CTC Trends, 2QFY98 & 3QFY98

TA. 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military occupational speciality (MOS) skills. Soldiers display exceptional knowledge in military occupational speciality (MOS) skills and are extremely proficient in aircraft repairs.

(TA 7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Unscheduled maintenance. The response time for completing unscheduled maintenance on aircraft has been very good. This is due to the strong skills of the individual crew chiefs. Maintenance supervisors have taken the time to coach and teach new mechanics on proper maintenance procedures. The supervisor's presence and assistance have ensured quality maintenance performed correctly the first time. The subsequent aircraft availability rates have been a significant factor in unit training opportunities at the JRTC.

(TA 7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 3: Aircraft operational readiness. The aircraft readiness rate is being maintained well above 90% during rotations at the JRTC. This is due to the technical and tactical proficiency of the crew chiefs, maintenance personnel, and maintenance test pilots, and their determination for mission success. Commanders should continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining combat equipment in the highest readiness posture at Home Station to ensure aviation units are ready to accomplish all assigned missions. Assigning crew chiefs to specific aircraft and requiring these crew chiefs to be on site during all maintenance ensures familiarity with aircraft problems and often reduces troubleshooting and delays.

(TA 7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 4: Basic first aid and evacuation. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations continue to be a positive trend, in part because of emphasis on certified combat lifesavers at the squad and team level. In addition, platoons traditionally bring their highly skilled medics.

(TA 7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment)

TREND 5: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations at company level. CASEVAC at the company level continues to be a strength and shows the impact of Home Station training. Platoons and companies normally do an excellent job treating and evacuating casualties as far forward as the company casualty collection points (CCP). They are also well versed in requesting aerial MEDEVAC aircraft and establishing helicopter landing zones (HLZs) for extraction of casualties.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 6: Vehicle maintenance and sustainment operations. Sustainment operations are a positive trend at the JRTC. This sustainment begins with the initial coordination before deployment and continues through the actual operational sustainment during the rotation. The platoon sergeant shoulders the bulk of the sustainment operation to include all classes of supply and personnel. Unit success can be attributed to the platoon sergeant's knowledge of the supply system and rapport with the supported brigade.

(TA 7.5.2 Supply the Force)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Evacuation planning.

OBSERVATION: The forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) leader needs to develop a better working relationship with the forward support medical company (FSMC) commander, brigade S-1, brigade surgeon, and the aviation task force.

Techniques:

1. This relationship should be fostered at Home Station and exercised during redeployment field training exercises (FTXs).

2. It is the FSMT leader's job to understand the capabilities and proper implementation of aeromedical assets on the battlefield.

3. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations need to be preplanned combat missions, supplementing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for continuous evacuation of the battlefield.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 2: Medical unit application of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

OBSERVATIONS:

1. The medical task force staff and subordinate leaders often cannot define or describe military terms used routinely in the fight. For example, medical units often do not understand the significance of task organization changes when defined in terms of assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON).

2. These terms provide critical command and control relationships that give commanders both specified and implied requirements in relation to those units.

RESULTS:

1. Information is often garbled in its translation. The lack of understanding in terminology and tactics results in unclear or incorrect interpretation of operations orders.

2. Seldom do medical units use backbrief methods to ensure subordinate leaders understand the message that was conveyed.

Technique: The backbrief clarifies instructions to reduce confusion and increase clarity. Leaders must understand that words mean different things to different people based on background, experience, and setting. For example, the term "secure the building" has entirely different meanings to a policeman or to an infantry officer.

(TA 7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

TREND 3: Enemy prisoner of war operations.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. Doctrinally, Military Police (MP) are responsible for the proper handling, processing, safeguarding, and reporting of all enemy prisoner of war/civilian internees (EPW/CI). Due to limited MP assets, the brigades, at times, do not require the MP platoon to conduct EPW/CI operations.

2. The brigades do not maintain and forward the required forms (DD Form 629, Receipt of Prisoner or Detained Person; DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document; and DA Form 5976, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag or local equivalent) for EPW/CI accountability.

RESULTS:

1. The MP company performs the mission assisted by the forward support battalion (FSB), and the brigade fails to provide the division with the required information, logs, and status reports on EPW/CI.

2. Proper controls and accountability for EPW/CI are not followed.

Techniques:

1. Military Police must be involved in EPW/CI operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require at least MP supervision/guidance over the processing and reporting of EPW/CI operations.

2. The platoon should enforce the guidelines for processing EPW/CI IAW the company and division TACSOP. References: FM 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, Enemy Prisoner of War; and STP 19-95B1-SM (task No.191-376-4101).

(TA 7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)

TREND 4: Civilians on the battlefield (COB).

OBSERVATIONS:

1. Most units are unfamiliar or untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield. Problems range from the unnecessary use or display of force to permitting civilians free access to the position area and allowing them to disrupt unit activities.

2. Another common occurrence is for the unit to call battalion for guidance whenever civilians appear at the perimeter. Frequently, the battalion takes an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with civilians.

RESULTS:

1. These actions unnecessarily anger friendly/neutral civilians and allow neutral/anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the command and control (C2) nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).

2. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the battalion operations center (BOC)/fire direction control (FDC) or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.

Techniques:

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians and clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian, as well as civilians not on any list.

2. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians; train and rehearse soldiers on how to deal with COB at Home Station.

(TA 7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)

TA.6 Mobility/Survivability BOS & NBC

TA.4 Command and Control BOS

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