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TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS


Positive Performance

4.1.1 Communicate Information

* Use of Mobile Subscriber Radio Terminals (MSRTs) [C2Signal]: Units rely heavily on MSRTs for commanders and staff to coordinate and synchronize task force operations.

Technique: some units use MSE telephones with speakers attached (MSRTs and DNVTs) to conduct conference calls for command and staff updates, and to supplement the commander's battlefield circulation.

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

* Commander's Planning Guidance [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Commanders generally issue clear and concise guidance that assists the staff in developing courses of action during the tactical decision making process.

* Commander's Fire Support Guidance [Fire Support]: The enhanced relationship between commanders and fire support officers has significantly improved the Commander's Fire Support Guidance. RESULT: more efficient and coordinated use of all fire support assets.

Technique: most commanders use the format of FM 671, ie. Purpose, Priority, Allocation, Restrictions format, when writing their fire support guidance.

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

* Use of Briefbacks [Battalion Command and Control]: Units continue to conduct briefbacks. By using the initial briefback format, ie. confirmation brief and then final briefbacks, ie. concept briefs, commanders are ensuring clear focus on their concept of operations.

4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support

* Drop Zone Terrain Management [Combat Service Support]: Brigade and support battalion staffs that compare operations and logistics overlays to deconflict terrain in the planning phase are less reactive and more successful during the execution phase of operations.

4.4.3 Provide Command Presence

* Battlefield Circulation [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Commanders, accompanied by select staff officers, are increasing the frequency of battlefield circulation.

Techniques:

l. Daily visits to units throughout the brigade area of operations significantly increases command group situational awareness, and allows for personal interaction between brigade commanders and their subordinates.

2. Movement through the brigade sector gives the command group a better feeling of how operations are progressing on the ground.

3. Command Sergeants Major that accompany their brigade commanders add significantly to the command groups' presence in front of soldiers.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Coordination Between Brigade Signal Officers and MSE Company Commanders [C2 Signal]: The coordination between the brigade and the MSE company supporting the brigade has been outstanding. Units have made great improvements integrating the normal divisional MSE assets into the brigade slice elements. Habitual relationships, ie. SEN team chiefs, FES platoon leaders, and MSE company commanders, have greatly enhanced the success of the signal units as well as the supported units.

Needs Emphasis

4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status

* Information Management [Brigade Maneuver/C2]: Staffs do not always track Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR), or critical events that impact on the brigade commander's "read" of the battlefield.

PROBLEMS:

1. Poor battle tracking.

2. Lack of use of Requests for Information (RFIs), particularly in combat support and combat service support.

3. Unit locations are routinely different between the Battle Captain's map board, the grids posted on tracking charts, and the actual unit locations.

4. Staff sections fail to notify the rest of the staff when a critical event has happened in their area.

RESULT: Information is either lost or not tracked.

Techniques:

1. Ensure all information received from subordinate and higher units is analyzed to determine what information may be missing.

2. Track RFIs to completion.

3. Develop a tracking system for incoming message traffic.

4. Track CCIR, combat power, planning guidance, and other significant activities.

5. Try to maintain a set battle rhythm.

6. Conduct staff updates and huddles.

7. Conduct commanders' conference calls with staff in attendance.

8. Standardize staff journals.

9. Enforce existing tactical standard operating procedures.

* Liaison Officer Employment and Resourcing [Aviation]: Brigade staffs, as well as aviation task forces, continue to use LNOs as information conduits only, rather than working members of the brigade staff.

PROBLEMS:

1. LNOs are often left out of critical staff processes, such as course of action development and wargaming.

2. Integration with the other battlefield operating systems remains weak, largely because of not correctly using LNOs.

Techniques:

1. Provide the brigade with experienced LNOs capable of 24 hour continuous coverage.

2. Involve the aviation task force commander, or S3 during key brigade planning processes, ie. COA development, wargaming, targeting, etc.

* Battle Tracking [Mobility/Survivability]: Engineers do not effectively integrate themselves into the information flow for route and obstacle status, breaching capability, and combat power.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units report information as raw data, but never follow through with hard copies, specifically of minefield records.

2. Units accept the minimum information received in SALUTE format, and track this as raw data.

Techniques:

1. After receiving initial information, follow through and request specific details to assist in the subsequent allocation of forces, assets, and in overall information dissemination.

2. Improve staff coordination with the S2 for OBSINTEL, IPB, and R&S planning for engineer squads.

3. References:
- FM 7-20, Section V for guidance on the use and integration of engineers.
- FM 90-7, Appendix B as a guide for reporting and recording obstacle information.

* Combat Trains as an Alternate Command Post [Combat Service Support]: Battalion S1s and S4s continue to have difficulties developing the combat trains into an alternate command post.

PROBLEMS:

1. S1 and S4 officers generally lack training in the basic functions a command post should be able to accomplish.

2. The combat trains command post (CTCP) generally does not have:
- current graphics
- updated status boards
- any established means of battle tracking

3. Most units do not have an SOP covering the CTCP's assumption of battle control.

RESULT: CTCP's are limited in their ability to smoothly and successfully take and maintain control of the battle.

Techniques:

1. Establish or refine the TACSOP to specify functions the CTCP will accomplish should it assume control of the battle.

2. Include, as a minimum:
- all necessary graphics
- status charts
- other battle tracking means

3. Conduct collective training at Home Station to validate and/or refine the CTCP TACSOP.

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