operation. The products of the IPB are critical to the success of the wargaming process. The situational and event plates provide the structure comparing enemy and friendly courses of action. This refines the task force's courses of action supporting the commander's intent. The wargaming process results in the finalization of operational graphics depicting the commander's intent. IPB products such as TAIs and NAIs are converted to operational graphics by the S3/Commander. These operational graphics facilitate continuity of task force operations should the task force commander become a casualty.

Locating Enemy Fire Sacks
(FM 100-2-1, Chap 6)

An extremely useful technique that S2s have developed is the use of range fans depicting the maximum effective range of weapons found in the motorized rifle platoon covering fire sacks between strong points. When the S2 develops the template showing the expected platoon and weapons, he draws in range fans for ATGMs, T-72 main gun, 73mm main gun, etc. The S2 uses these range fans to identify possible fire sacks. These range fans enable the commander and S3 to plan axes which best avoid fire sacks and greatly assists in the development of a scheme of maneuver. The task force commander is thus better able to concentrate on the seams between Soviet strong point defensive positions.

Companies can use the templates and range fans to avoid flanking fires from enemy platoons. They can then engage one MRP at a time while avoiding flanking fires from other MRPs in the motorized rifle company.

Obviously, the enemy's platoon positions require verification by ground or air reconnaissance, and this may cause the range fans to be adjusted. This is usually a relatively minor adjustment which can be done quickly if the initial work has been done correctly. The range fans are a significant aid to maneuver planning.

Reconnaissance In The Offense
(FM 34-80, Chap 4; FM 100-2-1, Chap 6)

Reconnaissance is continuous and everybody's business.

• The task force first finds the enemy main body, not just his reconnaissance elements.

• The task force develops information about what areas his weapon systems cover.

• The S2 and staff analyze information on:

  • The trafficability of attack routes.

  • Presence of obstacles.

  • Suitability of overwatch positions.

  • Any other information the commander deems appropriate.

This is similar to the backwards planning process. Look at the enemy, find where he is weak, figure out how you can take advantage of that weakness, and then figure out how to get there.

Weakness of enemy defenses are those locations where he can't stop the attacker. To determine weaknesses, you must know:

• The location of obstacles and the positions of defending infantry and AT weapons.

• Where anti-armor weapons are oriented and what they can cover.

Locations to the flank of enemy positions often aren't weaknesses -- they may be fire sacks, the strength of the defense.

In movements to contacts or hasty attacks, the need for information about the enemy's defense is just as important as during the deliberate attack. The task force's lead elements (scouts and company teams) develop this information while avoiding decisive engagement. Sufficient action must be taken to force the enemy to react while maintaining freedom of maneuver. Obstacles, weapons, and flanks must be found. Indirect fires must be adjusted on to the enemy. This "reconnaissance in force" is a necessary prelude to commitment of the task force to any course of action.

Successful Task Forces:

• Keep the enemy position under continuous observation. Put in a couple of OPs -- have them sit and watch. Over the course of a day, a smart soldier/leader will collect and report much more information that a moving patrol might see. Any competent defender will be continually upgrading his defense, so what was true at noon might not be true at dusk.

• Push patrols through the depth of the enemy positions.

Reconnaissance In The Defense
(FM 34-80, Chap 4; FM 100-2-1, Chap 5)

The key to a successful defense is maximizing the effects of terrain by careful positioning of weapons and obstacles. This must be done by physical reconnaissance.

• A map reconnaissance is only a useful start for planning.

• Make the tentative plan early and get leaders on the ground.

• Use subordinate leaders and staff to aid in his reconnaissance.

• Divide the sector/BP into areas and assign subordinates reconnaissance responsibilities.

Intelligence Updates

Many task forces use intelligence updates shortly before LD time or at other appropriate times such as prior to the assault. This technique involves a preplanned assembly of the battalion orders group. At this update, leaders are briefed on intelligence gained since the OPORD briefing. The task force commander briefs his subordinates on any final modifications to the original plan based on this intelligence. Final face-to-face coordination is made.

The timing depends upon how long it takes to assemble subordinate commanders. Normally 2 hours prior to LD time is sufficient. The assembly point has to be well forward and easily identifiable. Some battalions use an "intelligence dump" over secure radio instead, especially if no modification of the plan is required.

Actual assembly of the orders group for the intelligence update is beneficial, especially:

• When plans must be modified and new graphics are required.

• To facilitate final face-to-face coordination after subordinates have to finalize their plans.

Counters To Enemy Electronic Warfare
(FM 34-80, Chap 7; FM 100-2-1, Chap 15)

Soviet units on the battlefield demonstrate a very well-developed capability to identify and jam specific nets. The maneuver command and fire support nets are most frequently targeted. Fire support nets are particularly vulnerable to disruption by jamming and deception because of their normally heavy volume of traffic. Normally, the Soviet EW personnel will work to identify as many nets as possible before the commencement of an operation and wait to jam key frequencies once execution begins. They have also proven quite adept at electronic deception in lieu of jamming by transmitting false information over task force nets at crucial moments during the battle.

The Warsaw Pact, while formidable in its EW capability, can be beaten. Effective task force SOPs must provide simple procedures to:

• Initiate code words or visual signals to alert the net that it is being jammed and change frequencies, if necessary.

• Re-establish communications if lost.

• Leave someone on the net to bring up stations not receiving the initial directive. (EW personnel are notorious for sending false signals on the old net to deceive those friendly units still there.)

• Switch to an alternate frequency at a predetermined time(s) before the beginning of an operation.

• Establish "work through" procedures when it becomes known that jamming is in progress.

The absolute key to counter jamming is radio discipline. Radio operators must become experts in proper communication procedures. The net control station (NCS) must actively enforce discipline on the nets. When a unit can work through jamming, it must be extremely aware of security; if the unit's unsecured nets can be jammed, they can also be monitored. Finally, the enforced use of authentication codes is the simplest, most effective means to counter deception activities.

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