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RESULT: decisions on task organization, missions, and unit tasks and purpose cannot be soundly based without staff input.

Techniques:

1. Even with limited planning time, staff estimates must be updated.

2. See ST 101-5, Section 5, Appendix C, I-5-1.

* Prepare an Engineer Estimate [Mobility/Countermobility]: Engineers do not prepare/update engineer estimates throughout the operation.

PROBLEMS:

1. During mission analysis, the company commander/TF engineers develop unconstrained resource estimates for operations.

2. Leaders do not include FASCAM and Class IV obstacle materials in their estimates for resourcing obstacle belts and groups.

Techniques:

1. References: Engineer leaders must review ARTEP 5-025-11-MTP, #05-3-0002, Prepare an Estimate, and FM 5-7-30 Engineer Estimate, Appendix A.

2. Develop planning factors for each task based on the unit's proficiency.

4.3 Determine Actions

* Time Management [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Units develop time schedules during mission analysis, but they are not always enforced.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units usually do not start their meetings or other scheduled events on time.

2. Timelines are generally focused on the decision making process and end with issuance of the operations order.

3. Critical supervisory and follow-up tasks are rarely tracked.

4. Units either lack a standard battle rhythm, or do not enforce the one in their TACSOP.

Techniques:

1. Do not stop timelines once combat begins.

2. Continuously update the timeline

3. Work the timeline in conjunction with the battle rhythm, which gives the staff an idea of how to better manage their time during continuous combat operations.

4. Use the executive officer to enforce time management systems.

* Search and Attack Mission, Concept Development [Battalion Command and Control]: Battalions are not structuring search and attack plans using the find-fix-finish concept.

PROBLEM: Units are finding the enemy, but task forces are not either task organizing, wargaming or conducting detailed coordination to guarantee the successful employment of the finish force.

RESULT: Without a finishing force, ie. Quick Reaction Force or the designated reserve, task forces are incapable of influencing search and attack operations.

Techniques:

1. Consider the following when planning to employ a finishing force:
- location
- mobility
- rehearsed priorities of employment
- frequency coordination
- link up procedures

2. Reference: FM 7-20, Chapter 3

* Wargaming [Battalion Command and Control]: Staffs are not conducting a thorough analysis of the courses of action using wargaming techniques.

Techniques:

1. Effective wargaming tests a selected COA and ensures the entire staff has a clear vision of how the COA will most likely unfold.

2. Identify critical events early to focus the staff effort.

3. Commanders must provide definitive guidance and establish priorities for planning.

4. Record the wargaming results on a wargame worksheet or synchronization matrix; this will:
- facilitate orders preparation
- serve as a rehearsal tool
- serve as a draft execution matrix

5. Wargaming must be disciplined; practice wargaming during Home Station training.

6. References:
- ST 100-9
- NTC video, Wargaming from the Brigade Staff Trainers
- CALL Newsletter 95-12 Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning

* Direct Fire Planning [Battalion Maneuver]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Units are not properly analyzing terrain.

2. Units do not adequately understand how the enemy fights.

3. Fire control and fire discipline are weak.

4. Units generally fail to synchronize the direct, indirect and obstacle plans in the defense.

RESULT: units are not positioning weapon systems to effectively engage and destroy targets.

Techniques:

1. Leaders at platoon and company/team level must conduct their own IPB, and determine where they want to kill the enemy. Understand the terrain and anticipate the enemy's most likely course of action.

2. Position weapons after you determine where you want to kill the enemy.

3. Develop and sustain the following basic skills:
- aiming stakes
- range cards
- sector sketches
- basic fire control measures, ie. TRPs, maximum engagement lines, trigger lines, fire commands.

4. Use rehearsals to test the synchronization of fires with the obstacle plan.

5. Use CALFEXs to build soldier confidence in his weapon, and to provide real-time feedback on the integration of direct and indirect fires.

* MI Company Planning [Intelligence]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Lack of detailed planning.

2. Failure to apply the 1/3-2/3 rule.

3. Weaknesses in the conduct of troop leading procedures.

4. Too many subordinate leaders do not display a clear understanding of the mission, the commander's intent.

5. Lack of subordinate leader planning time. (See 2. above)

RESULTS:

1. Decentralized, unsynchronized planning.

2. Mission failure.

Techniques:

1. Leaders at all levels must adhere to the 1/3-2/3 rule for planning.

2. Practice Troop Leading Procedures during Home Station field training exercises to gain and sustain proficiency.

3. References:
- FM 7-10
- CALL Newsletter 95-12 Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning

* BSA Security and Defense [Combat Service Support]: The FSB staff does not plan or manage security assets for the BSA.

PROBLEMS:

1. Combat power of the BSA is unknown.

2. Available combat vehicles/systems, ie. mobility killed tanks, Bradleys, TOWs, etc, are not used.

3. Generally not to standard:
- fire support
- Quick Reaction Force
- OP/LPs
- survivability and fighting positions
- anti-armor defenses

Techniques: in sequence

1. Defensive preparation begins with the arrival at the new site.

2. FSBs, along with tenant units, conduct security sweeps.

3. Establish hasty security to receive the main body.

4. Begin establishment of the BSA commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work.

5. Continue to improve the defense based on METT-T.

6. All units and soldiers in the BSA must be familiar with the FSB TACSOP in order to respond correctly to significant events.

7. Overall:
- make maximum use of all available weapon systems, ie. the mobility kill vehicles, to augment up the firepower of the normal BSA tenants.
- rehearse the plan with the tenant units and soldiers to ensure the TACSOP is synchronized within the BSA.

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

* COLT Employment [Fire Support]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units fail to properly plan COLT employment.

2. Little consideration is given to the COLT as an observer or target designation asset for Copperhead, OH 58Ds, Close Air Support, or Naval Gunfire.

3. COLTs are often handed off to subordinate units at the last minute with little planning or coordination time for either the COLT or the unit.

Techniques:

1. COLT employment requires early consideration in the planning process. The COLT mission has expanded beyond maximizing the use of Laser Guided Munitions to encompass target acquisition (detect) assets.

2. Use COLTs to:
- weight the main effort
- overwatch obstacles
- adjust fires on a critical target, such as an ADAM/RAAM minefield

3. Include COLTs in rehearsals, including COLT communication, fire and extraction plans.

4. Train COLTs to use stealth to survive.

5. Reference: FM 6-20-50, Appendix J for COLT employment.

4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action

* Use Intelligence to Drive Operations [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Successful units integrate IPB into each phase of the decision making process.

PROBLEM: many units, especially during search and attack operations, develop courses of action that are not supported by a thorough IPB.

* Focusing Combat Power [Brigade Maneuver/C2]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Lack of complete course of action concept sketches/statements.

2. Poor staff estimate input.

3. Difficulty determining decisive points crucial to focusing combat power.

4. Subordinate unit efforts not integrated or coordinated.

5. Lack of a clear task organization.

RESULT: Failure to develop a focused course of action.

Techniques:

1. Establish a clear, METT-T based task organization.

2. Define decisive points.

3. Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-12 Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning.

* Ineffective Task Organization [Air Defense]: Air defense asset task organization often developed and executed without proper analysis.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units task organize in a vacuum, ie. seldom considering:
- IPB
- air defense priorities
- the supported unit's scheme of maneuver

2. In operations with more than one phase, little thought is given to potential task organization changes from phase to phase.

Technique: Task organize air defense assets based on IPB, the supported commander's air defense priorities and the scheme of maneuver. Refer to FM 44-100, U.S. Army Air Defense Operations, Chapters 4-6, and Appendix B.

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