Military

1. Rarely do battle captains have a working knowledge of all the BOS and "slice" elements employed in the TOC.
2. Most battle captains receive and pass information without analyzing the information in relation to CCIR.
3. Most NCOs remain underemployed in the TOC. They are often relegated to RTO duty, and their experience is not utilized in analyzing and processing information.
4. Most battle captains do not know what their responsibilities are.

Techniques:

1. Try an assign a battle captain who has completed his command.
2. SOPs should outline the battle captain's duties and responsibilities.
3. Conduct exercises to drill the analysis process the battle captain should use as he receives information.
4. Train the battle captain to conduct staff battle drills.
5. Have TOC NCOs supervise RTOs.
6. Integrate TOC NCOs into TOC operations, and clearly distinguish their duties in conjunction with the battle captain.
7. The XO/S3 should provide guidance to the battle captains covering their duties and responsibilities.

* Pre-operational checks and COMEXs: In most cases, staff sections and subordinate command pre-combat checks consist of reviewing packing lists or a cursory inspection of major components, and not a full range of operational and function checks of user owned and operated communications equipment.

Procedures:

1. Review and revise TSOP as necessary to include those pre-operational and pre-combat checks and services necessary for user/operators to accomplish prior to mission execution.
2. Pre-combat checks include: inventories; function checks; SOP review.
3. COMEXs include: critical net stations entering required nets under the control of associated NCS with specified tasks or objectives.

Technique: Review timelined events with the brigade staff to synchronize signal operations and identify critical events prior to the conduct of all phases of an operation.

* User/owner operator skills: Generally commanders and staff personnel lack basic user/operator skills necessary to operate their own organic communications equipment. Normally signal personnel install, operate, and maintain SINCGARS combat net radios (CNR), Single Channel TACSAT radios, and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) such as MSRTs, DNVTs, and facsimile devices.

Techniques:

1. Home Station user/operator communication equipment training programs will improve and sustain skills.
2. Use brigade TOC battle drills to improve, streamline, and sustain the collective task of C3 integration into the information management process.

4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information

* Time Management: Units initially establish time standards for planning, preparation and execution of combat operations, but during the decision-making process, complete timelines are never developed and refined.

Techniques:

1. During the initial mission analysis, the Bn XO must establish and then enforce a battalion timeline.
2. Use the reverse planning sequence in developing the timeline.
3. Inform leaders at all levels of the time schedule.
4. Adjust the time schedule as required, but ensure the essential tasks are completed IAW the time schedule.

Procedure: Incorporate a format for time schedule development in the battalion TACSOP.

* Shift change-over briefing:

1. Daily shift change briefings are not regularly conducted.
2. When they are conducted, they are frequently interrupted, difficult to focus on because of distractors in the TOC.
3. Shift change briefings do not follow established formats.
4. Key personnel are either not present to brief, or do not use their own aids (maps, overlays) to facilitate effective communications.
5. Shift change briefs too often are "one-on-one" sessions between the two battle captains.

Techniques:

1. Enforce briefing formats and aids used for shift change briefs.
2. Require BOS OICs or their representatives to attend.
3. Reduce distractors during the brief.

4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status

* Battle tracking: Battalion TOCs have great difficulty in battle tracking current and future operations.

1. TOC personnel do not adhere to their TACSOPs.
2. Most TOCs track unit locations down to company centers of mass.
3. Battle captains rarely know the locations and activities of non-organic units and adjacent units.
4. Battalion XOs and S3s do not enforce the use of standardized overlays, information flow, and effective staff cross-talk.
5. Most BOS sections rarely track and post their respective unit locations.
6. TOC personnel fail to routinely check all map boards to ensure what is being tracked is consistent throughout the TOC.
7. Staff do not track the countermobility/survivability effort and the Class IV delivery plan during defensive operations.
8. Units do attempt to track minefield locations, but do not adequately disseminate the information.
9. Battalion combat trains CPs seldom do any battle tracking.

Procedures:

1. TOC must record the location of all units down to platoon level, as well as specialty elements such as Stinger teams, GSR teams, etc..
2. The TOC must track obstacles, and disseminate the information.
3. The operations map is a focal point for the entire staff; all staff sections should be able to update their information from it.

Techniques:

1. Train TOC personnel to recognize key information and then immediately pass it to appropriate leaders.
2. The battalion XO and S3 must enforce TOC standards and ensure personnel perform their duties and responsibilities accordingly.
3. Review ARTEP 7-20, Operate a Command Post, and FM 7-20, Appendix B.
4. Read CALL Newsletter 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), May 95.

4.3 Determine Actions

* Wargaming: Wargaming is not universally understood and conducted by staffs to the degree and level necessary to ensure success.

1. Wargaming is not done to the detail required to adequately support collection planning and targeting.
2. In some cases no wargaming is conducted at all.
3. S2s do not routinely produce event templates to facilitate the action-reaction- counteraction process of wargaming to occur.

* Decision making process: While battle staffs are familiar with the process, its intent and the products associated with each step, most staffs experience difficulty implementing the process.

1. There is no clear focus for COA development, and COA decision making.
2. This leads to subsequent problems in OPORD development and issuance.
3. Too often the S3 and the commander, with little help from the rest of the staff, develop one course of action and expect the staff to support it.
4. Rarely do staffs conduct a thorough analysis and wargaming of courses of action.
5. Steps in the decision making process tend to get side-tracked easily.
6. Key personnel participation is intermittent as they get called away to work other issues.

Techniques:

1. Review FM 7-20, Chapter 2, Section II, the Command and Control Process; use ST 101-5 as an additional reference.
2. All staff personnel must be familiar with the process, understand the products they must produce and participate fully in the process.
3. The battalion XO is the staff coordinator responsible for the execution of this process.
4. Develop a Battle Staff training program, and reinforce the Tactical Decision Making Process through realistic training

Procedures:

1. Ensure the TACSOP outlines procedures for both the deliberate and hasty planning process.
2. Put useful extracts from key references into staff battle books.

* Signal operations/communications planning: Communications staff estimates, course of action development and comparison, the synchronization process, priority of communications effort, net matrices, overlays and system diagrams are not well developed.

Technique: The brigade signal officer should use FM 24-16, Communications-Electronics Operations, Orders, Records and Reports as the basis for developing planning tools.

4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance

* Air defense planning: Air defense battery commanders are not conducting effective mission analysis during the brigade planning process.

1. Commanders do not identify all specified and implied tasks.
2. Degraded ability to allocate forces in the brigade task organization and identify subordinate units tasks.
3. This often causes force allocations to not reflect critical tasks or the brigade commander's priorities.
4. Additionally, air defense commanders do not identify subordinates to command and control fire units, detached from platoons, providing general support air defense for brigade elements.

Techniques:

1. The air defense battery commander must develop his plan concurrently with the brigade plan.
2. Us FM 44-100, Appendix B, as a reference for the air defense estimate process.
3. Teams providing air defense for brigade rear area elements must know the chain of command and reporting channels for the elements they support.

Table of Contents
Section II: TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narratives, Part 1
Section II: TA.4, Part 3