7.1/7.2 Arm/Fuel
* Establishment of Jump FARPS [Aviation]: Unit proficiency in establishing jump FARPS has declined during recent rotations.
PROBLEMS:
l. Unit concerns about losing assets to the OPFOR result in units being tentative about establishing jump FARPS.
2.
The OPFOR will target the main FARP and, when successful, destroy a major portion
of the aviation task force's refuel capability.
Techniques:
1. Cache fuel assets throughout the assembly area to reduce the likelihood of all assets being destroyed.
2.
Establish silent
and/or
jump FARPs prior
to
offensive or defensive operations.
7.4.4
Provide Health Services
*
Combat Health Support (CHS) [Combat Service Support]:
PROBLEMS:
1. During this period units have inadequately executed the three tenets of CHS: treatment, evacuation and command, control and communications.
2.
Client units do not integrate CHS plans with tactical plans.
Techniques:
l. CHS plans must provide the timely arrival of treatment assets, adequate evacuation and C3 for each phase of the operation.
2. Appoint one person to act as CINC MEDEVAC, either the brigade surgeon or the brigade Sl. This person ensures units conduct comprehensive CHS planning, preparation and integration.
3. Treat CHS as a combat operation requiring detailed rehearsals.
4. Include in the brigade timeline: CHS wargaming, coordination meetings and rehearsals.
5. CINC MEDEVAC must coordinate the attendance of key participants at each key event on the timeline.
6.
The brigade signal officer should be instrumental in designing the CHS communications
architecture.
7.4.4.2
Evacuate Casualties
*
Evacuation Planning [Aviation]:
PROBLEM:
The FSMT leader frequently underestimates the importance of his role in the
brigade's casualty evacuation plan. EXAMPLE: during air assault operations,
MEDEVAC routes often converge with air assault routes
without
a time of separation.
Casualty collection points are not used for evacuation and "nineline" requests
are submitted while
the air assault is
still
being executed.
Techniques:
1. Include the ELT leader in the air assault coordination and AMB.
2. Ensure the FSMT and ELT leaders attend the brigade's medical planning and rehearsal process.
3.
Ensure the FSMT leader develops a working relationship with the FSMC commander,
the brigade S1, and the brigade surgeon prior
to
deploying from the ISB.
7.5
Distribute
*
LOGPAC Operations [Combat Service Support]:
PROBLEMS:
l. Battalion S4s and support platoon leaders are not planning and conducting LOGPAC resupply as combat operations.
2. Units are not briefing the enemy situation, routes, the fire support plan and actions on contact to members of the LOGPAC convoy.
3. Basic checklists for convoy operations are not being implemented at the unit level.
4. Generally, units do not ensure that there is a communications link with the combat or field trains.
5.
The CTCP does not battle track LOGPACs.
RESULT:
supplies
are lost before they get to company level.
Procedures:
1. Develop a LOGPAC resupply SOP that includes the following: basic checklists. briefing topics, ie. enemy situation, routes, known minefield locations, fire support plan, actions on contact, etc., for convoy leaders.
2. Establish a communications link between the combat and field trains.
3.
The CTCP must track LOGPACs until mission completion, and as a minimum, debrief
the convoy leader in order to gather intelligence.
7.5.2
Supply the Force
*
Battle Tracking of Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) [Chemical]:
Chemical staffs at all levels do not effectively battle track chemical defense
equipment.
PROBLEMS:
l. Units have difficulty verifying if CDE equipment, as listed in the equipment deployment list, is loaded and deployed because they have no verification system.
2. Staffs, on arrival at the Intermediate Staging Base, have difficulty gaining "ground truth" about CDE status.
3. Many SOPs do not include CDE in their logistic reporting procedures, or as part of the NBC defense annexes.
4.
Crossleveling of equipment is almost impossible once combat operations begin.
RESULT:
numerous casualties from shortages of chemical detection, decontamination and
force protection items.
Procedures:
l. Establish a mission critical equipment list prior to deployment that is METTT based, and disseminate throughout the command.
2. Establish SOP reporting requirements for subordinate units: submit critical NBC equipment status reports prior to deployment. update reports in theater as needed.
3. Begin resupply, requisition and cross leveling actions immediately upon shortage recognition.
4.
Have chemical and logistical personnel
follow
up requisitions
to ensure actions are completed.
7.7
Provide Military Police Support
*
Military Police Tactical SOP [Combat Service Support]:
Military
Police units deploy with no tactical SOP.
PROBLEMS:
1. Command and control: command post setup; battle tracking; report formats/times.
2. Tactical employment, ie. setup of a hasty EPW collection point; checkpoint operations; basic battle drills.
3.
Basic leader tasks.
Procedures:
1. Develop an MP TACSOP addressing the problems listed above.
2. The TACSOP should provide diagrams, checklists and list the steps for specific task accomplishment.
3.
Conduct Home Station field training to validate/refine the procedures as required.
Back
to JRTC BOS LIST
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to TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS LIST
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to TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
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