COMMAND
AND CONTROL
OBSERVATION: TOCs had difficulty providing command and control to their subordinate elements.
DISCUSSION: Units had difficulty gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information to subordinate elements. Special staff elements attached to the units for Stability Operations (STABOPS) were not routinely incorporated into the units TDMP. CA, CI, and PSYOPS elements worked for the unit S2 when they should work for the S3. Information sharing within the staffs did not routinely occur. TOC configurations did not allow for pertinent information to be posted where all those who needed the information could easily access it. TOCs did not track requirements imposed by factional elements at different checkpoints and disseminate that information to the rest of the unit. TOCs did not track and disseminate results of negotiations conducted throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), such as within the different villages, at CMWG/JMCs, or with NGOs.
LESSONS: That units continue to use TOC operations and configurations that work for them and facilitate information sharing within the staff. That the CA, CI, and PSYOPS elements work for the unit S3. That SOPs be developed to standardize staff updates including time, location, and type of information disseminated and in FRAGOs to subordinate elements. That standardized locations within the TOC for posting information be developed and used. That units understand that the type and level of detail of information being tracked may change in STABOPS -- not the requirement to track, analyze, and disseminate information.
OBSERVATION: Ground Check Points (GCP) improve communication and reaction times.
DISCUSSION: GCPs will enhance aviation operations in the ZOS. Reaction times, reference, orientation for area and zone reconnaissance, MEDEVAC, attack, and CSS missions will be improved.
LESSONS: BCT and 4BDE jointly establish a system of GCPs throughout the ZOS.
OBSERVATION: Use of the word "documentation" in OPORDS is unclear.
DISCUSSION: The base OPORD lists documentation as a specified task. During Exercise Mountain Eagle, documenting was not performed. Documenting -- or recording -- incidents in PKO and PEO is very important. Records are a tool for use at CMWG meetings and other gatherings in order to facilitate preservation of peace between factions. They are also critical in dispelling fraudulent claims against the peace enforcement command.
LESSONS: Train and exercise documentation. Standardize the method(s). Include cameras and video recorders in patrol, CP, and OP kits. A picture is worth a thousand words.
OBSERVATION: A2C2 is not practiced or understood.
DISCUSSION: According to FM 1-103, airspace management in the brigade sector is the responsibility of the Brigade S3 Air. At division level it is the G3 Air. Airspace management not only applies to helicopters, but all users of airspace over the brigade sector (fixed wing, indirect fires, and air defense). Since most S3 Airs are armor and infantry captains and lieutenants between jobs, airspace management gets ignored until an Army aviation liaison officer arrives.
LESSONS: S3 Air in BCTs study FM 1-103.
OBSERVATIONS:
1. Predeployment coordination is critical due to the number of ad hoc organizations and changes which occur in this fluid environment.
2. Rehearsals are frequently not conducted by units due to time constraints or procrastination resulting in poor performance during mission execution.
3. Poor communication not only during predeployment but during missions results in poor mission execution.
DISCUSSION: A lack of focus on each of these topics results in increased confusion and unfamiliarity between each unit and the Battalion/Brigade Staff.
LESSONS: Focus on the basics -- Predeployment coordination, Rehearsals, and Communication.
1. Predeployment coordination and comparison of SOPs will decrease the amount of learning that must take place on the ground for effective mission support.
2. Conducting rehearsals will increase performance during mission execution by identifying shortcomings before problems hinder the mission.
3. Daily coordination meetings, and providing redundant forms of communication to each element increases communication within the battalion.
4. Ensure that all elements are in all required nets and communications means at all times.
OBSERVATION: Rehearsals are critical to success.
DISCUSSION: All elements must rehearse all key actions in order to assure success. Rehearsals should include reactions to be taken in the event of both likely and most dangerous events.
LESSONS: Elements and events which require rehearsal include, but are not limited to : Convoy actions -- actions at checkpoints, actions on contact, actions at linkup; Fire support rehearsals; CSS rehearsals; Critical events such as joint military commissions; Quick reaction force responses; Actions at faction checkpoints; Actions by US soldiers as they man checkpoints and deal with likely and dangerous situations; Actions at minefields; Immediate action drills, including: Mine strike drill; Actions on contact; Actions at a convoy or road movement halt; Base defense actions, to include response to level I-III threat, under all light and weather conditions.
OBSERVATION: Units ignore their SOP.
DISCUSSION: Battalions must follow the procedures outlined in their TACSOPs. Reporting procedures are the most frequently abused systems. Often TACSOPs have not been read or distributed down to subordinate unit level.
LESSONS: Disseminate, read, and drill the TACSOP. Do this prior to deployment. Predeployment exercises are ideal. Drill the TACSOP via rehearsals so that responses are automatic. Bring the TACSOP on diskette to the field and update as necessary. Make the document " user friendly" by printing it so it fits into a BDU pocket. Also make as much of it as picture/diagram oriented as possible, making it simpler to understand.
OBSERVATION: This peace is a sergeant's peace to enforce.
DISCUSSION: Peace enforcement will succeed to the degree that the junior leaders are empowered, trained, and expected to enforce standards and discipline among their soldiers as well as to make decisions when enforcing the ROE. Senior leaders must ensure that the standards are communicated to the lowest level and must inspect to ensure that the standards are understood and complied with. As SOPs are revised with stability operations in mind, they must contain the PCI checklists and the drills (MINESTRIKE, etc.) which will soundly ground decentralized operations in doctrine and common sense. Commander's intents must decentralize decision making to the junior leader level, and the ROE must allow for the corporals to make the peace enforcing decisions.
LESSONS: As training continues, the NCODP classes and Sergeant's Time sessions must be devoted to the individual and small unit leader tasks already identified:
1. ROE
2. Mine Awareness and Clearing
3. Negotiations
4. Patrolling
5. Check Point Operations
6. Field Sanitation and Hygiene Enforcement
7. Pre-Operation Inspections
8. Reporting Using the SALUTE format
9. Safety and Cold Weather Safety
These training opportunities must be protected and must remain focused at the soldier level.
OBSERVATION: Inconsistent dissemination and understanding of the ROE.
DISCUSSION: Commanders at all levels must ensure that ROE is fully understood by all and that correct, current ROE are disseminated. ROE must be known and understood by all soldiers in the AOR, including those assigned, attached, and collocated. Poor dissemination of ROE leads to confusion about the rules of self-defense and when force is authorized to complete a mission.
LESSONS:
1. Use RAMP (see below) as a device to help soldiers learn the ROE.
2. Consider using separate ROE cards for leaders and soldiers. Soldier cards would explain the right of self defense and immediate actions (such as RAMP, above) and the leader card would address graduated force responses.
3. Include vignette/scenario training in teaching ROE.
4. Double check slice elements; do not assume they received their ROE training at home station.
5. Ensure that ROE training continues throughout deployment.
6. Integrate lessons learned into ROE training scenarios.
7. Emphasize that soldiers always have the right of self-defense, regardless of the mission.
"RAMP" RULES
Return fire with aimed fire. Return force with force. You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.
Anticipate attack. Use force first if you see clear indicators of hostile intent.
Measure the amount of force you use, if time and circumstance permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.
Protect with deadly force only human life and property designated by your
OBSERVATION: In the Peace Enforcement environment projected for these forces, some BOS have less applicability than in HIC, while other elements, not normally even assigned, become crucial.
DISCUSSION: The projected AOR is one where treaties reduce the threat of massed ground forces and artillery, and where operational/strategic-level elements such as Operation Deny Flight greatly reduce the conventional air threat. On the other hand, the center of gravity for the operation now involves the populace, to include paramilitary forces, multiple factions, religious leaders, and local leaders.
LESSONS:
1. Realign the staff from normal (in HIC) activities of synchronizing operations to analysis and projection activities with different emphasis than Intelligence/ Maneuver/FS/M-CM-S/Air Defense operations. The Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Counterintelligence staff elements will play a much larger role in the success of the peace operation .
2. Consider non-conventional roles for elements structured for HIC operations; for example, use of SHORAD elements for convoy or movement security; use of FA transportation elements (FAASV and 5-ton trucks) for resupply and convoy action.
OBSERVATION: Strategic consequences of tactical actions and information flow to the lowest level.
DISCUSSION: In the peace enforcement environment, information flow to the lowest level is crucial. Each soldier must have great situational awareness and must take actions which are consistent with his orders and their intended context. Each soldier must consider the consequences of his actions, since a decision and associated action by a soldier may have strategic consequences.
LESSONS: Disseminate maps, graphics, ROE and Peace Accord to lowest possible level. Keep soldiers informed of current situation; communicate. Rehearse all anticipated actions. In order to be successful, each leader and unit must ensure:
1. Accurate, current battle rosters of all soldiers working in the unit, including all assigned, attached, OPCON, etc. personnel.
2. Accurate, realtime reporting of all incidents up the chain of command.
3. SOPs are known and followed by all.
4. "You are what you appear to be:" soldier discipline and appearance are key; specifically, all soldiers must appear in correct, clean, serviceable uniforms when in the public eye.
Each soldier and leader must have:
1. An understanding of current situation regarding factions, forces, and civil situation.
2. Correct, current ROE.
3. An understanding of the Peace Accord.
OBSERVATION: Communications were inadequate to support BCT control of the AOR.
DISCUSSION: "If you can't talk, you can't play." As the Brigade Combat Team Main CP deployed at a realistic distance from its subordinate units, it became apparent that comms were not sufficient to allow them to influence the action in the AOR. At one point the BCT Main CP had to issue a FRAGO over HF, AM, MSE, FM Brigade O/I, and FM Command in order to reach all battalions. At no time were all required stations in any net, despite the use of FM retrans. Radio operators at all locations in the BCT often did not hear or transcribe messages correctly, forcing messages to be resent, or forwarding bad or incomplete information. Operators and their leaders at times appeared to be content to accept a condition of "negative contact" on a radio net rather than finding alternative means to get the message through. MSE signal nodes were not integrated into the BCT structure. There was constant tension between Signal Brigade leaders and BCT leaders regarding the requirement to position, secure and move the signal modes which form the backbone of the MSE network. It was not apparent that signal soldiers on the node centers had been trained to perform other than perfunctory, walking "security" patrols within 20 meters of their signal shelters.
LESSONS:
1. Before deployment, conduct signal profile studies of the AOR to determine proposed signal sites. Ensure that selected sites can be secured.
2. Review the force package and employment plan from the standpoint of emplacing and securing node sites and other critical non-combat-power assets.
3. Train remote site operators in self defense and local security so that they can be active contributors to their own safety while still operating the site.
4. Ensure that units are in all required communications nets and that all nets are operational. Aggressively pursue efforts to track and fix comms outages or stations not in the net.
5. Ensure that all comms systems are working mechanically and electronically at the best possible level. Emphasize antenna systems and cabling. Tune all RTs for greatest possible power and frequency accuracy as specified in applicable TMs.
6. Train operators to work through problems by training "commo immediate action drills" to be done in case of a commo loss with any station.
7. Train operators use SALUTE report formats. This will help them to take messages accurately to avoid the requirement to re-send messages repeatedly over nets that are tenuous.
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