Military

1. The battalion XO does not consistently check or focus staff effort.
2. Key battle staff members do not have defined roles in mission preparation and execution.
3. Staffs do not follow up or supervise the resolution of issues and problems discovered by the battalion commander.
4. Staffs rarely keep pace with the battalion commander throughout all operations.

1. Lack of quality control of staff products and timeliness.
2. Critical tasks not being performed and routinely checked.

* Rest plan management: Rest periods are not planned into the time schedule. Extremely long planning processes and frequent changes to plans also keep leaders from resting. Efforts are made to organize TOCs into shifts, but rarely do these efforts include key leaders. Key leaders tend to "go down" at the same time, leaving no senior leadership in the TOC for extended period of time.

Procedure: The battalion XO and TOC NCOIC must develop and enforce the rest plan, shift changes and maintenance of the staff. Update TACSOPs to include this plan. Train and execute the rest plan during all field exercises.

* Troop leading procedures: Heavy team troop leading procedures continue to lack the level of detail and quality required to execute assigned missions.

1. Typically leaders move from Step I, Receive the mission to Step 7, Issue and operations order without any structured planning or thought.
2. The most notable problem is the lack of detailed planning during Step 3, Make a tentative plan. The general weakness is the inability to identify critical events and put them into a workable and understandable timeline.
3. The problems with the "estimate of the situation" become apparent during the OPORD, which tend to be issued in Execution Matrix format. This does not provide subordinates the level of detail needed for platoons to conduct their own troop leading procedures.
4. Information about the enemy lacks detail and does not get disseminated to the appropriate levels.
5. Rehearsals are either not conducted or are not done to standard.

Technique: Refer to ST 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes as an excellent guide for training and executing the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP). Additionally, CALL Newsletter 93-3, The Battalion and Brigade Staffs an excellent pocket sized guide to techniques in applying TDMP under varying time conditions.

* Pre-combat inspections: Air defense leaders are not conducting effective pre-combat inspections.

1. Unit SOPs do not include dismounted Stinger checklists.
2. Inspections, if done, are not function oriented.
3. Leaders do not check to ensure critical equipment, such as Stingers, man-pack SINCGARS and night vision goggles are operational with the required number of batteries, etc. on hand.
4. The air defense battery rarely establishes standards for platoons, resulting in teams within platoons, performing the same mission, being equipped differently.

Procedure: Standardize equipment and equipment checklists to ensure teams deploy to support with similar and necessary equipment.

4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders

* Troop Leading Procedures, MI company team: Troop leading procedures are not followed by the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) team at all levels.

1. Team leaders often do not receive specific guidance from their platoon leaders/section OICs.
2. Team leaders do not conduct detailed mission planning.
3. Individuals deploy with minimal guidance, ie. no purpose or intent from their leaders.
4. Leaders do not follow the standard five paragraph OPORD format.
5. OPORDS are not issued in a timely manner leaving inadequate amounts of planning time for subordinate elements.
6. Platoon leaders do not conduct rehearsals, nor do they require team leaders to rehearse.

* Planning for and employing the task force reserve: Commanders and staffs do not thoroughly wargame the reserve fight.

1. The commander does not assign planning priorities.
2. The commander does not protect the reserve from being piecemealed to "911" missions.
3. Staffs fail to conduct serious analysis of time/space requirements and the trigger points for reserve commitment.
4. A separate element to handle QRF/TCF missions is often not designated.

Techniques:

1. Thoroughly wargame all aspects of the reserve fight.
2. Identify trigger points and decision points for the commitment of the reserve.
3. When the intent is for the reserve to be a "defeat mechanism," protect the reserve from commitment except to complete the enemy's destruction.
4. If a QRF/TCF mission exists, other elements other than the reserve in the task force must be given that mission.

* Staff officer organization: Units generally have good C2 SOPs which include the tools required to plan and execute operations. Individual staff officers do not have the discipline to use these tools.

1. Staff members are not well organized to perform their specific function.
2. Staff members fail to ensure functional integration with other staff members.

Techniques:

1. All staff personnel must develop and use battle books.
2. Staff members must have BOS checklists, tracking charts and easy reference planning charts to assist in streamlining the decision making process and updating the commander.
3. Weather-proof the battle books, and make them small enough to be deployable with the TOC as well as the TAC.
4. Have the battalion XO review and approve each staff officer battle book to ensure completeness, conformity and unity of effort. Put the standard for the battlebooks in the TACSOP.
5. Ensure cross-talk occurs between staff sections.

4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders

* Fire support rehearsals: Fire support rehearsals are not being conducted for all operations.

1. Most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of planned targets.
2. Units do not routinely discuss the purpose of targets, planned fires in relation to the scheme of maneuver, trigger points, primary and backup observers, communications nets, weapon systems, and volume of munitions to be delivered..
3. Unit rehearsal SOPs are poorly written, and rehearsal techniques in FM 6-20-1 are not being used.
4. Key players, such as battalion fire direction officers, COLT leaders, firing battery commanders, air liaison officers, etc. are often absent from rehearsals.

Procedure: Develop at Home Station a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of the rehearsal. Use FM 6-20-1, p. 3-12 for an excellent overview of the key rehearsal elements.

4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support

* Sustainment operations planning: Heavy teams either do not have or do not effectively use their written logistical SOP.

1. Typically the heavy team does not deploy with a working logistical tracking, reporting or requesting system.
2. The link from the heavy team to the brigade ALOC lacks the appropriate prior coordination and planning to be effective.

Techniques:

1. Because of the austere nature of a light infantry brigade task force, and the unique requirements of the heavy team, it is critical for the heavy team CSSpersonnel to be totally integrated into the brigade ALOCplanning process to ensure continuous and responsive support forward.
2. Prior coordination between the heavy team and the brigade will ensure the appropriate plans are established for tracking, reporting and requesting the support necessary for the heavy force;additionally, this will help maintain continuous communications with CSS LNOs.

4.4.2 Issue Orders

* OPORD/FRAGO development: Battalion/task force level

1. Unclear task organization
2. Operations overlays with incomplete or imprecise graphic control measures
3. Concept of operations lacking clearly definable tasks and purposes
4. No CSS overlay
5. No casualty evacuation plan
6. Unclear tasks to combat, combat support and CSS units
7. Missing fire support matrix, target list, and concept for fire support

Techniques:

1. Use the five paragraph field order format.
2. Check all orders for accuracy, synchronization and conformity prior to publication and briefing.
3. Place all taskings to subordinate elements in the base OPORD.
4. Adhere to TACSOP when conducting OPORD briefs to ensure all information is presented.
5. Use available tools, such as terrain boards and maps with operations overlay, to brief the OPORD.

4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline

* Soldier discipline: TOC soldiers do not routinely perform their duties without having to be told to do so or continuously supervised. TOC soldiers do not maintain focus on their respective functional areas even while units execute missions.

4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations

* Staff synchronization: Battalion XOs and S3s do not fully synchronize the staff in planning, preparation and execution of missions.

1. Staff do not attempt to synchronize the engineer effort with maneuver and CSS by developing a timeline, matrix or execution checklist.
   RESULTS:
   1. companies do not receive adequate supplies.
   2. unnecessary casualties and engineer equipment remaining idle over long periods of time because of no security and a lack of link up instructions.

   Poor tracking of actual defensive preparation status.

   Too often the TF engineer does not provide the TOC an obstacle plan, obstacle overlay or survivability matrix.

   Operations overlays, including fire support and obstacle, are not used to check the synchronization of combat power.

* Command and control, heavy elements: Heavy teams are having difficulty commanding and controlling subordinate elements on a decentralized battlefield. Heavy teams often perform Quick Reaction Force (QRF) missions for the light brigade task force, and the heavy team CP must develop the ability to communicate with all elements on the battlefield while fighting the battle. Additionally they must be able to maintain a current situation map and plan/wargame for future battles.

Table of Contents
Section II: TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narratives, Part 2
Section II: TA.5 Intelligence BOS Narratives