Military

2. Consider using separate ROE cards for leaders and soldiers. Soldier cards would explain the right of self defense and immediate action, ie. RAMP above, and the leader card would address graduated force responses.

3. Use vignettes and/or scenarios to train ROE.

4. Double check slice elements; do not assume they receive ROE training at Home Station.

5. Continue ROE training throughout the deployment.

6. Integrate lessons learned into ROE training scenarios.

7. Emphasize that soldiers always have the right of self defense, regardless of the mission.

4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information

* Brigade Combat Team communications support in the Area of Responsibility. [Command and Control]:

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) deployed realistic distances from subordinate units did not have sufficient communications within the Area of Responsibility (AOR). EXAMPLE: A BCT Main CP had to issue a FRAGO over HF, AM, MSE, FM Brigade O/I, and FM command nets in order to reach all battalions.

2. Even using FM retrans, all required stations are not always on the net.

3. Radio operators throughout the BCT often did not hear or transcribe messages correctly, forcing messages to be resent. Or, the operators forwarded bad or incomplete information.

4. Too often operators and their leaders are content to accept "A negative contact" rather than find alternative means to get a message through.

5. Often MSE signal nodes are not integrated into the BCT structure.

6. There is often conflict between signal brigade leaders and BCT leaders about requirements to position, secure and move signal nodes which form the backbone of the MSE network.

7. Often signal soldiers at the node centers appeared untrained to perform any security tasks beyond walking "A security" patrols within 20 meters of their signal shelters.

Techniques:

1. Before deployment, conduct signal profile studies of the AOR to determine proposed signal sites. Ensure the sites can be secured.

2. Review the force package and employment plan for emplacement and securing node sites and other critical non-combat power assets.

3. Train remote site operators in self defense and local security.

4. Ensure that units are in all required communications nets and that all nets are operational.

5. Aggressively pursue efforts to track and fix communications outages and/or to get required stations on the net.

6. Work to get communications systems mechanically and electronically functioning at the best possible level. Emphasize antenna systems and cabling.

7. Tune all RTs for greatest possible power and frequency accuracy, as specified in applicable TMs.

8. Train operators to work through problems. Conduct commo immediate action drills in case of commo loss with any station.

9. Train operators to use the SALUTE report format. This will help them take messages accurately, and thus prevent having to resend messages.

4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status

* Company level battletracking. [Combat Service Support]: this trend pertains to Combat Health Support

PROBLEM: poor battletracking hinders the timely and effective movement of Combat Health Support assets for brigade operations.

Technique: Use Home Station training opportunities to practice the how to of battletracking, ie. Situational Awareness. EXAMPLE: what battlefield events should trigger the displacement of medical assets to support brigade maneuver?

* Task force tracking of convoys and their movement. [Maneuver]:

PROBLEMS:
1. Task force TOCs do not properly track convoys and direct actions while conducting convoy escort missions.
2. Task force TOCs do not send timely, periodic convoy updates to higher headquarters.

Techniques:
1. Identify and track convoys by vehicle type, number, cargo and personnel.
2. Convoy escorts should have sufficient force to repel an attack en route.
3. Convoy escorts should also include maintenance and recovery vehicles, as well as medical assets.

* Information flow to the lowest elements. [Command and Control]:

PROBLEM: STABOPS are vulnerable to the possibility that an incident resulting from a low level, small unit action can erupt onto the world stage with strategic national consequences.

Techniques: To help preclude an avoidable incident
1. Disseminate maps, graphics, ROE, and Peace Accord provisions to the lowest possible level.
2. Keep soldiers informed of the current situation.
3. Rehearse all anticipated actions.
4. Keep accurate, current battle rosters, including assigned, attached, OPCON personnel.
5. Stress accurate, realtime reporting of all incidents up the chain of command.
6. SOPs should be understood and adhered to by all personnel.
7. Soldiers must be kept in correct, clean and serviceable uniforms, particularly when in the public eye.

* System for S-2 sending/receiving reports from collection assets within the Area of Responsibility. [Intelligence]:

PROBLEMS:

1. S-2s often fail to take advantage of additional collection assets operating within the AOR, such as combat intelligence (CI), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOPS), military police, chaplains, medical personnel, etc. These other personnel are unaware of intelligence requirements, while the S-2 remains unaware of the specific activities of these other elements. RESULT: Loss of valuable overtly gathered economic, social, political, infrastructure and military intelligence.

2. Too many S-2s fail to exploit the information gathered from check points, observation posts and patrols. The BCT S-2 rarely passes focused intelligence requirements to the soldiers performing these tasks. The information that is routinely collected is rarely forwarded back up the chain of command to the S-2.

Techniques: Designed to make information requirements known to all potential collectors.

1. Conduct daily meetings, chaired by the XO, with the S-2, CI chief, CA OIC, PSYOP OIC, MP company commander, and the S-5 (not necessarily an inclusive list) to determine intelligence acquisition tasks for teams and units moving through the AOR. Meeting result: a FRAGO for the collectors and a synchronization matrix for the S-2.

2. Develop Smart Cards with lists of standing intelligence requirements for CPs, OPs, patrols, convoys, etc. Update the cards based on changes in the mission and/or the AOR.

3. Establish a Debriefing SOP for soldiers manning checkpoints and observation posts. Forward routine reports from CPs and OPs through the battalions to the BCT S-2.

4. Pre-brief and then debrief patrols for every mission. Forward patrol reports through the battalions to the BCT S-2.

5. Develop a standardized, fill in the blank reporting form for distribution.

6. Intelligence personnel should routinely visit CPS and OPs to update soldiers about the current situation, provide updated intelligence requirements and to receive information and impressions.

7. Require intelligence briefings as part of the check out/in procedures for personnel traveling within the AOR. EXAMPLE: The S-2 section updates the threat situation along the route and passes on intelligence requirements. Upon return to the TOC, the individual(s) would be debriefed to get pertinent observations.

4.1.3.3 Publish and Reproduce Information

* Language phrase card dissemination. [Intelligence]:

PROBLEM: Either language phrase cards are not available, and/or are not distributed down the lowest level needed.

Technique: The basics that should be included on language phrase cards
1. Write the phrases in English with native language translations.
2. Spell out native phrases phonetically so soldiers can pronounce them.
3. Front of the card: simple greetings and action words, ie. Hello, stop, yes, no, etc.
4. Back of the card: basic questions pertinent to the AOR, ie. Are there mines in the area?
5. Card intent: to allow soldiers to conduct the most basic communication. Even showing the card to the person the soldier is trying to communicate with may help.

4.2.2 Project Future Requirements

*Overemphasis on occupation of the Zone of Separation. [Maneuver]:

PROBLEM: Units spend so much time and effort focusing on the planning, preparation and then execution of ZOS occupation, that subsequent issues too often catch units relatively unprepared.

EXAMPLE: It is only after ZOS occupation that most units begin to consider such "A unknowns" as:

Techniques:
1. Incorporate the "A unknowns" listed above into the information requirements early in the planning phase.
2. Once the operation has begun, and the ZOS occupation is complete, continue to assess and evaluate all aspects of the plan, and make adjustments as necessary.

CTC BOS LIST

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

TA. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS continued