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Needs emphasis

5.1 Collect Information

* Command and control of the R& effort. [Intelligence]

1. Lack of emphasis given to the operational requirements of conducting a successful R& effort.
2. R& plans typically lack the detaail to address command relationships, routes to NAIs, and comunication architecture.

1. Brigade R& efforts often fail to provide intelligence which supports command decisions during the battle.
2. S-2s hindered in their ability to monitor and redirect assets as necessary.
3. Often, mission failure.

Procedures: Develop R& SOPs prior to deployment addressing at least the following:

1. R& communications architecture.

2. Command relationships of R& assets, particularly when brigade and battalion assets may be operating in the same area.

3. Radio checks, ie. when, who, how, etc. and contingency plan for immediate action drill when communication is lost.

4. Chain of command and the procedure to refocus/redirect R& assets.

* Task force redundancy of coverage of key Named Areas of Interest (NAI). [Intelligence]:

PROBLEM: S-2s continue to develop R&S plans and templates which lack redundant coverage of key NAIs.

RESULT: The one assigned NAI observer either is killed, or his observation obscured and the NAI remains uncovered.

Technique: Plan for and rehearse redundant coverage of key NAIs.

* Use of HUMINT assets. [Intelligence]:

PROBLEM: Task force S-2s generally do not have the time and/or the expertise to successfully use the HUMINT assets routinely attached to the task force.

Procedure: Control HUMINT assets at brigade level.

* Brigade S-2s use of all intel assets and agencies to conduct sufficient IPB and R&S planning to support STABOPS. [Intelligence]: Intelligence responsibilities are greatly expanded during STABOPS.

EXAMPLE: In a situation requiring separation of belligerent factions, and control of a zone of separation (ZOS), the S-2 must conduct terrain analysis. This must incorporate not only on the traditional military factors, ie. OCOKA, but also account for the local populace and threats within the area of responsibility (AOR), such as paramilitary organizations and terrorists.


1. Use available doctrinal templates for conventional belligerent forces.

2. Develop threat models, incident overlays, and event templates based on an analysis of paramilitary/terrorist activity.

3. Constantly update and refine R&S plans based on changing missions and conditions within the AOR. 4. Task intelligence assets, such as OPs and patrols, to monitor separated belligerent forces and movement within the ZOS.

5. Use assets such as civil affairs and/or PSYOPs to collect information on the local populace and potential threat groups.

6. File, collate, and analyze the collected information to discern patterns and to develop new threat models.

7. Task the direct support field artillery battalion S-2 to conduct pattern analysis of artillery and mortar attacks; consider locating the DS FA battalion S-2 in the brigade combat team (BCT) TOC.

8. Require the combat intelligence (CI) operational control element to outbrief and debrief soldiers who routinely travel through the area.

9. Create an all-source BCT analytical cell using S-2 analysts, soldiers from the MI company platoon operations center and personnel from the operational control element.

10. Use WARLORD and TERRABASE systems whenever possible to assist in terrain and threat analysis.

11. Use subject matter experts to help develop R&S plans. EXAMPLE: use a sniper to determine the best locations for shots when establishing NAIs designed to check for snipers.

5.1.1 Collect Information on Situation

* Unit conduct of R&S. [Maneuver]:

PROBLEM: Units do not conduct tailing patrols of factional dismounted patrols and suspicious vehicles and convoys.

Technique: Use tailing patrols. Follow the suspect element at a specified distance for a specified distance, based on risk analysis and METT-T. The tailing patrol reports the activity of the suspect element. Tailing patrols can either be mounted or dismounted based on the situation.

5.2 Process Information

* Maintenance of incident overlays and the conduct of pattern analysis. [Intelligence]:

PROBLEM: While S-2s generally have a system for plotting incident overlays, a subsequent problem exists in collating and analyzing the collected information to determine increasing threats or in developing threat models.

Techniques: For conducting pattern analysis

1. Maintain an incident overlay for a 24 hour period with 3 overlays (72 hours of events) on the map at once. This overall incident overlay will assist the S-2 in identifying immediate operational patterns.

2. Transfer the overall incident overlay data onto long term event overlays, ie. one overlay for sniper attacks, one for road blocks, one for mortar attacks, etc. These overlays will assist the S-2 in identifying event patterns.

3. Maintain for future reference information relevant to each event, such as debriefs of participants, etc.

4. A simple computer database program can be used to more quickly determine patterns.

EXAMPLE: Enter information on a series of variables (fields), and then use the computer to determine correlations between events and correlations within types of events.

5.3 Prepare Intelligence Reports

* Task force S-2s situational templates. [Intelligence]:

PROBLEM: TF S-2s develop one situational template for the entire operation.

RESULT: During the counter-reconnaissance phase, the enemy reconnaissance picture, the intent of NAIs, the destruction of enemy reconnaissance and the execution of the plan is different than it is for the main defense. The lack of a counter-recon situational template often hinders the ability to successfully execute counter-reconnaissance. This further results in a greater likelihood of the main defense failing.

Technique: S-2s should fully develop the situational template for the counter-reconnaissance fight, as well as for the main defense.

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