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TA. 2 Negative Trend 1: Targeting Process

4QFY94

PROBLEM 1-1: The brigade level targeting process often lacks focus. It fails to orient collection and supporting fires.

1. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPTs).
2. Most units do not use the results of targeting meeting to refocus their collection plans or task specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest.
3. There is often little follow up on taskings to subordinate units as part of the targeting process.
4. The decide element is being performed adequately, but the execution of detect, deliver and assess needs great improvement.

1-3QFY95

PROBLEM 1-2: The battle staff targeting process needs improvement.

1. Intel, operations and fire support personnel do not focus on the targeting process.
2. High Value Targets (HVTs) lists are rarely disseminated to subordinate units.
3. Subordinate units who received HVT lists, did not use them to produce High Payoff Target (HPT) lists during the target planning process.
4. Meetings did not occur on a regular basis; S-2s did not present the current enemy situation.
5. S-2s conduct insufficient enemy analysis during the "decide" phase of the process.

RESULTS: The detect phase of the targeting process is not clearly focused; therefore, the delivery phase is inadequate due to prior flaws in the targeting process.

4QFY95./1QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3:

1. The brigade targeting process often lacks focus and fails to orient collection efforts and supporting fires.
2. Intelligence, operations and fire support personnel do not focus on all elements (decide, detect, deliver and assess) of the targeting process.
3. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find fix and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPT).
4. Most units do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus their collection plans, to task specific units to confirm/deny Named Areas of Interest, or to task and synchronize delivery and assess assets.
5. Too often personnel arrive at targeting meetings unprepared. No one is sure what the outcome should be.

1. The targeting process must become a routine action managed by the bde XO or S-3.
   - use the commander's intent to focus on finding, fixing and finishing the enemy.
   - "Decide, Detect Deliver, Assess" is a continuous process that must be understood and integrated by all brigade task force BOS members.

   Incorporate the targeting process into battle staff training, .

   Ensure that the appropriate personnel prepare for and attend targeting meetings. Staff should be prepared as follows:

   - S-2 should present:

   - analysis of current enemy situation

   - the current high value targets (HVTs)

   - a recommended list of high payoff targets (HPTs).

   - S-3 should:

   - present the current friendly situation

   - describe future operations.

   - at the conclusion:

   - S-3 cuts a FRAGO.

   FSO/targeting officer coordination:

   - work closely with the S-2 to develop HPTs

   - continually coordinate with all brigade elements for the most accurate, up-to-date information for proposed targets.

   Doctrinal references:

   - FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process

TA.2 Negative Trend 2: Automated Fire Planning

4QFY94

PROBLEM 2-1: Brigade and battalion fire support elements are not using light tactical fire direction (LTACFIRE), Digital Message Devices (DMD), or Forward Entry Devices (FEDs) to update target lists and compute fire plans.

RESULTS:

1. Errors in target grids
2. Lengthy radio transmissions
3. Lack of automated tactical fire direction
4. Delayed input at the battalion FDC. Automated fire planning is rarely being used even in the defense where soldiers' load is rarely a problem.

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 2-2: Units rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/IFSAS system to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and to conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. Fire plans are not disseminated and/or fired.
2. Inefficient resource use.
3. Failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.
4. Failure to follow LTACFIRE SOPs, which are generally excellent.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 2-3: Although units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/IFSAS system. Few units use LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. Fire plans are not disseminated nor fired.
2. Inefficient use of resources.
3. Failure to meet the commanders attack criteria. Primary reasons:
   - inexperienced operators
   - lack of command emphasis to use the system.

   Units often have excellent LTACFIRE SOPs. They are rarely used.

1. Establish SOPs and routine training programs to improve/sustain automated fire planning performance.
2. Include all digital players. Use an operational scenario over realistic distances.
3. For more effective employment of digital fire control systems and improved target management, emphasize the following key elements:
   - fire planning
   - tactical fire direction
   - information dissemination.

   Maximize the system's effectiveness: Ensure that both operators and leaders fully understand the system's capabilities.

   Establish effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training: Use realistic and demanding operational scenarios.

   Maintain confidence to use the system by continued sustainment training.

   Incorporate the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all home station training events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.

   Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction and the dissemination of information.

TA.2 Negative Trend 3: Indirect Fires During Close Contact

4QFY95/1QFY96

PROBLEM 3-1:

1. Fear of fratricide makes infantry platoon leaders and forward observers reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contact.
   - The OPFOR is normally only 200-300 meters away.

   Most fire support teams lack a set battle drill for this situation.

   - They are not well trained in the adjustment of fires on rapidly moving mounted and dismounted forces.

   Units rarely execute decentralized "fast" fire missions, particularly during search and attack operations.

   Most units do not fire enough ammunition to achieve the desired effects on the target.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.
2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

2-3QFY96

PROBLEM 3-2: Few units use mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) allow their observers and fire support officers (FSOs) to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.
2. Company FSOs and Platoon forward observers (FOs) do not establish priority targets with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars along the unit's route.

PROBLEM 3-3: Repeat of Problem 3-1.

1. Plan for and use artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block or defeat enemy forces on contact.
2. Use priority targets for both mortars and artillery. Use quickfire channels selectively to assist the observer in obtaining fast, accurate fire missions.
3. Establish and reinforce the following techniques during all appropriate Home Station training exercises:
   - Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground on contact.
   - train observers to make one bold, accurate shift; then fire for effect.
   - Ensure that accurate target descriptions are always given and that attack guidance is fully understood.
   - Include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving as part of fire support team (FIST) training.

   Forward observers (FOs) and fire support officers (FSOs) should establish targets along the units route on templated enemy positions and likely ambush sites.

   As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target.

   - Use the minimum safe distance of the designated weapon system as the trigger to shift to the new target.

   When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.

   Reference: "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" by LTC David L. Anderson in The FA Journal, March-April 1996. Effective battle drills, one round adjustments, bold shifts, and the use of priority targets are techniques which can be established or reinforced by aggressive tactical simulator forward observer (TSFO) and force-on-force training at home station.

TA.2 Negative Trend 4: Clearance of Fires

4QFY94

PROBLEM 4-1: Timely clearance of fires (counterfire and targets of opportunity) remains one of the greatest challenges.