INTELLIGENCE
OBSERVATION: HUMINT assets are not utilized to their full potential.
DISCUSSION: Task Force S2s do not have the time or expertise to employ HUMINT assets which are routinely attached to the task force.
LESSONS: That HUMINT assets be controlled and activities planned at Brigade level.
OBSERVATION: Each soldier needs to have a language phrase card.
DISCUSSION: Units need to develop language phrase cards with English and native language translations on them. They also need the native phrases spelled phonetically so soldiers can pronounce them. The front of the card needs to contain simple greetings and action words (i.e., hello, stop, yes, no, etc.). The back of the card needs to ask basic questions about the operating environment (i.e., are there ant mines in the area?). The intent of the card is to be able to speak basic phrases and/or be able to show the person you are trying to communicate with the card to obtain an answer.
LESSONS: Each soldier carry a language phrase card with the following basic information:
FRONT: Greetings; Come forward; Stop/halt; Please; Wait; Put your weapon down.
BACK: Are there any minefields in the area? Are there any bridges in the area? Are there any soldiers or military units in the area? Can you show me where these people/places are if it is not too dangerous? (If it is dangerous) Will you wait here until I can get someone who speaks your language to help me understand?
OBSERVATION: S2 must fully understand how to maintain incident overlays and conduct pattern analysis.
DISCUSSION: Pattern analysis is critical to COA development, focusing R&S plans, and developing countermeasures. S2s generally have a system for plotting incident overlays; however, the information must then be collated and analyzed to determine increasing threats in specific areas or to develop threat models.
LESSONS: S2s should develop systems for maintaining and analyzing large volumes of information (pattern analysis). Recommended TTP's include:
1. Maintain an incident overlay for a 24 hour period with 3 overlays (72 hours worth of events) on the map at a time. This overall incident overlay will assist the S2 in discerning immediate operational patterns.
2. Transfer the overall incident overlay data onto long term event overlays (i.e., one overlay for sniper attacks, one for road blocks, one for mortar attacks, etc.). These overlays will assist the S2 in discerning patterns for types of events.
3. Information relevant to each event (debriefs of participants, etc.) should be maintained in files for future reference.
4. A simple computer database program can be used to more quickly discern patterns. By entering information on a series of variables (fields), the S2 can use the computer to determine correlations between events and within a type of event.
OBSERVATION: Pattern analysis is critical to effective contingency planning and incident prevention.
DISCUSSION: S2s generally have a system for plotting incidents on an overlay, but the information should then be compared and collated into threat models (pattern analysis).
LESSONS: S2s should develop systems for tracking, comparing, and maintaining large volumes of information (pattern analysis). Recommended TTP s include:
1. Maintain an incident overlay for a 24 hour period with 3 overlays (72 hours of events) on the map at one time.
2. Transfer the overall incident overlay onto one long term event overlay (i.e., one for sniper attacks, one for road blocks, one for mortar attacks, etc.).
3. Using available commercial software, develop simple data bases by incident type and maintain long term statistics on the incidents as they occur.
4. Briefback format should be in TF SOPs and after all movements in sector the data from each briefback is updated both on the maps and in the automated tracking systems.
5. Include in your pattern analysis data bases profiles on NGOs, PVOs, local authorities, towns, military factions, and any other person of significance.
As a result, the TF S2 records incidents, retrieves information from all sources, and with the staff, gets to the point of planning and preventing future incidents.
OBSERVATION: S2's must have a system for tasking or receiving reports from the numerous collection assets available throughout the AOR.
DISCUSSION: S2's must take advantage of the "opportunity collectors" operating throughout the AOR. Numerous units in the BCT - including CI, CA, PSYOP, MP's, medical teams, chaplains, convoy drivers, etc. - have extended access to the AOR and local populace. All of these have the potential to overtly collect valuable economic, social, political, infrastructure, and military information. Unfortunately these collection opportunities are often missed because the S2 is unaware of the activities of these teams and the teams are not aware of the intelligence requirements. Similarly, check points, observation posts, and patrols must be fully exploited for intelligence information. The BCT S2 rarely passes focused intelligence requirements to these soldiers. Information that is collected on a routine basis is rarely forwarded back up the chain to the S2.
LESSONS: The S2 should develop systems to make information requirements available to all potential collectors. TTP's may include:
1. A daily meeting chaired by the XO with the S2, CI chief, CA OIC, PSYOP OIC, MP company commander, and S5 (list not all inclusive) to determine intelligence acquisition tasks for teams and units moving through the AOR. The final result of this meeting should be a synchronization matrix and FRAGO for these collectors.
2. Developing "Smart Cards" with lists of standing intelligence requirements for CP's, OP's, patrols, convoys, etc. The cards must be updated per changes in mission and AOR environment.
3. Establish SOP's for debriefing soldiers manning check points and observation posts. Designated intelligence personnel should routinely visit CP's and OP's to sensitize soldiers to the current situation, provide updated intelligence requirements, and receive information and impressions. Routine reports from CP's and OP's (a standardized 'fill in the blank' format is helpful) should be forwarded through the battalions to the BCT S2.
4. Patrols should be pre-briefed and debriefed prior to every mission. Patrol reports should be forwarded through the battalions to the BCT S2.
5. Require intelligence briefings as part of the check out / check in procedures for personnel traveling within the AOR. The S2 section can update the individual to the threat situation along the route and sensitize him to intelligence requirements. Upon return to the headquarters / TOC, the individual would be debriefed to extract pertinent observations.
OBSERVATION: S2's must leverage all intel assets and agencies to conduct sufficient IPB and R&S planning to support operations in a STABOPS environment.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence responsibilities are greatly expanded during stability operations. In a situation requiring the separation of belligerent factions and control of a ZOS, the S2 must conduct terrain analysis which concentrates not only on the traditional military factors (OCOKA), but also takes into account the environmental factors of the population and potential support structures for paramilitary/terrorist threats in the AOR. The IPB process must be completed for the conventional threat (separated belligerent forces) as well as the potential paramilitary/terrorist threat posed to each brigade mission. While the S2 will have doctrinal templates for the belligerent forces - and can develop familiar HIC situation and event templates for these, he must develop threat models, incident overlays, and event templates based on his own analysis of paramilitary / terrorist activity. Similarly, R&S plans must be constantly updated and refined - with assets tasked and monitored - based on the different missions and changing conditions in the AOR. Traditional HIC intelligence assets (OP's, patrols, etc) must be tasked to monitor the separated belligerent forces and movements within the ZOS. Additional HUMINT assets - CI, CA, PSYOP, or any unit having contact with the local populace - must be focused to collect information on the attitude of the population and activity of potential threat groups. Finally, the collected information must be filed, collated, and analyzed to discern patterns and develop threat models.
LESSONS:
1. S2's must conduct traditional IPB for the AOR concentrating on the threat posed by the separated belligerent factions (FM 34-130) as well as expanded IPB for the populace / paramilitary / terrorist threat to the BCT and individual BCT missions (FM 34-130, FM 34-7). Similarly, R&S plans must provide for direct surveillance of the separated belligerents and the avenues of approach into the ZOS as well as direct collection within the AOR to determine the attitude and allegiances of the population and activity of potential paramilitary groups.
2. In order to meet the expanded mission requirements of STABOPS, BCT S2's must take full advantage of the assets and technology available to them in the BCT. Suggestions include:
3. Tasking the DS FA Battalion S2 to conduct pattern analysis of artillery and mortar attacks; consider locating the DS FA Bn S2 in the BCT TOC.
4. Requiring the CI operational control element (OCE) to outbrief and debrief soldiers who routinely travel through the area
5. Create an all-source BCT analytical cell using S2 analysts, soldiers from the MI company platoon operations center (POC), and personnel from the OCE
6. Using Warlord and Terrabase systems whenever possible to assist in terrain and threat analysis
7. Using subject matter experts in the IPB process when developing R&S plans (i.e., have a sniper determine the best locations for shots when establishing NAI's to check for snipers).
8. Realign the staff to better support intelligence operations; particularly in the establishment of an analysis cell to process the many intelligence reports which will flood the BCT.
Table
of Contents
Command
& Control
Maneuver
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
