TA.
6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1: Trained teams.
Downed
aircraft repair/recovery teams are better trained on rigging aircraft for sling
load and accomplishing battle damage assessments and repairs.
(TA
6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
2: Survivability. Careful
management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, Class IV planning,
and improved threat analysis and awareness have contributed to improved survivability.
(TA
6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
3: Plotting chemical attacks.
Brigade
and battalion NBC personnel continually display a firm understanding of the
necessary skills required to plot chemical attacks. They possess a keen understanding
of manuals such as FM
3-3,
Chemical
and Biological Contamination Avoidance,
and FM
3-7, NBC
Field Handbook.
(TA
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TREND
4: Environmental issues.
Units
are demonstrating the capability to establish fueling and arming points quickly
and effectively. When a FARP is established, units are placing emphasis on
safety and environmental issues such as fuel spills and ammo protection. The
FARP is vital to the success of any aviation mission, and establishing and
operating a FARP quickly gives the aircraft more mission time and less refueling
time.
(TA
6.3.2.2.1 Employ Camouflage)
TREND
5: Smoke operations at the platoon level.
A
majority of platoons effectively employ large area smoke to cover the target
area. Troop-leading procedures are generally utilized, resulting in detailed
planning and soldiers being informed on the current mission. References:
FM
3-50,
Smoke
Operations,
and
FM
3-101-1,
Smoke
Squad/Platoon Operations.
(TA 6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1: Use of Air Volcano.
OBSERVATION:
The
successful employment of Air Volcano requires extensive planning and detailed
guidance. Air crews and aviation battalion planners often fail to ensure they
have all the information required for successful employment of this combat
multiplier. Air Volcano requires centralized planning and decentralized execution.
RESULT:
Aircrews
do not make the decisions required to ensure a minefield is emplaced IAW the
commander's intent.
Techniques:
1.
A number of variables must be incorporated in mission planning: -
The type of minefield to be emplaced must be defined to the aircrew.
-
The type of minefield affects such planning requirements as timelines, aircraft
load, time on target, FARP planning, flight route (number of passes over target
area), and even the ability to conduct the mission.
-
The air crew must know the type of minefield and the intent of each type of
minefield to better meet the commander's intent in the event they cannot emplace
the minefield exactly as planned once they are over a target area.
-
If a crew understands the differences between disrupt and fix verses turn and
block minefields, and understands the commander's intent for the mission, it
is more capable of making last-minute changes once on target to properly employ
the minefield.
2.
The aircrew must have a full understanding of the enemy situation and the commander's
intent for the minefield. Armed with this information, the aircrew can identify
whether they can conduct a deliberate dispensing or, if time and enemy are
an issue, a hasty dispensing. Crews can also plan on the delivery technique,
which often is tied to the commander's intent and the friendly situation. It
is imperative that flight crews emplace the mines at the right location, and
depending on the mine time settings (4hr, 48hr, 15day), the minefield must
be emplaced at the right time. Based on these factors, the delivery techniques
used may be critical to successful mission accomplishment. 3.
Air Volcano crews should be trained and familiar with the different types of
minefields which can be emplaced with Air Volcano. These types of minefields
are defined in FM
20-32, Mine/Countermine
Operations
and
FM
1-113, Utility
and Cargo Helicopter Operations.
Unit
standing operating procedures (SOPs) for Air Volcano tend to be very thorough
and identify all information required for Air Volcano missions; however, units
must follow the guidelines outlined in their tactical standing operating procedures
(TACSOPs). 4.
Use of a command and control aircraft is recommended for Air Volcano missions.
The synchronization of attack aviation, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD),
scatterable mine (SCATMINE) reports, and mission coordination can all be conducted
through a command and control (C2) aircraft. A division engineer representative
can also be located on the C2 aircraft to aid in last-minute coordination or
expertise in the event the target layout is different or battlefield situations
require changes to the planned minefield.
(TA
6.2.2.1 Emplace Mines)
TREND
2: Positioning of crew-served weapons.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of identifying enemy capabilities
and taking the necessary force protection measures to eliminate or counteract
the threats of positioning crew-served weapons. 2.
Units do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons, placing them in positions
that restrict movement and operation. 3.
Too often the crew-served weapons positions lack interlocking fires. 4.
Units fail to clear fields of fire. 5.
Units select positions with little or no consideration about dead
space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, and
hill masses that block fields of fire.
6.
Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card. 7.
Many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions
on their weapons. 8.
NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons.
RESULT:
Batteries
and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few
as three to five enemy soldiers.
Techniques:
1.
Doctrinal references: FM
6-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,
chapter 3; and STP
6-13B14-SM-TG,
pg.
3-6. 2.
Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement,
range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, positioning
crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the
terrain. 3.
Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions.
This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the
battery's occupation. 4.
Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader
battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively.
This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring
it is set up correctly.
(TA 6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
3: Battlefield framework.
OBSERVATION:
Battalions
continue to have difficulty developing a battlefield framework within which
to conduct movement-to-contact operations.
RESULT:
Most
plans focus on the close fight (killing the enemy today), but allocate insufficient
efforts on reconnaissance and security (finding the enemy for tomorrow's fight),
and the rear fight (shielding the force to sustain the fight).
Technique:
Commanders
and staffs should address the complete battlefield framework when developing
courses of action as suggested in both FM
100-5, Operations,
and
FM
7-20, The
Infantry Battalion.
(TA
6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
4: Breaching of mined/wire obstacle.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Units consistently fail to track and disseminate intelligence on known and
suspected enemy minefields, resulting in frequent losses to enemy mines and
even repetitive minestrikes in the same minefield. 2.
During the conduct of a breach, units routinely require attached engineers
to establish their own suppression and obscuration at the breach point, and
then require the engineers to secure and reduce the obstacle themselves (i.e.,
suppress, obscure, secure and reduce [SOSR] are left up to the engineers).
This is a problem, as the typical engineer unit has a limited night-fighting
capability compared with that of the infantry (engineers have fewer NVGs, no
PVS-4 on M249, no PAQ-4s). RESULT:
These
actions result is a much slower breach and many unnecessary casualties.
Techniques:
1.
Use infantry to fight to the breach site (if necessary) and effectively suppress
and obscure the site before committing the engineers. This allows the engineers
the ability to focus on the actual breach of the obstacle with bangalore, other
demolitions, or an alternate technique. 2.
If the enemy can place effective direct fire on a unit's breach site, then
the unit is not suppressing and/or obscuring adequately. If this is occurring,
a unit must take the time necessary to suppress those fires before sending
soldiers up to the breach point again. 3.
Despite success in predicting minefield locations, leaders and drivers lack
awareness of mines and do not know which routes are clear and which are not.
Part of the solution lies in the TOC and the employment of effective battle-tracking
techniques as outlined in
CALL
Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), May
97. 4.
The rest of the solution lies in dissemination. When operating in a minefield-rich
environment, all vehicles should travel with a minefield and route overlay,
and battalions should establish procedures for the routine dissemination of
overlay updates.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
5: Route clearance and sustainment.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Too many units fail to execute a sustained route clearance plan. 2.
Units often do not commit maneuver forces to destroy the enemy forces overwatching
minefields. RESULTS:
1.
Failure to execute a route clearance hampers logistics, delays casualty evacuation,
and often prevents the commander from being able to circulate the battlefield
to increase his situational awareness. 2.
Enemy forces regularly reseed minefields that are detected and cleared by friendly
units and then ignored. Technique:
A
discussion of route clearance and sustainment techniques can be found in two
articles found in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) News
From the Front!
Mar-Apr
98 issue: "Reducing
the Cost of Reducing Obstacles"
and "I
Could Have Been a Contender."
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
6: Reaction to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threats.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Most units lack a well-thought-out NBC plan. 2.
A common problem is the lack of basic NBC knowledge and a plan that delineates
actions to take on and after the attack (to include unmasking procedures).
RESULT:
Too
many units suffer NBC-related casualties because of improper actions on NBC
contact.
Technique:
FM
3-4, NBC
Protection,
provides information on NBC protection. Even though other field manuals provide
a wealth of information on NBC, Chapters 2 and 3 of FM 3-4 provide outstanding
basic information to help thought and planning processes.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
7: Force protection.
OBSERVATION:
Too
many medical units continue to underestimate the importance of force protection,
especially from indirect and direct fires.
RESULT:
The
forward support medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) teams forward support maintenance
teams (FSMTs) fail to construct survivability and fighting positions to standard.
When attempted, most neglect the task altogether.
Technique:
Units
should review FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
page 2-86; STP
21-1;
and
SMCT,
Soldiers Manual for Common Tasks
(tasks
No. 071-331-2025, No. 551-721-1352, No. 051-191-1501, No. 031-503-1004).
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
8: Survivability operations.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Individual soldiers do not know the standards for individual and crew-served
weapon fighting positions. These positions are almost always substandard and
frequently dangerous to the soldiers that occupy them. 2.
Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability and force protection
requirements outlined in FM
5-103, Survivability,
and the force protection planning process described in FM
5-114, Engineer
Operations Other Than War,
and Joint
Publication 3-10.1, Joint
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense.
3.
Frequently, units do not construct viable survivability positions for critical
systems such as artillery batteries, counterfire radars, tactical operations
centers (TOCs), signal nodes, aviation assembly areas, and ammunition transfer
points, leaving them vulnerable to ground and air attack. RESULTS:
1.
Cursory berming, rather than digging, is the norm. 2.
Camouflage measures are rarely used outside immediate tactical operations center
(TOC) areas. Technique:
Train
leaders and soldiers on survivability standards in accordance with FM
5-103, Survivability.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
9: Force protection and perimeter defense.
Protecting
the force is every leader's concern and essential to sustaining the force.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Aviation maintenance units training at the JRTC are very weak in the skills
needed for force protection. Most unit personnel do not know how to construct
fighting positions or put up triple standard concertina wire to standard. 2.
Individual and crew-served weapons positions are not completed to standard,
often lacking overhead cover. 3.
The use of obstacles is non-existent. 4.
Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.
5.
The improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.
Techniques:
1.
All leaders and soldiers should review FM
7-8, The
Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and
FM
5-103, Survivability,
for
techniques and standards for defensive measures. 2.
FM
20-3,
Camouflage,
gives leaders information about camouflage principles. 3.
Develop an assembly area plan and then continually improve force protection
measures. 4.
Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.
5.
Leaders must ensure that force protection is a priority and that the aviation
task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.
(TA
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
10: Common skills.
OBSERVATION:
A
large percentage of soldiers in medical units do not know the common skills
expected of every soldier. There is a tendency to teach the few tasks that
will be tested in a fiscal year and leave the remainder of the tasks untrained.
RESULT:
Soldiers
do not understand how to construct fighting positions, where to place fighting
positions for effective fire, how to report incidents and events, how to scan
areas for which they are responsible, or how to move through areas without
being exposed.
Technique:
Most
of the skills necessary for survival on the battlefield are contained in STP
21-1, Soldier's
Manual of Common Tasks Skill Level I (SMCT).
NCOs
and soldiers need to train those basic skills to standard and then work to
sustain proficiency.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
11: Force protection and basic soldier skills.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
Soldiers do not always apply basic combat skills (e.g., vehicle dispersion,
camouflage, cover and concealment, security at halts). 2.
Many soldiers do not know how to properly use the mine detector or the M2,
.50-cal machinegun. RESULTS:
1.
While conducting mounted patrols, MPs follow each other too closely and fail
to dismount to provide security at halts. 2.
While moving mounted and dismounted and at halts, soldiers do not seek cover
and concealment quickly enough to avoid detection and injury. 3.
Soldiers do not harden vehicles, sandbag turrets, or dig fighting positions
with appropriate overhead cover. 4.
Leaders do not employ the platoon mine detector with squads on route reconnaissance
missions. 5.
Soldiers need more NBC training across the entire spectrum of operations. Techniques:
1.
Leaders and soldiers should review, apply, and teach the techniques outlined
in FM
21-75, Combat
Skills of the Individual Soldier;
FM
19-4, Military
Police Battlefield Circulation, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations;
ARTEP19-100-10-DRILL,
Military
Police Drills;
and
STP
21-1-SMCT, Soldiers
Manual of Common Tasks
(tasks
No. 071-326-0513, No. 071-326-0502, No. 071-326-5703). 2.
Leaders must reinforce the importance of force protection and incorporate these
measures, as well as NBC, into training scenarios that require leaders and
soldiers to react to challenging, complex situations. Leaders must also continue
to train and equip squad combat lifesavers.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
12: Fighting positions.
OBSERVATION:
Signal
soldiers on retransmit (RXMT) teams are digging substandard fighting positions.
RESULT:
Due
to poor construction, fighting positions do not offer the protection from direct
and indirect fires and are frequently dangerous to the soldiers that occupy
them.
Technique:
Soldiers
must review graphic training aid
GTA
7-6-1, Fighting
Position Construction.
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
13: Perimeter defense.
OBSERVATION:
Medical
unit perimeter defense shows significant improvement. However, several shortcomings
still impact the unit's ability to defend against level one threats.
RESULTS:
1.
Soldiers do not know how to construct hasty or deliberate fighting positions.
2.
Leaders do not look at terrain to locate fighting positions at strategic points
to provide interlocking fires covering the entire perimeter. 3.
Obstacles are not covered by fire. 4.
Perimeter lighting is often used but not clearly integrated into the defense.
Techniques:
1.
Units should train and review FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
page
2-86. 2.
Review STP
21-1,
Soldier's
Manual of Common Tasks Skill Level I (SMCT)
(tasks
No. 071-331-2025, No. 551-721-1352, No. 051-191-1501, No. 031-503-1004).
(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
14: Route clearance and mine awareness.
Despite
some success in predicting minefield locations, units continue to suffer considerable
loss due to enemy mines.
OBSERVATIONS:
1.
There is a lack of minefield awareness among leaders and drivers (many vehicles
are lost in minefields that have been marked by earlier units). 2.
There is a lack of proficiency in clearing minefields and a general lack of
reaction when minefields are reported to the tactical operations center (TOC).
Despite an enemy who very predictably caches mines within 300 meters of his
minefields and overwatches with infantry, few units see a minefield as an indicator
of enemy activity. RESULTS:
1.
Units do not include minefield locations into their targeting process or commit
maneuver forces based on the presence of mines. 2.
Enemy forces regularly reseed minefields that are detected and cleared by friendly
units and then ignored. In some cases, this scenario persists for a period
of days and results in multiple mine strikes and casualties. Technique:
Commanders
should exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow
engineer leaders to analyze the situation to facilitate route clearance.
(TA
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TREND
15: Reconnaissance and security.
OBSERVATION:
Units
fail to protect the force through aggressive reconnaissance and security patrolling
during defensive preparation and patrol base activities. Only a small percentage
of the force (if any at all) is dedicated to security operations.
RESULTS:
1.
There is little analysis of terrain using observation and fields of fire, concealment
and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). The threat
goes into where to position security elements. 2.
Listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs) are normally positioned too close
to friendly elements to provide adequate early warning. 3.
Enemy stay-behind elements are able to provide overwatch of obstacles, fighting
positions, and other high-value targets with little fear of compromise. Techniques:
1.
Security operations are outlined in FM
7-10, The
Infantry Rifle Company,
pp.
2-19 to 2-22 and 5-12 to 5-14. The techniques must be applied and rigidly enforced.
2.
The first priority of work is SECURITY!
(TA
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
