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TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS


Positive Performance

2.3 Integrate Fire Support

* Commander/FSO Integration [Fire Support]: The habitual relationship between commanders and fire support officers is working well. Brigade through company commanders understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of determining when fires are critical, where fires must be placed and understanding the restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.

* Fire Support for the Rear Area [Fire Support]:

STRENGTHS: 1.Typically units arrive with a dedicated rear FSO and a 24hour workstation in the FSB TOC.

2. Limited, but effective, fires now occur in the brigade rear area.

Techniques:

1. Adequately resource the rear FSE with personnel, ie. COLT or FOs, and equipment.

2. Make use of nonlethal munitions, such as smoke or illumination.

3. Integrate early into the planning cycle and CSS rehearsals.

4. Practice this integration during Home Station Training.

Needs Emphasis

2.1 Process Ground Targets

* Targeting Process [Fire Support]:

PROBLEMS:

1. The brigade targeting process often lacks focus and fails to orient collection efforts and supporting fires.

2. Intelligence, operations and fire support personnel do not focus on all elements (decide, detect, deliver and assess) of the targeting process.

3. Targeting meetings routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix and finish critical high payoff targets (HPT).

4. Most units do not use the results of targeting meetings to refocus their collection plans, or to task specific units to confirm/deny Named Areas of Interest, or to task and synchronize delivery and assess assets.

5. Too often personnel arrive at targeting meetings unprepared and no one is sure what the outcome should be.

Techniques:

1. Read and review FM 62010, The Targeting Process, with emphasis on Chapters 2 and 5.

2. Ensure that the necessary personnel attend targeting meetings, and come prepared.

3. At the targeting meeting: the S2 should present a current analysis of the enemy situation, the current High Value Targets, and a recommended list of HPTs. the S3 should present the current friendly situation and describe future operations. the brigade FSO should facilitate the meeting. He should present, and enforce, the agenda; he should provide a list of available resources (for detection, delivery and assessment); he should present a target synchronization matrix. at the conclusion, the S3 should cut a FRAGO.

4. The FSO/targeting officer should work closely with the S2 to develop HPTs, and should continually coordinate with all brigade elements to obtain the most accurate data for proposed targets.

* LTACFIRE Operations [Fire Support]:

PROBLEM: Units rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/IFSAS system to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and to conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. Fire plans are not disseminated and/or fired.

2. Inefficient resource use.

3. Failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.

4. Failure to follow LTACFIRE SOPs, which are generally excellent.

Techniques: do the following to more effectively employ digital fire control systems for improved target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and information dissemination.

l. To exploit the system, both operators and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of the system.

2. Conduct effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic, demanding operational scenarios to instill and reinforce confidence in employing the system.

3. Use LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training to ensure this becomes the primary means of fire control and fire planning.

2.2 Engage Ground Targets

* Indirect Fires During Small Unit Contact [Fire Support]:

PROBLEMS:

l. Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contact because of a fear of fratricide. NOTE: the OPFOR is normally only 200-300 meters away.

2. Most fire support teams do not have a set battle drill for this situation, and are not well trained in the adjustment of fires on rapidly moving mounted and dismounted forces.

3. Decentralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during search and attack operations.

4. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition to achieve the desired effects on the target.

Techniques:

l. Plan for and use artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block or defeat enemy forces on contact.

2. Use priority targets for both mortars and artillery, and the select use of quickfire channels to assist the observer in obtaining fast, accurate fire missions.

3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground on contact. Once the round is on the ground, train observers to make one bold, accurate shift, and then fire for effect.

4. Ensure that accurate target descriptions are always given and that attack guidance is fully understood.

5. FIST training should include engaging closein targets with fire support, while the observer is moving.

6. Establish and reinforce these techniques during all appropriate Home Station training exercises.

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