SECTION I: COMMAND AND CONTROL
(FM 71-2J, Chap 3; FC 71-6)
A unit that recently rotated through the NTC was highly successful. What they lacked in modernized equipment they made up for with strong leadership. A senior observer/controller (O/C) described one of the leaders by saying:
"He is the single best leader I have ever seen. He is a teacher; a role model; an excellent communicator. He is concerned with excellence for the sake of excellence itself. He inculcates high standards in others, and understands that combat arms leaders must touch, talk with, and openly love their soldiers."
"The task force has an aggressive NCO Corps and disciplined soldiers. Everyone knows his job, his subordinate's job, and the job of those on his right and left. Everyone knows the importance of doing his job without being told to do it. The relationship of his job to that of other people has been explained to each soldier."
That's quite an endorsement from an OC who has had the opportunity to see numerous leaders and units train at the NTC.
The task force was structured for success. Several factors influenced their success:
- Early task organization
- Ingraining teamwork through repetitious combined arms training
- Emphasizing basic gunnery techniques
- Rehearsing
- Developing and using tactical plays
These factors may help your unit prepare for combat. There is no unique factor which determines the outcome of any battle.
Early Task Organization
The division resourced the task force. Positions, especially command and staff, were stabilized six to nine months prior to the NTC rotation. The unit task organized six months prior to the rotation.
Tank/Infantry Teamwork
Infantry dismounted at night to unhinge the enemy defenses and point out targets for the tanks. The infantry was also used to acquire targets during the daylight. The skills of the infantry and armor crews were well-honed. Most vehicles had two pairs of binoculars up and looking all the time, resulting in super target acquisition. Observers keyed on their own sectors and did not fixate on the one Soviet vehicle everyone could see. Both tankers and infantrymen understood each other's role and strove to help each other so the total effort could succeed.
Co/Tm Teamwork
Co/Tm commanders also understood each other's role. The quality of situation reports was excellent. Units took ownership of parts of the battle and coordinated with adjacent units to influence the battle. This lateral coordination was universal throughout the task force. Mutual trust and explicit battle responsibilities allowed adjacent commanders to coordinate on each other's company net. This reduced the amount of traffic on the battalion command net during heavy engagement periods.
Each leader was expected to display initiative without risk of punishment. Initiative was coupled with strong teamwork. "Think of what the other leader needs to know. Tell him." This was enforced and practiced. Leaders knew each other well enough to anticipate their moves on the battlefield. An exchange might have gone like this: "I'll suppress -- you maneuver to hit him by the wadi."
Gunnery
Companies constantly boresighted by the manual. They used every opportunity when they stopped movement to recheck their boresight. There was strong emphasis on the technical and practical aspects of MILES gunnery (see NTC Lessons Learned Miles Checklist, Jun 86). Fire commands, target acquisition, and land navigation were practiced during maneuver training. Observations from FORSCOM unit after action reports were used to reinforce the link between leadership and gunnery. One report stated,
"Junior leaders must do their job. Command and control is a two way process, and proactive leadership is essential at all levels. From reestablishment of communication to the proper care, boresighting, and zeroing of all MILES, are leader's responsibilities and must be supervised right down to the individual infantryman."
They treated MILES as a weapon system, not as a training aid, to gain enough proficiency to defeat the OPFOR.
Rehearsals
A reverse planning sequence was used to rehearse actions on the objective first, then to rehearse other battle actions. Leaders conducted rehearsals in the vicinity of the TOC. They positioned themselves on simple terrain models to replicate units in the upcoming operation. Terrain features were depicted using 3 x 5 cards. The task force wargamed possible attack alternatives against the OPFOR regiment. They also integrated the combat support leaders in the wargaming process.
Wargaming integrated supporting fires with the maneuver plan. Each company and separate platoon had specific responsibilities for shooting indirect fires. Execution of the task force fire support plan was everyone's responsibility, not just the company FSOs. For example: "Tm A shoots tgt A0045 as they cross phase line Blue."
The task force also rehearsed while buttoned up and in MOPP IV, and timed the actions. Company commanders backbriefed the task force commander on rehearsal timings. Timings gave the commander an idea of how long it would take to move under actual conditions and facilitated sequencing unit moves.
Communication was key to understanding. Subordinates wargamed each action so no aspect of execution was unclear. Wargaming also reduced communication times on the task force nets. Changes to orders could be quickly passed through the use of short messages.
Plays
The task force developed a few basic plays (two movements to contact, two attacks, and two defenses) and learned to execute them well. The plays evolved over a period of time. Refinement was a collective effort with everyone's ideas shared and discussed.
During professional development classes, task force leadership met and and wargamed the plays and clarified responsibilities. Individual soldiers understood how their tank, TOW, or Dragon fit into the task force plan as a result of combined arms training at homestation. The plays were trained and believed in by everyone in the task force. They were flexible and easily modified IAW the factors of METT-T. The use of plays permitted operation orders to be published quickly. They also promoted continuous operations because soldiers knew their job and were able to execute in the absence of direct supervision.
The plays are not an end-all. As a task force commander said,
"[Plays] are not a substitute for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) or METT-T. The goal of the plays is to promote teamwork. Teamwork breeds discipline; it is key to the success of the Army on the battlefield."
Other units have unsuccessfully used plays without considering these factors. Plays are similar to drills but are not the same. They incorporate many of the automatic responses of drills but integrate combat support and combat service support players. For example, when a play is chosen, the FSO, mortar platoon leader, S4, and medical platoon leader all know how they are going to support the plan. Therefore, it is easier to modify a play according to the factors of METT-T.
Four principles were used in designing the plays:
- Win the recon/counterecon war
- Hit the flank
- Mass
- Depth
This article presented the more significant command and control techniques used by this unit. Their key to success was strong leadership, teamwork, and the flexibility to react to the dynamics of the battlefield. CALL has produced a videotape, "Teamwork and Flexibility, an NTC and Training Success Story," that further discusses this topic.
This is an example of a wide sector defense play. The IPB process anticipated the TF defending against three motorized rifle companies that had two avenues of approach into the sector. The play is called by the task force command or S3 by a net call stating two numbers. If the enemy had two companies on the west/left avenue and one company on the east/right avenue, the commander called 1,2. Everyone held and fought from their primary position.
(Editor's Note: The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) does not promote the plays or play books as the ultimate solution. CALL promotes repetitive crew drill, leader training using terrain models, and field rehearsals of unit battle plans. This type of training builds teams, unit flexibility on the battlefield, and increases the unit's probability of success in combat.)
(Memorandum,
USACGSC, School of Advanced Military Studies, 9 Mar 86;
TRADOC
Pam 525-28, US Army Operational Concept for Leadership)
Technical proficiency ". . . refers to knowing one's job and those of your subordinates. It includes analytical ability and diagnostic skills . . ." Technical proficiency is the most important leadership factor on the battlefield. Analysis of the performance of platoon leaders and platoon sergeants shows that technical proficiency has the greatest correlation to the overall effectiveness of the platoon. Understanding each other's roles in the platoon was also a significant factor in determining platoon success.
Surveys and questionaires were administered to platoon leaders and platoon sergeants before and after they trained at the NTC. The purpose of this research was to determine what leader development factors contributed the most to success at the platoon level. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants felt they were most successful when:
- they understood their respective duties and responsibilities.
- they shared responsibility for leading the platoon.
- the platoon leader sought the advice of the platoon sergeant.
- they kept each other informed about mission preparations.
- the platoon leader delegated authority to the platoon sergeant, and he had a role in tactical planning and decision making.
- there was a sense of cooperation and a willingness to share information.
- the platoon leader was willing to learn from the platoon sergeant.
- the platoon leader respected the platoon sergeant.
- the platoon sergeant was willing to be led by the platoon leader.
- the platoon sergeant respected the platoon leader.
These factors are not a formula for success in working out the right way for the platoon leader and platoon sergeant to interact. They are the result of research and interviews conducted with platoon leaders and platoon sergeants who trained at the NTC. They are a start point for developing a successful and effective leadership team at platoon level. Awareness of these ideas will increase the likelihood of success on the battlefield.
(FM
22-600-20, Noncommissioned Officers Guide, Mar 80;
TRADOC
Pam 525-28, US Army Operational Concept for Leadership)
The Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer states:
"Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine."
Today's noncommissioned officers strive to live up to those standards while performing their duties during unit rotations at the National Training Center. This article focuses on the interaction between the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Critical elements that impact on this relationship are:
- planning
- technical and tactical proficiency
- platoon leader/platoon sergeant rapport
Planning
The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must discuss current and future requirements and establish priorities based on METT-T. They must consider who will do what, when, where, how, and why.
Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must willingly share leadership responsibilities during garrison and field training. This division of labor between the platoon leader and platoon sergeant must be understood. For example, the platoon leader is responsible for establishing fields of fire for the platoon, but the platoon sergeant should be given responsibility for ensuring range cards are completed properly. Unequal sharing of tasks is a common mistake made by young leaders during training at the NTC. This is often the cause of conflict and confusion within the platoon. Platoon leaders should bring platoon sergeants into the decision making process early. This allows them to capitalize on the vast experience of the platoon sergeant. It also enables the platoon sergeant to assume control of the platoon if/when that becomes necessary.
Technical and Tactical Proficiency
Platoon leaders expect to be trained by their company commanders and advised by their platoon sergeants. They feel that company commanders give them a better perspective on the tactical aspects of how the company fights, while the platoon sergeant gives them advice and assistance on how the platoons and squads fight.
Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant Rapport
Rapport between the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant must be developed early during home station training. Planning is a critical factor in developing that rapport. Some platoon sergeants feel compelled to show the lieutenant how to run the platoon. They do this by having the lieutenant watch them conduct business. The vast majority of platoon leaders do not agree with this approach. They prefer the"help me" rather than "show me" attitude of their platoon sergeants. Young platoon leaders want to learn by running their own platoon and having the platoon sergeant advise them.
Successful platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have shown themselves to be highly competent in their individual duties and responsibilities. They also know each other's job. The two leaders continue to complement each other's strengths and weaknesses. They do this by maintaining a continuous dialogue and open lines of communication. Successful platoon sergeants must:
- provide assistance to the platoon leaders.
- exercise initiative in the absence of orders.
- maintain their own tactical and technical proficiency.
Applying these principles, the platoon sergeant not only adheres to the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer, but also contributes to the success of the platoon.
(AR
385-10, The Army Safety Program)
According to NTC safety office records, there were 251 accidents at the National Training Center during the thirteen rotations in FY 86. These accidents involved both NTC units and rotational units, and resulted in:
- three dead soldiers
- two permanently disabled soldiers
- 2,933 lost man days
- $804,089 medical aid cost
- $401,448 equipment repair cost
The costs exclude salary paid to soldiers while recuperating and benefits paid to survivors.
These are not simply cold statistics. They represent a loss of combat power and an increased burden on all battlefield systems. There is a corresponding degradation in unit morale. Safety is a command responsibility.
Most accidents are preventable. We must keep as many soldiers as we can combat ready. The key to prevention is heightened awareness of accident potential during certain times and at certain locations. Leaders must make safety checks paramount, especially during the more dangerous phases and times of the rotation.
Certain phases of NTC rotations are particularly dangerous. By examining historical accident data, we can anticipate accidents in the future. Figure 1 shows that less than six percent of accidents occur during the five days prior to the beginning of rotational training. Ten percent occur after the completion of training as units prepare to leave. The greatest number of accidents at the NTC occur during days two through six of the force on force engagements.
We can also determine what time accidents are most likely to occur. As Figure 2 shows, only 16 percent of accidents occur from 2301 to 0600. Most units are extremely safety conscious during night operations. Sixty-one percent occur from 0601 to 1800, and 23 percent occur from 1801 to 2300. The highest concentration of daylight accidents occur because soldiers ignore known safety hazards, such as soldiers positioning themselves between two vehicles during recovery operations, or excessive speed.
This is one of the challenges of leadership at the NTC: to become involved in safety awareness accident prevention. By educating leaders and properly supervising soldiers, we can reduce the number of accidents, maintain high morale, maintain our combat strength.
Table
of Contents
Preface
Section
II: Maneuver
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